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"Dr. Arthur Browne, a commentator whose influence on the development
of American admiralty law cannot be overstated."
Judge Harold R. Medina'
The first treatise on admiralty law in English was Arthur Browne's A
Compendious View of the Civil Law and of the Law of the Admiralty,
published in Dublin in 1797-99, republished in a new edition in London in
1802-03, and republished posthumously in New York City in 1840. The fact
that it was written in English guaranteed its usefulness in America, where
many attorneys and judges lacked the classical education and familiarity
with modem languages necessary to use Browne's sources. For many years
it was the authoritative commentary on admiralty law, cited by the United
States Supreme Court and used by both lower courts and practitioners. This
*Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law (New York City). While serving as a naval
officer in Newport, Rhode Island, the author was introduced to the study of eighteenth century Newport
by the late Reverend Canon Lockett F. Ballard, Twenty-Fifth Rector of Trinity Church (Newport)
(1954-72), in whose memory this piece is offered. The author's research was made possible by the
cooperation of the inter-library loan personnel and rare book curators of Fordham University, Columbia
University, St. John's University, the Houghton Library of Harvard University, and Trinity College
(Dublin). Parts of this article were delivered at the Eighteenth Annual Conference of the Northeast
American Society for Eighteenth Century Studies on October 9, 1994. Helpful comments were made on
the text by Professor Martin Flaherty, David R. Owen, Esq., Kenneth H. Volk, Esq., Professor George
K. Walker, Professor Sean P. Walsh, and my wife, Alice Quill Sweeney.
'Maryland Tuna Corp. v. M/S Benares, 429 F.2d 307, 321 (2d Cir. 1970). As will be discussed in
greater detail in Part IV, see infra notes 260-386 and accompanying text, there are more than fifty cases
in which Arthur Browne's text was used in the United States Supreme Court. There are a further 125
cases in which lower courts cited Browne's text. (These figures are necessarily somewhat imprecise
because of the failure of early courts to spell out the full names of authors and texts, as is now required
by the Bluebook). In the early decisions, Browne's text was cited authoritatively, even when it was
merely part of a string cite. In the later decisions, his text was often used by dissenting justices to indicate
their preferences for the settled law of an earlier day.
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article will review the life and writings of Arthur Browne 2 and examine the
changes in admiralty law from the eighteenth century to the present.
II
NOTES FOR A BIOGRAPHY
A. The Brownes in America
Arthur Browne was American and Irish; he was the third generation of his
family to live in America. His father and grandfather were priests of the
established church, missionaries sent to America by the Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (SPG). 3
Arthur's grandfather, the Reverend Arthur Browne, originally from
Drogheda, County Louth, north of Dublin, was born in 1699 and studied at
Trinity College in Dublin, where he received his A.B. in 1726 and his A.M.
in 1729. 4 He arrived in Newport, Rhode Island, on September 2, 1729, the
2There is no biography of Arthur Browne. One source gives the date of his birth as -1756(?)." See
III English Dictionary of National Biography 41 (1882) (hereinafter EDNB). I have not found any record
of the date or place of his birth.
A laudatory article, after first noting that Browne was one of the three teachers who contributed the
most to the teaching of law at Trinity College, asks why no detailed account of his life or bibliography
of his writings has been forthcoming. See O'Higgins, Arthur Browne (1756-1805): An Irish Civilian, 20
N. Ir. Legal Q. 255 (1969).3The SPG was established by royal charter in 1701 to provide clergy for the colonies. It was the
inspiration of Dr. Thomas Bray, who in 1698 in London had founded the Society for Promoting Christian
Knowledge (SPCK) to provide books for the missions and missionary clergy. The objects of the SPG
were, first, to furnish religious services for British people in the colonies and, second, to convert the
native people. Its work in the United States gradually ceased after the 1783 Treaty of Peace recognized
the independence of the United States. From 1702 to 1789, the SPG established 202 missions and sent
out 422 priests to the American colonies. No bishop was ever sent. Seven missions were established in
Rhode Island before the American Revolution, beginning with Trinity Church in Newport. The SPG
required each clergyman to submit a report on his mission every six months. These reports are preserved
in the archives of the SPG in London. See Midwinter, The SPG and the Church in the American Colonies,
4 Hist. Mag. Protestant Episcopal Church 70 (1935), and C. Pascoe, Two Hundred Years of the SPG
(1901). Carl Bridenbaugh takes a less benign view of the SPG, calling it "British imperialism in
ecclesiastical guise." See C. Bridenbaugh, Mitre and Scepter: Transatlantic Faiths, Ideas, Personalities
and Politics, 1689-1775, 57 (1962).
4Reverend Arthur Browne (1699-1773) was the son of Reverend John Browne, Archdeacon of
Elphin in County Roscommon. Reverend Arthur Browne was ordained in 1729 by Edmund Gibson,
Bishop of London for the SPG. The Bishop of London's jurisdiction had been extended to all of the
American colonies by King Charles I. Reverend Arthur Browne married Mary Cox of Drogheda in 1729;
shortly thereafter, the couple sailed for America. They were the parents of nine children: five daughters
and four sons. In 1730, he became Rector of King's Chapel in Providence, Rhode Island, where he
remained until 1736. (The Providence church had been founded in 1722 with the SPG's assistance; its
name was changed to St. John's in 1790.) The Providence church paid £60 per year salary, but in 1736
Queen's Chapel, Portsmouth N.H. offered a salary of £100 per year and Browne moved there.
In addition to parish duties in Portsmouth, Reverend Arthur Browne travelled to new towns in New
Hampshire and Maine. He also served as Chaplain to the Governor and Council of New Hampshire after
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same year as the philosopher George Berkeley.5 It had been Berkeley, a
member of the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge (SPCK),
and later an important member of the SPG, who had persuaded Browne to
come to America to serve a Christian people and convert the Indians. There
is no evidence, however, that Browne was to be part of the College of St.
Paul that Berkeley hoped to establish in Bermuda. After arriving in Newport,
Browne served as an occasional preacher at Trinity Church, the beginning of
a forty year relationship between the Brownes and that parish.6
There was no established church in Rhode Island, although Trinity
Church (founded in 1698) was thriving in the busy commercial center of a
colony where the majority of the inhabitants were Quakers and Baptists. In
1730, Browne and his bride moved to Providence.Six years later, he and his
family moved to Portsmouth, the capital of the New Hampshire colony,
where he served as rector at the Queen's Chapel (founded in 1732) until his
1766. Reverend Arthur Browne appears in Nathaniel Hawthorne's Tales of a Wayside Inn in the story
of Governor Benning Wentworth. A later rector (Charles Burroughs in 1857) eulogized Reverend Arthur
Browne as "faithful, revered and beloved." A collection of his sermons was published in 1757. See E.
Pennington, The Reverend Arthur Browne of Rhode Island and New Hampshire (1938), and M. Rogers,
Glimpses of an Old Social Capital (Portsmouth, N.H.) as Illustrated by the Life of the Rev. Arthur
Browne and his Circle (1923). His portrait by Copley (1757) is in the General Theological Library,
Boston.
5George Berkeley (1685-1753) was born near Kilkenny and schooled at Kilkenny College. He
received his A.B. in 1704 from Trinity College, became a Junior Fellow and earned an A.M. in 1707, was
awarded a B.D. and became an ordained priest in 1710, served as Lecturer and Preacher from 1712 to
1723, made Grand Tours of France, Italy, and the Low Countries as Chaplain in 1713-14 and again in
1716-20, became a Senior Fellow, T.C.D., in 1717, and was awarded a D.D. in 1721. In 1724, he was
appointed Dean of St. Columb's Cathedral (Derry), the second wealthiest deanery in Ireland. Thus, at a
comparatively young age, he achieved a well-paying job that did not require his presence.
In 1724 Berkeley published "A Proposal for the Better Supplying of Churches in Our Foreign
Plantations and for Converting the Savage Americans to Christianity." Berkeley's project to found a
college to accomplish these goals was doomed from the beginning because of his choice of distant
Bermuda as the site of the college and his failure to cultivate London politicians. Private funds had been
raised and appointments made, but realization required a government grant of £25,000, which, although
promised, was never paid.
Berkeley and his new wife arrived in Newport on January 23, 1729, in order to prepare a farm for the
use of the college and await the government grant. He stayed in Newport for almost three years, finally
giving up all hope of receiving the grant. During his Newport stay Berkeley wrote his philosophic
dialogue, "Alciphron," and preached often in Trinity Church and the other Rhode Island missions. On
his return to England Berkeley was appointed Bishop of Cloyne in County Cork in 1734, not considered
a wealthy bishopric in the eighteenth century church, at a salary of £2500 per year.
Berkeley's eight year effort on behalf of the Bermuda College and his writings, especially his poem
"On The Prospect of Planting Arts and Learning in America," written in 1726 and revised in 1752 with
its famous line, "Westward the course of empire takes its way," demonstrates that Berkeley was so
obsessed with the potential of America that he could easily persuade others to follow him on his mission
to save and convert America. See A. Luce, Life of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (1949), and E.
Gaustad, George Berkeley in America (1979).6See G. Mason, Annals of Trinity Church, Newport, R.I., 1698-1821 (1890), and L. Ballard, Trinity
Church in Old Newport on Rhode Island (1979) (unpublished manuscript on file with Trinity Church).
The SPG connection began in 1704 with the sending of James Honyman, a Scot, to be the second rector.
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death in 1773. He was a vigorous opponent of the enthusiastic evangelism
of Rev. George Whitefield's "Great Awakening" (1744-8) and a strong
supporter of the British Empire. This was, of course, before the American
Revolution drove many Anglican clergy out of the country. 7
Marmaduke Browne, son of Reverend Browne and father of our subject
Arthur Browne, was born in 1731 in Providence, Rhode Island; like his
father, Marmaduke was a graduate of Trinity College and a priest.8 In 1753,
while completing his studies in Dublin, Trinity Church (Newport) sought
Marmaduke's services as a schoolmaster ("catechist") for a new school
established for the parish under the will of Nathaniel Kay. Marmaduke
declined this offer, however, because it was financially unattractive.
After ordination to the priesthood by Thomas Sherlock, Bishop of London for
the SPG, on January 29, 1755, Marmaduke became an itinerant missionary in
New Hampshire, visiting Trinity Church (Newport) as a guest preacher. (The
land distance from Newport to Portsmouth is about 125 miles, at least a three
day journey in the eighteenth century.) He married Anne Franklin of Bristol,
England before they set out for America in 1755. A second offer in 1758 was
more generous, and Marmaduke moved to Newport as catechist and preacher.
In 1760, when the fourth rector, Thomas Pollen, moved to Kingston, Jamaica,
Marmaduke became the fifth rector of Trinity Church.9
The growth of Marmaduke's congregation required expansion of the
church building in 1762 from five to seven bays in order to add forty-six box
pews. The renovation also included the extension of the chancel to the street
and the addition of a striking canopied "wineglass" pulpit. Meanwhile, the
parish school flourished under Reverend George Bisset of Aberdeen,
Scotland, who had been sent over by the SPG in 1767 to assist the rector.
The town appreciated Marmaduke's learning and gentle character. He
apparently was also highly regarded in the colony because, in 1764, he was
selected to be a founding fellow of Rhode Island College (which later
became Brown University).' 0
7The oath of allegiance to the King was taken at the time of ordination to the priesthood. Refusal to
break this oath, despite Parliamentary dispensation, had caused a schism in Scotland in 1688 wherein the
"non-juring" bishops continued their own church without official sanction. On the oath problem see
generally B. Steiner, Samuel Seabury, A Study in the High Church Tradition 157-88 (1971). Many
clergy fled or were exiled during the American Revolution. Those who remained believed that the Treaty
of Peace of 1783 released them from their allegiance to George In.
8See G. Lewis, Clergymen Licensed to the American Colonies by the Bishop of London, 1745-1781,
13 Hist. Mag. Protestant Episcopal Church 129 (1944).
9Mason, supra note 6, at 119.
l°Rhode Island College was organized in 1764 in Warren, Rhode Island, the seventh college
established in the English colonies of North America. John Brown and his brothers (Nicholas, Joseph,
and Moses) led the effort to move the school to Providence, a much larger town that would eventually
succeed Newport as commercial center and state capitol. Nicholas Brown, son of the first Nicholas, gave
such a generous contribution to the school that it was renamed in his honor in 1804.
Our author, Arthur Browne, was born about 1756, either in Newport,
Rhode Island, or Portsmouth, New Hampshire. He spent his first seventeen
years in cosmopolitan Newport, a rich seaport, the capital of the Rhode
Island colony, and the seat of an admiralty court. Today, it is not necessary
to guess at the appearance of eighteenth century Newport because 350
buildings of that era still stand, including Marmaduke Browne's church, the
most elegant Georgian church in America.
The Newport of Arthur Browne's youth was a town of about 9,000
people.' t Shipping, shipbuilding, and the maritime trades were most
important. Distilling molasses into rum, brewing, cooperage (barrel mak-
ing), tanneries, butchery and meat packing, and grain milling joined the
maritime trades of ropewalks, sail-lofts, and ship's carpentry to provide
employment for the town. Vessels regularly sailed to the West Indies and to
the North American ports of New York, Philadelphia, Annapolis, and
Charleston, but less frequently to England because of Boston's dominance
of the trans-Atlantic traffic.
Newport had twenty licensed taverns, several printers (one of whom was
James Franklin, Benjamin's elder brother with whom "Poor Richard"
began his apprenticeship), portrait painters, silversmiths, and more than 120
skilled craftsmen producing high-quality furniture for ship and home. The
town supported its own Latin School and there were several other private
schools besides that of Trinity Church. A weekly newspaper, The Newport
Mercury, began publishing in 1758. Wealthy merchants, that class of
entrepreneur which was both shipowner and cargo owner, built substantial
residences furnished in the finest Georgian style.
The largest church was the Great Meeting House of the Society of Friends
(Quakers), built in 1699. In addition, there were about ten other churches of
various denominations, as well as such other handsome public buildings as
the Colony House (1736), headquarters of the Governor and Legislature
until 1843; the Redwood Library and Atheneum (1748), built in the style of
an exquisite Greek temple; and the Brick Market (1762), a combination
marketplace, office building, and lecture hall in the New England tradition.
The curse of all this prosperity and culture was slavery, a consequence of
the West Indies trade. Although tolerated in the town, slavery was not
accepted in the surrounding hinterlands. Anti-slavery, preached by the
1The census of 1774 records 9,208 inhabitants. See Census of Inhabitants of the Colony of Rhode
Island 239 (J. Bartlett ed. 1858). See generally E. Crane, A Dependent People: Newport, Rhode Island
in the Revolutionary Era (1985); C. Jeffreys, Newport: A Short History (rev. ed. 1992); and C.
Bridenbaugh, Fat Mutton and Liberty of Conscience (1974). The story of anti-slavery in Newport is told
in The Minister's Wooing (1859), the third novel by the ardent abolitionist Harriet Beecher Stowe.
Despite its subject matter, The Minister's Wooing never rivalled the success of Uncle Tom's Cabin
(1852), Stowe's first novel.
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Reverend Samuel Hopkins (1721-1803), the minister of the First Congre-
gational Church, would succeed by default after the Revolution as the wealth
and trade of the town declined; slavery would be prohibited in Rhode Island
after 1784, although it would be some years before the prohibition became
effective among Newport seafarers.
Arthur's initial studies were in the Parish School of Trinity Church, where
the curriculum included English, Latin, arithmetic, and writing. He would
surely have received further instruction from his father and grandfather.
In 1767, Arthur's mother Anne died leaving a legacy in Britain for her
son. However, litigation developed over the inheritance. To protect his son's
interest, as well as secure the parts needed to expand the organ that had been
given to the parish by George Berkeley in 1733, Marmaduke Browne, with
the permission of his congregation and the SPG, sailed for Europe in June
1769.12 In 1770, while in the course of his journey, he obtained an A.M.
from Trinity College. He also secured the requisite organ parts and the
legacy for his son.
The Rhode Island colony, founded in 1636 at Providence and in 1639 in
Newport, has been described as "the most modem ... the most entrepre-
neurial of the thirteen colonies." 13 During Marmaduke Browne's tenure as
rector of Trinity Church, Rhode Island seems to have been free of the
hot-tempered and vicious disputations among Christians that characterized
that non-ecumenical age. 14 The "problem" for Browne and the other
Anglican clergy in Rhode Island were the very numerous, wealthy, and
powerful Quakers, for whom the organization and discipline of the Church
of England were anathema. Nonetheless, he could report to the Bishop of
London that a "good harmony subsists between Churchmen and dissent-
ers," and further that "the Quakers, in particular, express their regard for the
Church from the experience they have had of the mildness and lenity of its
administration." 15
12Mason, supra note 6, at 130.
13See G. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 140 (1992). For a description of the era's
maritime affairs, see Wiener, Notes on the Rhode Island Admiralty, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 44 (1932). Wiener's
acknowledged model was Judge Charles M. Hough's Reports of Cases in the Vice Admiralty and
Admiralty Courts of New York (1925). Most of Wiener's reported cases related to prize. See also C.
Ubbelhode, Colonial Courts of Vice Admiralty (1966).
Newport gained considerable notoriety for hanging twenty-six "pirates" on July 19, 1723, at Bull's
Point "between the flux and reflux of the sea." Of the condemned men, sixteen were in their twenties
and one-half were born in England. W. Updike, Memoirs of the Rhode Island Bar 293-94 (1842). It is
a controversial point whether trials for piracy in the colonies were conducted by the vice admiralty courts
or by royal commissioners, one of whom would have been the admiralty judge. See D. Owen & M.
Tolley, Courts of Admiralty in Colonial America: The Maryland Experience 1634-1776 (1995).
14See generally S. James, Colonial Rhode Island 188-204 (1975); Crane, supra note 11; and
Bridenbaugh, supra note 11.
15Mason, supra note 6, at 113.
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Newport also had a wealthy congregation of Spanish and Portuguese
Jews, who built an imposing Georgian synagogue in 1759. There were no
acknowledged Roman Catholics, and Arthur did not meet any members of
that faith until he arrived in Ireland.' 6 Indeed, civil rights in Rhode Island,
including citizenship, the right to vote, and the right to hold public office
were denied to Jews until 1777 and to Roman Catholics until 1783.
The relative peace in ecclesiastical matters, however, did not characterize
the political relations between the colony and the mother country. Here there
was great turmoil, causing extreme distress to clergymen serving the state
and the established order. In 1765, for example, during the Stamp Act crisis,
a riot broke out and a mob besieged Augustus Johnston, the stamp master,
in his house and extorted his resignation from office. No one could be found
to replace him and the stamps were never used.
A repeat riot occurred when the Stamp Act was repealed and the former
stamp master was hanged in effigy.17 The Stamp Act controversy produced
a lively pamphlet war between patriots and loyalists in Rhode Island as to
the rights of Englishmen and parliamentary taxation of the colonies
unrepresented at Westminster.
Also in 1765, a mob burned a small boat belonging to the HMS Maidstone
and seized a junior officer in order to stop the impressment of local fishermen
into the Royal Navy. By this time, the "Sons of Liberty" were organized in
Newport and a "Liberty Tree" on Thames Street, the principal thorough-
fare, was regularly decorated. In 1769, a customs enforcement sloop, the
Liberty, was set adrift by a mob, beached, and burned. 18 Two years after this
event, just shortly after his return to Newport from Europe, Marmaduke
Browne, who had suffered frequent spells of bad health, died on March 16,
1771, just forty years old. 19 His lengthy homeward voyage of eleven weeks
was given as the reason for his failing health, fever and subsequent death.
Almost a quarter of a century after the death of his father, Arthur Browne
sent to America a marble memorial of his parents, with the likeness of his
father carved in Dublin by Edward Smyth, master carver of the sculptures on
the Four Courts (1785) and the Customs House (1791). This memorial,
installed in 1795 on the gospel (or north) side of the altar in Trinity Church,
reads in part, "In token of his Gratitude and affection to the best and
16Arthur Browne later said: "He had never seen a Roman Catholic until he was seventeen years old,
and he then soon considered him a prodigy; but he had since by interviews with many respectable men
of that sect got rid of his prejudices." O'Higgins, supra note 2, at 258 (quoting A. Browne in the House
of Commons, 12 Parl. Reg. 189). The first Roman Catholic church in Rhode Island, St. Mary's in
Newport, was founded in 1828.
17james, supra note 14, at 328-34. See also Updike, supra note 13, at 67-68, 85-87, and 128-29,
and D. Lovejoy, Rhode Island Politics and the American Revolution 1760-1776, 128-53 (1958).
18James, supra note 14, at 319.
t9 Mason, supra note 6, at 133.
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tenderest of Parents, and of his respect and Love for a Congregation, among
whom and for a place where he spent his earliest and his happiest days." 20
Arthur Browne lovingly described the scene of these earliest and happiest
days in his Miscellaneous Sketches, written in middle age, while riding out
to lonely sessions of the courts in the west of Ireland during a period of busy
practice and teaching. 2'
Now an orphan at the age of sixteen, Arthur turned to the Newport
congregation for assistance. In a letter written on May 16, 1771, while at his
grandfather's house in Portsmouth, Arthur described his plight as follows:
Dear Mr. Bours:
It seems to me most proper to write to you concerning the following affair,
both as Church Warden, and as being one of my best friends. My grandfather
declines drawing upon the Society, informing them of my father's death, of his
leaving me wholly unprovided for, by which means there was a great chance
of my losing a liberal education at home, whither my father designed to send
me. He says I may be pretty sure, if those gentlemen would be so kind as to
write (obliterated) of the Society's doing something handsome for me,
especially if they would represent me in as favorable a light as they think
proper, as a lad of some merit, who, if properly encouraged, might turn out
something.
2
oThe memorial tablet reads in full:
To the memory of the Reverend Marmaduke Browne, formerly Rector of this Parish, a man
eminent for Talents, Learning and Religion, who departed this life on the 19th of March (sic) 1771
and of Anne his wife, a Lady of uncommon Piety and suavity of Manners, who died the 6th of
January 1767.
This Monument was erected by their Son Arthur Browne, Esq. now Senior Fellow of Trinity
College Dublin in Ireland, and Representative in Parliament for the same, In token of his Gratitude
and affection to the best and tenderest of Parents, and of his respect and Love for a Congregation,
among whom and for a place where he spent his earliest and his happiest days.




The Latin phrase at the end translates, literally, as follows: "How much less it is to converse with others
[i.e., the living] than to remember you."21The following passages are typical:
The vistas through the woods, the breaks of light through the trees, with an orient sun and the
brightening sky formed a Paradise.... The face of the country was beautiful beyond descrip-
tion....
There was a midseason consisting of about six weeks or two months in Spring and as many in
Autumn, which exceeded in delight all the creations of poetic fancy.
The innocence of the people made them capable of liberty. Never in any Utopia could there be
greater freedom from crimes.... Murder and Robbery were unknown.
This obedience to the laws was fostered by religion which flourished with universal vigor.
A. Browne, Miscellaneous Sketches 195, 197, 202, 203 (1798) (hereinafter Sketches). Browne also noted
the absence of landlords, tenantry, and beggars, id. at 194, and claimed that neither poverty nor riches
were known while nobility (i.e., aristocracy) was unknown and a real equality reigned. Id. at 201.
Vol. 26, No. 1
These are his words, not mine; for not all the vanity natural to man should
induce me to write thus of myself, were it not his direction. I know your
friendship will excuse this trouble, which, notwithstanding after having
troubled you so often, I am to give you, and I hope poor Peter was recovered
before you got home. My love to Mrs. Bours.
I received Sam Bours' kind letter, and found that I must chuse a guardian,
as he says. I hope poor Mr. Bours has had no more ill turns. My compliments
to all friends. My grandfather and all the family join with me in love to you
and Mrs. Bours, and believe me always, your affectionate, humble Servant,
Arthur Browne22
John Bours, senior warden, and James Honyman, an admiralty lawyer and
son of the long-serving second rector, were appointed by the vestry to draft
a letter for its approval.
The Newport vestry did represent Arthur Browne in a "favorable light."
Its letter of May 29, 1771 to the SPG had to serve many purposes: inform
it of the death of Marmaduke Browne; request support for Arthur; approve
the selection of George Bisset, Marmaduke's assistant, as sixth rector; and,
most important, request that the mission status be continued. This last point
was extremely controversial as the parish had become very wealthy and the
money of the SPG could have been better spent on other missions. 23
While Arthur Browne and his family tried to secure the funds needed to
pursue his studies, the political struggle in the colonies became bloody. A
riot in Boston on March 5, 1770, in which belligerent townsmen taunted
British soldiers, led to bloodshed when the guard at the Old State House fired
into the mob, killing five workmen. That incident would be developed by
Samuel Adams, the genius of revolutionary communication, into "The
Boston Massacre. ' 24 Committees of Correspondence were organized in
each colony to hear and respond to Boston's claims of British tyranny and
oppression.
No further armed clashes occurred in New England, however, until a mob
from Providence attacked the HMS Gaspee, a customs schooner that had run
aground in Narragansett Bay while chasing smugglers. The commanding
officer of the Gaspee, Lieutenant William Dudingston, was wounded; he and
his crew were captured and put ashore while the mob burned the ship.25 This
event took place in June 1772, after Arthur Browne had left America for
22Mason, supra note 6, at 145-46.
23Ballard, supra note 6, at 355-63. The vestry said of Arthur Browne that he is "a lad of singular
modesty and of a capacity very rarely to be met with in one of his years" and that "very early in life
... marks of a lively Genius" were discovered.
24 See H. Zobel, The Boston Massacre 205-301 (1970).
25James, supra note 14, at 333-36, 345-51.
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Ireland to begin his studies at Trinity College. There is no evidence that he
ever returned. 26 For him, America would become a Paradise Lost.
In 1774, responding to the British government's punishment of Boston for
the December 16, 1773 "Tea Party," Rhode Island sent delegates to the
First Continental Congress, thereby joining the complete embargo on trade
with Great Britain. After the battles of Lexington and Concord outside
Boston (April 19, 1775), the British army was besieged inside the city and
the Whig Committee of Public Safety began to assume governmental
functions. By May 1775, the Newport Royal Custom House had closed and
the Sons of Liberty and other vigilantes were threatening to tar and feather
the few remaining royal officers of the Rhode Island colony. Thus, in Rhode
Island, as in Massachusetts and other colonies, the authority of the British
government withered and died.27
On May 4, 1776, the General Assembly of Rhode Island repudiated all
allegiance to King George III because "the King had entirely departed from
the duties and character of a good king." In assertion of its new indepen-
dence, Rhode Island commissioned its own privateers to capture British
shipping, restored its admiralty jurisdiction, and seized the charter and other
symbols of the crown from the last royal governor.28 The British army that
had evacuated Boston in March 1776 occupied Newport until October 1779;
after it left, a mob invaded Trinity Church and tore down the royal arms in
the chancel.29
26As Browne later explained:
... I trust I have said enough to prove there were charms in the country [America], and to show
what it is that makes every former resident in America think of it with affection, with melancholy,
and with regret; it does not follow that he should wish to return to it; the death of friends; the total
change of inhabitants within a few years; the wonderful alteration made by an intervening
revolution; his welfare in the country in which he is [Ireland]; the kindness of that country and his
obligation to it and the new ties he has formed in it, may totally eradicate such a wish from his
heart; but he will now and then cast back a look to it, as if a distant Paradise....
Sketches, supra note 21, at 210.27 James, supra note 14, at 337-51. A brilliant new study of the opening battles of the Revolution is
D. Fischer, Paul Revere's Ride 261-80 (1994). A further description of the assumption of governmental
functions by the Whig Committee can be found in J. Reid, In a Defiant Stance: The Conditions of Law
in Massachusetts Bay-The Irish Comparison and the Coming of the American Revolution 118-34
(1977). See also G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 127-61 (1969), and R.
Morris, The Forging of the Union, 1781-1789 (1987).
28james, supra note 14, at 346-47. On the Rhode Island admiralty court see Wiener, supra note 13,
at 59-62. It functioned only as a prize court from 1776 to 1780; thereafter, it became a court for "all
matters and things of a maritime nature" with trial by jury. The Second Continental Congress would call
upon the American colonies to form state governments only six days after Rhode Island declared
independence. See infra note 125, and Morris, supra note 27, at 55-79.29 N. Isham, Trinity Church in Newport, Rhode Island: A History of the Fabric 69-71 (1936).
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B. Arthur Browne's Formal Education and Legal Training
Arthur Browne had been admitted to Harvard College in 1771 for the
class of 1775, but he never studied there. 30 Provided £25 passage money by
the SPG, assured of £40 per year from his inheritance, and armed with the
basics of an eighteenth century education that he had received at home and
at the Newport parish school, he began his studies at Trinity College in
March 1772.
The curriculum included Latin, Greek, logic, philosophy, astronomy,
physics, ethics, metaphysics, and mathematics. 3' Browne became a "schol-
ar" in 1774, which should have eased his finances. He received his A.B. in
the spring of 1776; during the next year he advanced to Junior Fellow, the
first step in an academic or ecclesiastical career. 32 The year of his fellowship
was also the beginning of his legal career: in May 1777, at the age of
twenty-one, he traveled to London to join Lincoln's Inn and thereby qualify
as a barrister. Formal studies were not required of aspiring barristers-
3°EDNB, supra note 2. Harvard in the 1770s would not have been a congenial place for the clergy of
churches established by law in Great Britain and Ireland. (The Congregational church was established by
law in Massachusetts.) As Samuel Eliot Morison has noted, only 196 of 1,224, or a mere sixteen percent,
of Harvard graduates living in 1776 were "loyalists." S. Morison, Three Centuries of Harvard 147
(1936). Morison also quotes a loyalist lady's complaints about the students: "the Independancy and
Liberty with which the Youths are brought up, and indulged, makes too many of 'em proficients in
Vice." Id. at 135.
A major distraction for the students was the presence of the disorderly legislature (The Great and
General Court) in Harvard's buildings from March 1770 to March 1773, having been moved there by
Governor Hutchinson to escape the Boston mobs. Id. at 136-37. Because of the Boston Port Act of 1774
(punishment for the Boston Tea Party of December 1773), the College suspended all public ceremonies,
including commencement (which was not resumed until 1781). Id. at 145. After the battles of Lexington
and Concord, all those "unfriendly to the Liberties and Privileges of the Colonies" were dismissed. Id.
at 147. Governor John Hancock described Harvard College in 1781 as "the Parent as well as the nurse
of the late Happy Revolution." Id. at 164.
Harvard College in the 1770s consisted of about 200 students, the President, three professors, and at
least four tutors. The most recent volume of Sibley's Harvard Graduates (C. Shipton ed. 1975) ceases
with the Class of 1771, which had matriculated with fifty-six students in 1767 and graduated sixty-three
in 1771. Unlike the seventeenth century situation, Harvard College had ceased to be simply a theological
seminary as the Class of 1771 produced fifteen medical practitioners, fourteen clergymen, six lawyers,
and five schoolmasters. Arthur Browne's description of Harvard College in Miscellaneous Sketches is
sufficiently detailed to believe that he may have visited there. See Sketches, supra note 21, at 196. His
aunt Mary was married to Rev. Winwood Serjeant, Rector of Christ Church, Cambridge near Harvard
Yard.31R. McDowell & D. Webb, Trinity College Dublin, 1592-1952, 45-49, 69-73 (1982).
The Dublin of Arthur Browne's youth was the second city of the British Empire, surpassed only by
London. As the capital of Ireland it was the seat of the nearly regal court of the viceroy, the center of
shipping, industry, and luxury trades, with a vigorous intellectual life. Unlike Newport, Dublin had many
desperately poor people living in crowded, unsanitary conditions, the source of disease and crime. The
population was estimated to have grown from 128,570 in 1772 to 175,319 in 1814. See generally C.
Maxwell, Dublin Under the Georges, 1714-1830 (1936).32EDNB, supra note 2.
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merely attending the moot courts and eating the required number of dinners
in the Inn sufficed. 33 Apprenticeship or pupillage, rather than academic
study, was the preparation for lawyers in that age. 34
These years of Browne's professional preparation in Dublin and London
were the years of bloody struggle in America after the British army
abandoned Boston in 1776 and Newport in 1779. Concentration of British
forces in New York and the middle colonies indicated the possibility of a
long war or a stalemate. However, America's formal alliance with France in
1778, after the American victory at Saratoga, brought in the French forces.
This led to the surrender of the British army at Yorktown in 1781 and, two
years later, the evacuation of New York and the Treaty of Peace between
Great Britain and the United States of America.35
In Ireland, an intense though bloodless struggle preceded the achievement
of the legislative independence of the Irish Parliament from Great Britain in
1782. In that year, both parliaments repealed Poynings' Law of 1494, a
statute that required prior approval of Irish legislation by the British Privy
Council. Ireland's opportunity came as the direct result of the struggle in
America: because Great Britain had been forced to send its armies from
Ireland and the British Isles to America it no longer had the ability to enforce
the old system. 36
33See D. Hogan, The Legal Profession in Ireland, 1789-1922 (1986).
34Arthur Browne wrote humorously of the "studies" at the Inns of Court in London, where social
graces and good fellowship were more important than contingent remainders and springing uses; having
struggled to understand Coke on Littelton, then to be told that he had not studied what the law is but what
it was. Sketches, supra note 21, at 372-81. (Nevertheless, Thomas Jefferson and Joseph Story both
thrived on Coke's intricacies in their reading of law.) See also T. Ruggles, The Barrister, or Strictures on
the Education Proper for the Bar (1792), and B. Abel-Smith & R. Stevens, Lawyers and the Courts: A
Sociological Study of the English Legal System, 1750-1965, 15-27 (1967) ("In selecting their students,
the teachers placed greater emphasis on social than intellectual qualities. Students from Oxford and
Cambridge had learnt no law and the benches saw no need to repair the omission.").
Works studied in preparation for Doctor's Commons and the admiralty bar in the late eighteenth
century would have been: Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625); Bynkershoek, Quaestiones Juris
Publici and Quaestiones Juris Privati (1737); Vattel, Le Droit des Gens (1758); Valin, Nouveau
Commentaire sur l'Ordonnance de la Marine (1776); Heineccius, Elementa Juris Naturae et Gentium
(1746); Molloy, De Jure Maritimo et Navali (1676); Beawes, Lex Mercatoria Redivivia (1752); Clerke,
Praxis Supremae Curiae Admiralitatis (1743); and possibly The Black Book of the Admiralty (in Latin,
probably compiled in the fifteenth century).35 See generally 3 E. Channing, History of the United States 241-345 (1912), and J. Miller, Triumph
of Freedom 1775-1783 (1948). A British view of the American Revolution can be found in P. Mackesy,
The War for America, 1775-1783 (1964). See 8 Stat. 6 for the French alliance and 8 Stat. 80 for the
Treaty of Peace between the United Kingdom and the United States.36 See generally L. Cullen, The Emergence of Modem Ireland, 1600-1900, 193-256 (1981); R.
Foster, Modem Ireland, 1600-1972, 167-286 (1988); R. McDowell, Ireland in the Age of Imperialism
and Revolution, 1760-1801, 239-348 (1979) (hereinafter Imperialism); Smyth, The Volunteers and
Parliament, and Malcomson, The Parliamentary Traffic of this Country, in T. Bartlett & D. Hayton, Penal
Era and Golden Age: Essays in Irish History, 1690-1800, 113-61 (1979); A. Malcolmson, John Foster:
The Politics of the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy 192-208, 267- 80 (1978); M. Elliott, Partners in Revolution:
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The "Volunteers," an Irish military force made up principally of the
Protestant-landed interest, did organize in 1778, determined to redress Irish
grievances resulting from Britain's imperial trade policy. But the Volunteers
and the "Ascendancy" generally were also fearful of the possibility of
retribution, retaliation, and confiscation by the majority Catholic population
asserting its rights to ancestral lands taken by the victorious Protestants in
the seventeenth century wars. 37 While political change was in the air in the
1780s, the type of social revolution that would occur in France after 1789 did
not seem probable or even possible to "enlightened" minds in England and
Ireland. As a result, the 1798 Revolution would be a profound shock.
Having been called to the English bar, Arthur Browne returned to Dublin.
In the summer of 1779 Browne received an A.M. from Trinity College,
followed by an LL.B. in the spring of 1780 and an LL.D. in the spring of
1784. During this time he also took the first steps of his political career by
being elected to one of the college's two seats in Grattan's Irish Parliament
in 1783 (and being reelected in 1790 and 1797). He would serve continu-
ously in the Irish House of Commons until it was suppressed in 1801 by the
union with Great Britain.
Although the Irish House of Commons had been formally freed from total
English control by the repeal of Poynings' Law, it was in fact an
unrepresentative, ineffective, and corrupt body. 38 While the Irish Parliament
had achieved nominal independence, the executive (the lord lieutenant and
The United Irishmen and France 35-50, 67-74, 95-123, 197-240 (1982); J. Beckett, The Making of
Modem Ireland, 1603-1923, 223-83 (1966); The United Irishmen 74-87, 115-34, 176-96, 269-96 (D.
Dickson, D. Keogh & K. Whelan eds. 1993); R. McDowell, Irish Public Opinion, 1750-1800, 16-23,
40-50, 58-68 (1944) (hereinafter Public Opinion); D. Doyle, Ireland, Irishmen and Revolutionary
America, 1760-1820, 137-79 (1981); and Reid, supra note 27, at 135-73.
On Poynings' Law, see Note, The Empire Strikes Back: Annesley v. Sherlock and the Triumph of
Imperial Parliamentary Supremacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 593, 600 n.48 (1987) by Martin Flaherty. The
Irish legislation is in 21 & 22 Geo. 3, ch. 47.37See 1 J. Froude, The English in Ireland 277-81 (1881). Froude's anti-nationalist views led to
controversy with W. E. H. Lecky. See W. Lecky, Ireland in the Eighteenth Century, selections from his
eight volume The History of England in the Eighteenth Century 17-26, 29-36 (L. Curtis ed. 1972)
(1890). Lecky, a graduate of Trinity, eventually would represent Trinity College in the British Parliament
at Westminster. An opponent of nineteenth century Home Rule, he nevertheless disapproved of the 1801
Act of Union.
Fear of Catholics may have been absorbed by Arthur Browne from colleagues and students at Trinity
College, but it is not evident in his mature writings, except for his first published piece on the Treaty of
Limerick in 1788. The closest he comes to a religious discussion was when he wrote, "I am a sincere
Protestant. I know the errors of the Church of Rome, but what imports it to me whether a man calls
himself a Protestant or Papist if he violates every law of Charity, Humanity and Christianity? I detest him
equally." Sketches, supra note 21, at 5 (end notes). See also infra note 52.
38There were 300 members of the House of Commons. Of these, 234 came from 117 boroughs and
cities, sixty-four from the thirty-two counties, and two from Trinity College (elected by students and
fellows.) See J. Lee, Grattan's Parliament in the Irish Parliamentary Tradition 149-60 (B. Farrell ed.
1973).
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the ministers) was not responsible to the Irish Parliament but rather to the
ministry in power in London. (Criticism of the acknowledged unrepresen-
tative nature of the Irish House of Commons in no way implies that the
English House of Commons was any better in the days of the "rotten
boroughs.")
Arthur Browne's political activity was accompanied by further advance-
ment at Trinity College: Junior Proctor in 1784 and Regius Professor of
Civil and Canon Law in 1785. While holding this chair he gave the lectures
that subsequently formed the basis of the book with which we are concerned.
These lectures were very popular with his devoted students and his faculty
colleagues considered that he had set a new precedent by taking seriously the
duties of his chair of law.39
In 1784, Arthur Browne began active practice in his specialties, civil law
and admiralty, the subject matter of Doctors' Commons in England. He
began as an advocate (barrister) in the courts of delegates, prerogative,
admiralty, and consistory. His practice was further enhanced by his
appointment as Vicar General of the Diocese of Kildare, where he was judge
of the diocesan court dealing with marriages, wills, and ecclesiastical
disputes. This was undoubtedly a lucrative appointment.
In 1792, Browne's advanced studies in Greek resulted in his appointment
as Regius Professor of Greek, a position he held from 1792 to 1795, 1797 to
1799, and 1801 to 180 5 .40 The high point of his academic career was his
election in 1795 as Senior Fellow, thereby making him a member of the
governing body of Trinity College. Today, a portrait of Browne as Senior
Fellow hangs in the Provost's House of the college.
In his legal career, Arthur Browne continued to accumulate the honors of
his profession, becoming King's Counsel in 1795 and, in 1803, Bencher of
King's Inn (Dublin) and Prime Serjeant.4' His appointment as the last holder
39McDowell & Webb, supra note 31, at 81. An unsigned obituary noted that "For many years no
person in the university was more beloved than dr. Browne-he was the idol of the students-they loved
him with the affection of fond children, for he strove to retain their affections by a suavity of temper
peculiarly his own." Hibernian Mag., Oct. 1805, at 599.
4°His published studies on the classical Greek language included "Strictures on Lord Monboddo" in
Sketches, supra note 21, at 259-99, and Some Observations Upon the Greek Accents (1800). He also
published short pieces in the Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy.
41The Prime Serjeant was the superior officer of a group of barristers with the exclusive right to appear
in the Court of Common Pleas, the principal royal court. The name supposedly derives from the Knights
Templar that had a special group offratres servientes; the latin servientes having become "serjeants" in
English. These knights established Temple Church (London) in the twelfth century. Later, the inns of
court surrounding the church would become the Inner Temple and the Middle Temple, today the
chambers of barristers. At one time judges were chosen exclusively from the serjeants, but this monopoly
was lost as the larger order of barristers developed. The "serjeants at law" were dissolved in 1877 in
England. See generally T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 220-39 (5th ed. 1956). For
a history of the serjeants in Ireland at an earlier time, see Hart, The King's Serjeant At Law in Tudor
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of the office of Prime Serjeant resulted in occasional service as a judge at the
assizes on circuit, an indication that his career would eventually be capped
by a senior judgeship. This, however, was never to be. On June 8, 1805,
Arthur Browne died from a sudden illness described as "dropsy" (edema
due to kidney disease or congestive heart failure) at the early age of 49,
leaving a wife and five children. Three days later, the students and faculty of
Trinity College, gowned in academic robes and bearing the symbols of
academic achievement, accompanied his body from his home on Clare
Street, near the east end of the college yard, to its resting place in Saint
Anne's churchyard. 42
C. The Political Career of Arthur Browne (1783-1801)
Arthur Browne entered political life as a representative of Trinity College,
a Whig43 in the sense in which the term "Whig" had developed in
England, 44 America,45 and Ireland:46 that good government resulted from a
Ireland, 1485-1603, in Serjeants and Attorneys: Studies in the History of the Irish Legal Profession (D.
Hogan & W. Osborough eds. 1990).42The foregoing description comes from an unsigned obituary that appears in Faulkner's Dublin
Journal, June 11 and 13, 1805. Browne's first wife was Marianne, by whom he had a daughter, MTB
(Marianne). The first volume of Miscellaneous Sketches is dedicated to his daughter MTB and the second
to the memory of his first wife.
43Use of the terms "Whig" and "Tory" to contrast political viewpoints arose during the long reign
of Charles II (1660-83) and refer to conflicting attitudes towards the personal government of the
sovereign.
The Whigs controlled English politics through the reigns of George 1 (1714-27) and his son George
I (1727-60), largely because the Tories had been compromised by connections with the Stuarts, exiled
in 1688 to France and later to Rome; the two Stuart intrusions in Scotland in 1715 and 1745 and the
support of the Stuarts by Louis XIV and Louis XV of France having confirmed the suspicion of foreign
influences on the Tories. See B. Williams, The Whig Supremacy (1962).
44See L. Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution 358- 418 (2d ed. 1961); L. Namier,
The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George I1 (1929); E. Smith, Whig Principles and Party
Politics: Earl Fitzwilliam and the Whig Party, 1748-1833, 36-51, 85-113, 117-122 (1975); F.
O'Gorman, The Whig Party and the French Revolution (1967); and L. Mitchell, Charles James Fox and
the Disintegration of the Whig Party, 1782-1794 (1971).45Many delegates to the First Continental Congress (1774-75) thought of themselves as Whigs. They
were empire loyalists when confronted by the French and Spanish, but did not hesitate to coerce the
British Parliament into redressing their economic grievances. Leaders of this Whig group were John
Hancock, John Adams, and Samuel Adams of Massachusetts and Patrick Henry and Richard Henry Lee
of Virginia. "No taxation without representation" was their battle cry, to be picked up ten years later in
Ireland.
The Second Continental Congress (1775-81) did not meet until after the battles of Lexington and
Concord and the beginning of the siege of Boston; nevertheless, more than a year of debate ensued before
the decision on independence was taken, by which time the Whigs of 1774 had become revolutionaries.
Whig ideology developed out of conflict with the royal influence in the ministries: "Rise of an
arbitrary power in the midst of deepening corruption was an only too reasonable and too familiar story
told a hundred times over in the pages of Bolingbroke, Trenchard, Gordon, Molesworth, Rapin and
Sidney." B. Ballyn, Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 306 (1967). See also J. Miller,
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contract between the ruler and the subject, and that the safeguard of the
liberties of the citizen was to be found in a mixed government of
monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements. In Parliament Browne
would become the "America" expert, interpreting the changes in the land of
his birth to the politicians of his adopted home.
After twenty-three years of the reign of George III and his attempts to
control the British Parliament through "influence," the Whig movement in
all three countries would agree on a common principle: "power of the crown
has increased, is increasing and ought to be diminished." 47 Genuine
economic conflict with England also contributed to Whig principles in
America and Ireland and may even have been the cause. When it came to the
use of military force, the Whigs opposed the King's policy in America. After
the British army made war on the Americans, however, the Whig attitude
towards the war was at best a detached indifference, in contrast to the
bellicose Tories who would pursue war with America to the bitter end. Whig
detachment ceased when war with revolutionary France began in 1793, and
the English and Irish Whig parties shattered on the question of support for
the French Revolution. Some Whigs would join with Edmund Burke in
support of the war against regicide France.48
Browne's attitude towards Ireland, the adopted land he served for almost
a quarter of a century, is difficult to disentangle from his attitude towards
England, a land he respected for its Constitution, established church, and
enlightenment, but distrusted because of its intolerance of the Irish people
and control of the Irish economy, especially its foreign trade. 49 It should be
pointed out that Browne was interested in early Irish history and studied it
Origins of the American Revolution 165-97, 445-56, 497-505 (rev. ed. 1959); G. Guttridge, English
Whiggism in the American Revolution (1963); W. Benton, Whig Loyalism: Political Ideology in the
American Revolution (1969); Wood, supra note 27, at 3-45; and R. Gummere, The American Colonial
Mind and the Classical Tradition: Essays in Comparative Culture 97-119 (1963).
461reland, with its overwhelming Catholic majority of landless, disfranchised peasantry, was quite
unlike England with a large, Protestant majority in a highly complex class structure. Royal patronage had
been used to control the Irish parliament long before George III used the same tactics to buy the loyalty
of the King's friends in England.
One mystery of Irish history for twentieth century scholars is how the narrow Protestant oligarchy,
looking out for its own interests, nevertheless developed a Whig ideology (supporting constitutional
principles and Irish interests opposed to the principles and interests of Protestant England) in writers and
politicians like Molyneux, King, Swift, Lucas, Burke, and Grattan. See generally J. Beckett, Protestant
Dissent in Ireland, 1685-1780 (1946); F. James, Ireland in the Empire, 1688-1770, 80-87 (1973); C.
O'Brien, The Great Melody: A Thematic Biography of Edmund Burke (1992); and M. Elliott, Wolfe
Tone, Prophet of Irish Independence (1989).47john Dunning (a Shelbume Whig) made this resolution, which was carried in the Westminster
Parliament by a vote of 233 to 215, on April 6, 1786. See generally O'Brien, supra note 46, at 212-13.
48See id. at 501-03; Mitchell, supra note 44, at 153-238; and O'Gorman, supra note 44, at 90-173.
49 Browne wrote, "The English Constitution does not object to virtue - it rejoices in it: But its
wisdom is, that it can abstract from virtue - it has provided for its absence, and depends more upon
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at a time when Irish history and language had not yet become subjects of
academic interest. 50
As an enlightenment Whig, Browne was greatly interested in public
education 5' and the protection and encouragement of his spiritual and
intellectual home, Trinity College. As the great-grandson, grandson, and son
of clergymen of the established church, his favorable attitude toward
"tithes" is not difficult to understand, despite its violation of Whig
principles.52
In other public issues, Browne was interested in the possibilities of
farming cooperatives and examining the problems of Irish land tenures, an
issue that Ascendancy politicians would regard as very dangerous. 53 He
viewed all of these potential changes, however, through the lens of their
effect on the welfare of the Protestant-landed interest, which he considered
to be the backbone of the Constitution.
We do not find Arthur Browne's name in the list of fifty-six barristers and
solicitors among the 425 names in the Dublin Society of United Irishmen in
the 1790s. 54 While he might have supported its goal of the inclusion of
conflicts of parties and the balancing of powers to produce its salutary ends." Sketches, supra note 21,
at 233.
Browne's views on the connection of Ireland to England may have resembled those of Edmund
Burke, who wrote, "I cannot conceive how a man can be a genuine Englishman without being at the same
time an Irishman... [and] I think the same sentiments ought to be reciprocal on the part of Ireland."
Dickson, Keogh & Whelan, supra note 36, at 103.
A last speculation is that Browne would have agreed with John Adams, Whig revolutionary yet
admirer of natural aristocracy and second President of the United States (1797-1801), that England's
constitution, "the best, the most equal, the freest in the world," had created a democracy disguised as
a monarchy. See Wood, supra note 27, at 48.
5 Imperialism, supra note 36, at 153-54. Arthur Browne died before the first Gaelic Society was
organized in Dublin in 1807. The teaching of the Irish language had begun informally in Trinity College
in the late seventeenth century to preach the reformed religion to the people, but had lapsed in the
eighteenth century when it was thought that it might soon disappear. The first professorship in the Irish
language was set up in the Divinity School in 1846. See McDowell & Webb, supra note 31, at 9-10,
189-191.5 1Imperialism, supra note 36, at 94, and Public Opinion, supra note 36, at 40, 116, 232.52See O'Higgins, supra note 2, at 258-59; Public Opinion, supra note 36, at 123-24; and Froude,
supra note 37, at 481. The tithe was a charge upon the produce of certain agricultural lands paid to support
the clergy of the established church. In Ireland it was not owed by the Protestant landowners but rather
by the Roman Catholic tenant. The "Tithe War" of 1831-38 and the disestablishment of the Church of
Ireland in 1869 brought an end to the tithe system.53See Public Opinion, supra note 36, at 123-25; Imperialism, supra note 36, at 523-24; and Froude,
supra note 37, at 479.
54McDowell, The Personnel of the Dublin Society of United Irishmen 1791-94, 2 Ir. Pol. Stud. 12-53
(1940-41). The Society was suppressed by the Irish government in May 1794 but continued as a secret
society into the early nineteenth century. It was made up of members of all religious traditions who
realized that division of the people on religious grounds could only assist the oppressor.
In the ritual of the United Irishmen, the questions and answers used to identify fellow members were:
Q. What have you got in your hand?
Browne 75January 1995
76 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce
Irishmen of every religious persuasion in government, French republican-
ism-with its abolition of tithes and confiscation of church lands (let alone
the cult of the Supreme Being)-would have repelled him.
Nevertheless, the keystone of his parliamentary career and practice was
devotion to civil liberties.55 Relief of Roman Catholics from legal oppres-
sion was one of the interests Browne vigorously supported. 56 This was an
elusive goal, for despite partial success-such as the repeal of restrictions on
the practice of the professions by Catholics, ownership of property, and the
grant of the vote in parliamentary elections, together with the establishment
of the Roman Catholic college at Maynooth-Grattan's Parliament could
not achieve parliamentary equality for Catholics because a Roman Catholic
could not be a member of the Irish Parliament. 57
A. A green bough.
Q. Where did it first grow?
A. In America.
Q. Where did it bud?
A. In France.
Q. Where are you going to plant it?
A. In the crown of Great Britain.
T. Pakenham, The Year of Liberty: The Story of the Great Irish Rebellion of 1798, frontispiece (1969).55McDowell & Webb, supra note 31, at 81 ("he courted ministerial displeasure on more than one
occasion by standing up for civil liberties."). The unsigned obituary in The Hibernian Magazine, supra
note 39, said: "[He] used the most vigorous intellectual efforts to protect the liberty of the subject against
the encroachments of power and oppression. His countrymen will not readily forget the zeal with which
he protected the freedom of the press, that grand bulwark of our liberties."561t is uncertain how vigorously the penal laws of 1690-91 against Roman Catholics were being
enforced throughout Ireland by the time Arthur Browne arrived in 1772. Nominal conformity to the
established church was one method of evasion. The growth of a Roman Catholic merchant class would
also lead to the end of economic persecution. The unsigned obituary that appeared in The Hibernian
Magazine, supra note 39, commented that on "Catholic emancipation and the suspension of the habeas
corpus, he exerted himself to the astonishment of every one who heard him." See also Imperialism, supra
note 36, at 414-15.
The Irish Parliament never admitted practicing Roman Catholics to membership, and in fact
membership of Catholics in the United Parliament at Westminster was not achieved until 1829. Religious
censuses of eighteenth century Ireland are based on questionable estimates. In 1834, before emigration
and famine affected the numbers, a census showed that of a total population of 7,943,940, there were
6,427,712 Roman Catholics (81%), 852,064 Church of Ireland adherents (11%), and 642,356 Presbyte-
rians (8%). First Report of the Commissioners of Public Instruction, Ireland (1834).57British Catholics had received concessions lifting ancient prohibitions in 1791 as Catholicism and
French imperial policies were no longer synonymous because of French republican hostility to the
Roman Catholic church. Efforts at Catholic relief in the Irish Parliament in 1793 were still controversial
because of seventeenth century Protestant confiscation of Catholic land, but in that year the franchise in
parliamentary elections (subject to property qualifications) was extended to Roman Catholics, together
with the right to hold all civil and military offices (with the exception of the highest state offices, high
court judicial appointments, and the office of sheriff). The right to take degrees at Trinity College and to
keep and bear arms (subject to an oath of allegiance) also were extended. An unexpected consequence
of the repeal of anti-Catholic legislation was the rise of the Orange Order (1795).
Prior to the establishment of Maynooth College in 1795 to train men for the Roman Catholic
priesthood, it was necessary for aspirants to be sent to France to study and even to be ordained. In the
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Nationalist Ireland became convinced that Grattan's Irish Parliament was
incapable of leading the way into a democratic and just society. The majority
Catholic population, rendered landless by confiscation in the seventeenth
century, was muzzled or muted by threats of Protestant persecution in the
eighteenth century. Catholic businessmen would find a strong public voice
in the 1790s in the Catholic Committee, served by the pen of Wolfe Tone,
while Arthur Browne, descended from priests of the established church,
spoke out vigorously in favor of Catholic emancipation.
During the war with France, Arthur Browne responded to the direct threat
of a French invasion at Bantry Bay by organizing and leading a corps of
Trinity College students and fellows.58 The 1798 Revolution, however,
brought confrontation between British suppression of armed rebellion with
great violence and the civil rights of those accused of treason and other
crimes. Browne was strongly opposed to martial law and the trial of political
prisoners by courts martial while the King's courts remained open. 59 In this,
his constitutional views were similar to those of John Philpot Curran,
defense counsel to the United Irishmen leaders in the summer of 1798 and
later counsel to Wolfe Tone.
Tone, wearing a French uniform, had been captured at the battle between
English and French warships in Lough Swilly on October 12, 1798. Taken
to Dublin and charged with treason, Tone was tried by court martial on
Saturday, November 10, 1798, found guilty, and condemned to be hanged on
Monday. On Sunday, Tone attempted to take his own life. At the first
opportunity, Curran brought the writ of habeas corpus to free Tone from
military custody. It was granted on Monday morning, November 12, by
Chief Justice Kilwarden (Arthur Wolfe) before the scheduled 1 p.m.
execution. In the meantime, the execution was postponed, to the dismay of
early eighteenth century Protestants viewed this French training as treasonable because of French support
for the dethroned House of Stuart. By the end of the century it was fear of French republicanism and
deism that compelled the Protestant regime to keep young Irishmen at home for their priestly training and
ordination.
58The French fleet of forty-three vessels with 16,000 troops appeared off Bantry Bay in December
1796 under the command of General Hoche. Contrary winds and violent weather prevented any landing
in force, but the country was aroused to the danger of revolutionary France using Ireland to distract the
British from the war in Europe. Arthur Browne was unanimously elected Captain Commandant of the
Trinity College Corps (consisting of 300 men). He then studied military strategy and tactics which he
condensed into a thirty-five page booklet which he reproduced in Miscellaneous Sketches as "Extrac-
tions from Guibert." See Sketches, supra note 21, at 319-54. His association with the corps continued
until his death.59Imperialism, supra note 36, at 597. During the 1798 debate on martial law Browne observed that
public opinion had lost interest in parliamentary proceedings. See infra text accompanying note 70.
The American case that states this principle is Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). In a
broad opinion, the Court ruled that a military commission could not try and convict civilians in Indiana
on charges of conspiracy to commit treasonable conduct while the civil courts remained open.
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the Earl of Clare, because the suicide attempt had left Tone too weak to
stand. When Tone died from his self-inflicted wound a week later, the
question of the validity of courts martial while the civil courts were still open
was left unanswered. 60 Several years later, on July 26, 1803, Kilwarden was
murdered on a Dublin street during the unsuccessful uprising led by Robert
Emmet, fianc6 of the daughter of John Philpot Curran.
The revolution of 1798 brought an official effort to purge Arthur Browne
from Trinity College because of his Whig beliefs, forcefully expressed.
There had been a brawl in the college involving two scholars who, if not
members, were at least sympathetic to the United Irishmen. The two scholars
were expelled over the vigorous protest of Browne as Senior Fellow. This
incident was one of the factors in the decision to have a "visitation," or
purge, of the college by John Fitzgibbon, the Earl of Clare, Vice Chancellor
of the College, and Lord Chancellor of Ireland. He was also the leader of the
Tory party's right wing and a strong supporter of the connection, even
subservience, to England. While Arthur Browne was one of the targets of
Fitzgibbon's persecution, the end result was simply a public rebuke, in
contrast to the expulsion of twenty undergraduates and the censure and
degradation of two Fellows. 6 1
D. The Union of the Kingdoms of Ireland and Great Britain
There can be little doubt that Arthur Browne's reputation as an Irish
patriot suffered in the eyes of nationalist Ireland in the nineteenth century
because, between January 1799 and February 1800, he changed his mind
about the union of Ireland and Great Britain. 62
6°EIliott, supra note 46, at 392-402. Tone's trial is reported in 27 T. Howell, A Complete Collection
of State Trials 616-26 (1809).6t McDowell & Webb, supra note 31, at 76-78. The unsigned obituary in The Hibernian Magazine,
supra note 39, noted:
Nor were his [Arthur Browne] principles confined within the walls of parliament; he avowed them
out of doors, and his ingenuous avowal soon roused the suspicious and petulant indignation of lord
chancellor Clare, who when he visited the university in 1798, thought proper to direct insinuations
against the character of dr. Browne. But the fair fame of a just senator was not tarnished by the
aspersions of a statesman who libelled every one that chanced to hold an opinion different from his
own; it was too strong to break at the feeble blast of a black inquisitor, and it happily survived his
utmost malevolence.... He [Browne] was a professed enemy to the abuse of power, and always
stood forward the champion of the people, when measures were proposed in the house of commons,
which he conceived injurious to their rights or prejudicial to their interests.62The essential study is G. Bolton, The Passing of the Irish Act of Union (1966). The Irish legislation
is in 40 Geo. 3, ch. 38; the English legislation is in 39 & 40 Geo. 3, ch. 67. See also A. Browne, Remarks
on the Terms of the Union (1800), and Anonymous, Some Documents relative to the late Parliamentary
Conduct of Doctor Browne, Representative in Parliament for the University of Dublin (1800). Cf. J.
Barrington, The Rise and Fall of the Irish Nation (1833). A cynical view of the January 1799 negative
vote is that it was merely for the purpose of raising the price to be paid for the February 1800 vote.
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In January 1799, with what was left of the Whig party, Browne
successfully opposed the suppression of the Irish parliament and the union
of the Irish church and state with Great Britain. His colleagues at the bar and
in the university were similarly opposed to the union and remained so after
Browne changed his mind. The question is whether his 1800 vote was
bought in exchange for office, preferment, or cash. Browne always denied
the charge.
In 1783, when Arthur Browne entered political life, there was some hope
that Ireland, beginning to control her own destiny, could resolve her
economic and social problems. By 1798, "risings" of the United Irishmen
had occurred and had been suppressed with great violence by the Irish
government and the British military. The bloodshed at Wexford and Antrim,
together with the unsuccessful French invasion in Mayo, would shatter the
dreams of the United. Irishmen for a new Irish nation undivided by religion
or class. An occupying army, eventually composed of 100,000 troops,
executed the Protestant and Catholic leaders of the United Irishmen and
probably killed 30,000 Irish Catholic peasants. The British military presence
also ended the possibility of independence achieved with the assistance of
French allies. In 1798, the Year of Liberty had become the year of crushing
defeat. 63
William Pitt, the British Prime Minister, 64 with an unshakable majority in
the British parliament, had determined that the only way to prevent a
recurrence of rebellion in Ireland was the union of the kingdoms and the
suppression of the Irish parliament. To carry out this policy Cornwallis and
Castlereagh in Ireland were instructed to press the matter until it carried, no
matter how often defeated; thus, the proposal's defeat in January 1799 was
merely the first skirmish in a long campaign.
Pitt's solid Tory majority at Westminster meant that his only difficulty in
achieving the union would come from the corruptible Irish House of
Commons, which was expected to be "bought off" in the traditional manner
(by titles, jobs, honors, and cash). To unify the kingdoms, forty-eight
peerages, along with government jobs, military appointments, ecclesiastical
promotions, and a cash outlay of £1,260,000 (to compensate the owners of
63Pakenham, supra note 54, at 263-97. A splendid novelistic treatment of the 1798 rising is T.
Flanagan, The Year of the French (1979).
64William Pitt the Younger (1759-1806), originally a Whig like his father the Earl of Chatham,
became Prime Minister in 1783 at age twenty-two. By 1796, he had become the symbol of implacable
Tory opposition to the French Revolution and its "Reign of Terror." After the 1796 election he could
regularly count on 250 votes, more or less, opposed by only ninety Whig votes, more or less. The
opposition Whig party had shattered after the split between Edmund Burke and Charles James Fox over
the French Revolution in 1791. Pitt served as Prime Minister for twenty-two of his forty-seven years. See
generally 2 J. Ehrman, The Younger Pitt (1983); K. Feiling, The Second Tory Party 1714-1832 (1959);
and O'Brien, supra note 46, at 484-96, 501-03.
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pocket boroughs) were used to change the negative vote of January 1799 to
an affirmative decision in February 1800.65 Accordingly, on January 1, 1801,
the Irish parliament ceased to exist and a new Union Parliament at
Westminster began the unhappy experience of attempting to govern both
kingdoms.
The change of mind of the Irish Commons was not, however, a simple
matter of massive bribery. One-fifth of the membership of the House of
Commons had changed in the intervening year, and the disorganized Irish
Whigs had no hope that the entrenched Tory ministry in London could be
replaced in the foreseeable future by the English Whig party, which was
fractured by war and revolution. Although nineteenth century nationalist
Ireland chose to believe that only massive corruption could have persuaded
the Irish parliament to agree to its final dissolution, twentieth century
scholars view the efforts of Castlereagh as a simple continuation of the
methods traditionally used to control the fractious and disputatious parlia-
ment.66
65The political task of obtaining the consent of the Irish Parliament to its own destruction (without an
election on the issue) was handled by Lord Charles Cornwallis (1738-1805), the Viceroy, whose
reputation as the general who had surrendered the British army to George Washington at Yorktown in
1781 had been resuscitated by successes as Governor General in India (1786-93). Having sold the union
on the expectation of Catholic emancipation in the unified parliament, where Catholics would be a
smaller percentage of the general population, he resigned in 1801 when George III refused to consent to
Catholics in the Westminster Commons because of an imagined derogation from his coronation oath to
support the Protestant faith.
The actual details of changing the 1799 negative vote into the 1800 affirmative vote were handled by
the Chief Secretary, Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh (1769-1822). A Dublin-born politician who
possessed estates in Ulster as the Marquis of Londonderry, Stewart served in the Irish House of
Commons from 1790 to 1801. Like Cornwallis, he resigned his Irish office on the King's refusal to carry
out Catholic emancipation. Castlereagh subsequently had a brilliant career in the Westminster Parliament
as leader of the House of Commons (1812-22) and the successor of Pitt as fierce opponent of Napoleon
(whom he exiled to Saint Helena). In despair and stressed beyond endurance, he cut his throat and died
as his domestic policies were being successfully challenged. See J. Derry, Castlereagh (1976), and I.
Leigh, Castlereagh (1951). Castlereagh described his task, "to buy out and secure to the crown for ever,
the fee simple of Irish corruption."
Cornwallis described the purchase of the Irish parliament in equally colorful terms, "My occupation
is to negotiate and job with the most corrupt people under heaven. I despise and hate myself every hour
for engaging in such dirty work, and am supported only by the reflection that without a union the British
Empire must be dissolved." 3 Froude, supra note 37, at 501.
Somerville [& Ross] absolve Browne of corruption in An Incorruptible Irishman: The Life of Charles
Bushe 122 (1932): "He [Plunket] began by falling upon the apostasy of Dr. Arthur Browne, an
American, member for the Dublin University, who having been a violent anti-Unionist, had recently been
moved.., by sincere conviction to change his opinion. Having demolished the unhappy Browne with a
completeness worthy of Attila the Scourge of God, Plunket proceeded to lay bare the past history of...
the wicked plot of the union."
66"The anti-unionists then failed to sustain their [1799] victory because they were unable to agree on
any constructive alternative to union, owing to the conflicting elements on their side. This failure, and not
corruption, ensured the Government's eventual victory.... The Government's majority in 1800 was
principally secured from interests which had hitherto stood neutral." Bolton, supra note 62, at 218-19.
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Jonah Barrington, sometime admiralty judge, gossip, and raconteur of
eighteenth century foibles to a righteous nineteenth century audience, had
lists of those members of parliament who could be bought (and their price)
and those who could not be bought. He viewed Browne's change of vote as
"one of the most unexpected and flagitious acts of public corruption." 67 The
modem historians of Trinity College, however, take a different view.
Professors McDowell and Webb say:
On the question of the Union he (Arthur Browne) hesitated for some time, but
at the final vote, although he realized that most of his constituents took a
contrary view, he came down in favour of it from a conviction that it gave the
best promises of peaceful progress for Ireland.
They conclude that the only thing Arthur Browne received for his affirmative
vote for the Union was the loss of his seat in Parliament.68
But there was another reason for Arthur Browne's change of mind: public
opinion. Cornwallis had reported the blood-thirsty attitude of the Irish-
Protestant Parliament in 1798 as "averse to all acts of clemency" and
described its policy as one that "would drive four-fifths of the community
67Barrington, supra note 62, at 460. Barrington in full wrote:
One of the most unexpected and flagitious acts of public corruption was that of Mr. Arthur Brown
(sic), member for the University of Dublin. He was by birth an American, of most gentlemanly
manners, excellent character, and very considerate talents. He had by his learning become a senior
fellow of the University, and was the law professor. From his entrance into Parliament he had been
a steady, zealous and able supporter of the rights of Ireland-he had never deviated; he would
accept no office; he had attached himself to Mr. Ponsonby, and was supposed to be one of the truest
and most unassailable supporters of Ireland.
In the session of 1799 he had taken a most unequivocal, decisive, and ardent part against the
Union, and had spoken against it as a crime and as the ruin of the country: he was believed to be
incorruptible. On this night he rose, crestfallen and absorbed at his own tergiversation; he recanted
every word he had ever uttered-deserted from the country-supported the Union-accepted a
bribe from the Minister-was afterwards placed in office, but shame haunted him-he hated
himself: an amiable man fell a victim to corruption. He rankled, and pined, and died of a wretched
mind and a broken constitution.
In his list of rewards to barristers, Barrington wrote "Mr. Arthur Browne, Commission of Inspector 800
£ per annum." That same list notes two rewards of £5000 per annum; eight rewards of £3300 per annum;
one of £1200 per annum; fifteen judgeships with rewards of £600 apiece per annum; two commissions
of inspection (like that of Arthur Browne) at £800 per annum; an office in the chancery at £500; an office
in the custom house at £500; and a secret pension at £400.
68McDowell & Webb, supra note 31, at 81. The obituary in Faulkner's Dublin Journal, supra note 42,
said:
Upon the great question of Union, he thought (as he always thought for himself) that it was the only
measure which promised security to the Constitution in Church and State and tranquillity to the
Country-on these grounds he acted, and though assailed with the most incessant and virulent
calumny, by an active and malignant party, he gave to the measure of Union, the full support of his
vote and his talent.
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into irreconcilable rebellion." 69 Not only did the Irish Parliament make no
effort to remedy any of the grievances of the majority of the population, it
was willing to substitute martial law and military government for civil
liberty. Thus, Arthur Browne came to believe that the Irish Parliament had
forfeited the confidence of the people. He said so clearly in a memorable
speech in the Irish House of Commons:
Had I seen, after the rejection of the union last year [1799], any measures
brought forward to conciliate the people, to heal the distractions of the country,
had I seen any reminiscence of that spirit, which produced the constitution of
1782, coming forward to preserve it, I should not have listened to proposals of
union. But for gentlemen to suppose that if Parliament does not support itself
it can be supported; to suppose that, without domestic virtues, the nation will
trouble itself about its existence, is absurd. The truth is, apathy has gone
through the nation upon the subject; the thing is evident-in 1782 the idea of
a union could not have been brought forward; in 1785, it could not have been
brought forward; why can it now? Because then the Parliament had the warm
affection of the nation, now it has not.70
Browne's subsequent appointments to the Board of Accounts in 1801 and
to the office of Prime Serjeant in 1803 were tainted with the scandal of the
final corruption of the Irish Parliament. Yet these offices, although not paltry,
hardly compare with the lavish rewards made by the government to change
the votes of uncertain and uncommitted members.
Political opposition to the union was not eternal. Within a short time, the
most vociferous opponents were accepting offices from the Crown. Charles
Bushe became attorney general and later chief justice of Ireland; John
Philpot Curran became master of the rolls; William Plunket became solicitor
general, attorney general, chief justice, and lord chancellor; and John Foster,
speaker of the Irish House of Commons (1785-1801), was named chancellor
of the Irish Exchequer. Arthur Browne's preeminence at the bar and in
teaching, together with his wide circle of friends, classmates, and former
students, would surely have guaranteed the few honors he received in the last
years of his life.
69Letter from the Lord Lieutenant to the Duke of Portland, July 8, 1798, quoted in Reid, supra note
27, at 148 (quoting F. Dermot, Theobald Wolfe Tone: A Biographical Study 53 (1939)). Browne's 1800
views may be said to resemble those of Edmund Burke in 1780-81, supporting genuine independence
for America but rejecting independence for the dominant ascendancy in Ireland that was thereby free to
perpetuate its domination over the oppressed majority of the Irish people. See O'Brien, supra note 46, at
197-201.70Bolton, supra note 62, at 172 (quoting Report of Debate in The House of Commons of Ireland on
Wednesday and Thursday the 15th and 16th of January, 1800, at 134).
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E. The Legal Practice of Arthur Browne (1784-1805)
1. Admiralty Cases
In the fifth appendix to his text, Browne discussed "Admiralty Cases
Decided in Ireland" and reported on some of his own cases as advocate
(barrister in the admiralty court). He had begun his practice in admiralty in
1784 when, having qualified as a barrister at Lincoln's Inn, and having
received the LL.B. and LL.D. from Trinity College, he was admitted to
practice in those Irish courts that were based on Roman law principles. In
many of these cases Arthur Browne acted for shipowners.
In Corish v. The Murphy,71 Browne can be found arguing against
admiralty jurisdiction. According to Browne, a bottomry bond executed by
his client, the half owner of a ship, in exchange for a loan of £99 44' to buy
out the other half owner, was not a bottomry bond within admiralty
jurisdiction because the purpose of the loan had no connection with a
voyage. Since there was no maritime contract, Browne believed that there
was no admiralty jurisdiction. 72
Browne further argued that a bottomry bond must contain words expressly
binding the vessel (a fact that was absent in his client's case). Browne lost
on the latter point and on the general jurisdictional point, since the facts
proved did not mention where the contract for the bottomry bond was made
(whether on land or at sea) and the court was not willing to presume against
its own jurisdiction. 73
A question of admiralty procedure was involved in Wood v. The
Hannah.74 The Hannah was captured by a French privateer off the coast of
Norway, condemned as prize in the French court of vice admiralty in the
French consulate at Christiansand (Oslo), and sold at public auction to the
defendants, who rebuilt the vessel and registered her as a Danish (neutral)
vessel. On a voyage to Belfast her former owners arrested the vessel under
the process of the Irish admiralty court.
Browne sought a writ of prohibition from King's Bench against the
admiralty proceeding, arguing for the Danish owners that the issue was one
of the common law of title to property and that the case concerned things
done upon the land (condemnation and sale) and not on the high seas.75
Browne also argued that only the English admiralty court, not the Irish court,
712 Browne at 530 (1795).
72Id. at 531. See infra notes 157-70 and accompanying text.
732 Browne at 532. See infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text. As will be shown, interpretation
of the statutes of Richard II constituted a major part of admiralty disputes even in Browne's time and
continues today.
742 Browne at 535 (1799).
7 51d. at 536.
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had jurisdiction in prize and that only King's Bench could determine the
jurisdiction of foreign courts. Based on these arguments, Browne won his
prohibition.76
Browne was not averse to taking any advantage that the law might
provide, as shown by the interesting collision case Briggs v. The Persever-
ance.77 In thick fog in the Irish Sea, the brig Ann, close hauled, was
proceeding at five knots on a south-southwest course with the wind from the
southwest or southwest by west. The brig Perseverance, going before the
wind (or going large), was proceeding at seven knots on a north-northeast
course. Perseverance had nine crew on deck with proper lookouts while the
Ann had a helmsman and no lookouts. The customary Rules of the Road
required the Perseverance (going large and thereby able to maneuver) to
give way to the Ann (close hauled). 78 As a result of the collision, the Ann
sank. As far as can be determined, the. case was tried on the evidence of the
survivors of the Ann alone.
Without the retired Masters (the Elder Brethren of Trinity House) to
advise the court, as in London,79 the Irish judge impanelled an assessor and
two party-appointed advisors; the assessor being a serving senior captain of
the Royal Navy and the two advisors being retired officers thereof. Judgment
was in favor of the Ann against the Perseverance.
At this point, confusion arose because the process of the court was against
the brig Perseverance of Swansea, George Tetherly, master, while the party
defending (and losing) the trial was the brig Perseverance of Appledore,
John Tetherly, master. The plaintiffs (the owners of the Ann) had been
advised of their error before trial but had persisted in order to preclude the
testimony of John Tetherly.
Now Browne moved to prevent amendment of the pleadings and, more
importantly, the bail bond given in place of the continued arrest of the
vessel. Browne may have been arguing on behalf of insurers, but that is
unclear. In any event, Browne contended that since the case had been tried
against the Swansea brig, there could be no mere amendment to substitute
the Appledore brig. The trial court permitted amendment and Browne
76 1d. at 557. In Metcalf & Wanton v. Weston, 8 R.I. Adm. Papers 146 (1761), the admiralty court in
Newport condemned a cargo but the Rhode Island Superior Court issued a writ of prohibition, indicating
that the conflict over admiralty jurisdiction could also be found in the colonies. Similarly, in a 1747 case
where admiralty was prohibited, the dispute between common law and admiralty was decided in an
extra-legal arbitration. See Wiener, supra note 13, at 54-56.
772 Browne at 539 (1795).781d. at 540. Cf. 1972 COLREGS, Rule 12.
792 Browne at 541. In admiralty cases the judge may take the advice of the Elder Brethren on points
of seamanship, although they are not fact~finders. When the judge reaches a conclusion different from the
Elder Brethren, the opinion typically explains the reasons for so doing in substantial detail.
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appealed, arguing that an amendment was no longer possible. The appeals
court, however, rejected his argument.80
2. Civil Liberties
The case of Daly v. Magee8' deals with censorship and suppression of the
press. Arthur Browne represented John Magee, a Whig editor of the Dublin
Evening Post, a lively, provocative, and arguably even vicious newspaper.
Magee had been sued by Richard Daly, manager of the Theater Royal, for
libel. A procedure known as a "fiat" 82 was used against Magee. Fiats were
common law writs, similar to the more familiar capias ad respondendum,83
by which the defendant's body was seized by the sheriff to answer a writ of
trespass.
The Lord Chief Justice (Earlsfort, later Lord Clonmel) set an excessively
high bail which Magee could not make. He therefore remained in the
sheriff's prison for six months until the trial, at which he was held liable to
Daly for defamation in the amount of £200. Although Browne had sought to
portray the case as one involving the unwarranted persecution of the press,
he lost.
Having been defeated by a biased judge in an unusual proceeding in the
trial court, Arthur Browne carried the issues to the House of Commons,
where a violent but inconclusive debate took place. George Ponsonby
simultaneously sought to impeach the Chief Justice because of this case, but
again a violent debate broke out and the matter was left unresolved. 84
Although the outcry produced by the Magee case ultimately resulted in
the discontinuation of fiats being issued against the press, 85 the Irish
government carried on in its effort to suppress unfriendly criticism by any
means fair or foul. The Magee case and the reaction it provoked also led
Tone to produce his first political pamphlet, entitled "A Review of the
Conduct of Administration During the Last Session of Parliament." 86
802 Browne at 543 (1798).
810'Higgins, supra note 2, at 259 (citing The Trial of John Magee for Printing and Publishing a
Slanderous and Defamatory Libel against Richard Daly (1790)).
821d. at 260 (citing Mr. Sheridan's Argument in the Case of Daly against Magee on a Motion to
Discharge the Defendant on Crown Bail (1790)).
83The writ of capias ad respondendum directed the sheriff to take the person or the thing mentioned
in the writ into custody to hold until physical custody could be replaced by a bond or some other form
of surety. See Sweeney, Abolition of Wage Garnishment, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 197, 200 (1969).
84See supra note 81.
5 Id. at 260.
86See Elliott, supra note 46, at 83-86.
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F. Parallels in the Career of William Scott
There are many similarities in the careers of Arthur Browne and Sir
William Scott (Lord Stowell), to whom the second or admiralty volume of
Browne's treatise is dedicated. 87 Scott, who was born in 1745, was eleven
years older than Browne. There were also substantial differences in their
backgrounds: Scott was a "high Tory," violently opposed to political
change and especially opposed to any form of Catholic emancipation, while
Arthur Browne was an independent Whig, suspicious of Tory government
and supportive of Catholic emancipation. Further, Scott inherited a substan-
tial fortune from his father, while Arthur Browne made his own living by
teaching and practice. Both men, however, benefited from lucrative appoint-
ments from the established churches and their courts.
William Scott began his university career in 1760 at Corpus Christi,
Oxford, when he was fifteen. He received his A.B. in 1764, became a Fellow
of University College in 1765, and was made a Reader in Ancient History
in 1774. In 1767 he received his A.M., in 1772 his B.C.L., and in 1779 his
D.C.L. Scott entered the Middle Temple in 1777 and was called to the Bar
in 1781. In 1779 he began the "year of silence," or unpaid observer status,
at Doctors' Commons, after which he assumed active practice as an advocate
at Doctors' Commons.
In 1790, when he was forty-five, Scott entered the House of Commons
representing a pocket borough (in 1801 he became a member for Oxford
University). In 1821, upon becoming Lord Stowell, he was elevated to the
House of Lords. In addition to his parliamentary posts, Scott in 1798 was
appointed Judge of the High Court of Admiralty-a position he was to hold
until his retirement twenty-nine years later. In 1836, Scott died at the age of
ninety.
Scott's younger brother, John (Lord Eldon), a longtime friend and
supporter of William Pitt the younger, had an even more brilliant career.
Appointed Lord Chief Justice in 1799, he became Lord Chancellor in 1801.
In these positions John championed equity practice and substantive juris-
prudence but, like William, opposed every possible reform.
Undoubtedly William Scott had more practical experience than Browne,
especially in view of his service as Advocate for the Navy (the Lords
Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral) from 1782
and as King's Advocate from 1788. Browne, on the other hand, was able to
devote more time to teaching and academic pursuits, leading to his synthesis
of the subject in his text. Yet during his long time on the bench (including
87See generally H. Bourguignon, Sir William Scott, Lord Stowell, Judge of the High Court of
Admiralty, 1798-1828 (1987).
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seventeen years of the Napoleonic Wars), Scott became the authority on
prize law and wrote enough admiralty judgments to fill almost eleven
volumes of reported decisions, thereby assuring himself an enduring place in
both England and America on the subjects of customary international law,
prize law, and admiralty jurisprudence.
In
ANALYSIS OF "A COMPENDIOUS VIEW"
A. General Perspective and Methodology
Arthur Browne's treatise, A Compendious View of the Civil Law and of
the Law of the Admiralty,88 is in two volumes: the first, dedicated to his
colleagues at Trinity College, deals with the civil law, that is, the Roman law
of Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis and proceeds from it into canon law;89 the
second volume, dedicated to Sir William Scott,9° deals with the law of
nations and the law of admiralty.
88Volume I was published in Dublin in 1797; volume II followed in 1799. A revised and enlarged
edition of both volumes appeared in London in 1802-03. This second edition was used in teaching
admiralty at the Harvard Law School in 1830, see O'Higgins, supra note 2, at 264, and was often cited
by the Supreme Court. An American edition (allegedly "with great additions") was released in 1840 by
Halsted & Voorhies, a company of law booksellers located at the corner of Nassau and Cedar Streets in
New York City. The American edition is essentially a copy of the 1802-03 London edition. If there were
"great additions" it was in the changes made by Arthur Browne for the London edition. No changes
seem to have been made by the publisher in the 1840 New York edition, despite the differences in legal
systems. All citations in this article are to the London edition of Browne's work.
S9The Corpus Juris Civilis (A.D. 534) was prepared by a committee of ten scholars under the Minister
of Justice, Tribonian, at the order of the Emperor Justinian I (A.D. 483-565) in the years A.D. 528-534
at Constantinople. It is made up of four books: The Institutes, a treatise on law for beginning law students
put together from the works of three earlier scholars: Gaius, Ulpian, and Paulus; The Digest or Pandects,
an authoritative compilation of those elements of 1,000 years of Roman jurisprudence from the Kings,
the Republic, and the Caesars regarded as still operative in 534 A.D.; The Code (or Codex lustinianeus)
a collection of older imperial decrees having the force of law in 534 A.D.; and The Novellae or Novels,
the new legislation (154 sections) of the Emperor Justinian, in Greek (the language of the Eastern
Empire) but translated into Latin for use in the West as well as the East; fourteen additional statutes were
added by Justinian's successors. An English translation of the work by Scott (1932) runs to 2,342 pages.
See generally Berman, The Origins of Western Legal Science, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 894 (1977), and M.
Cappelletti, H. Merryman & J. Perillo, The Italian Legal System 14-22 (1967). For the influence of
Arthur Browne upon the civil law in America, see Stein, The Attraction of the Civil Law in
Post-Revolutionary America, 52 Va. L. Rev. 403, 407, 425 (1966).
9°As explained supra text following note 87, Scott did not become a peer until 1821. As a result, he
was still Sir William Scott at the time Browne penned his dedication.
In a note preceding the history of admiralty, Browne wrote, "The author begs that he may not be
accused of plagiarism, if on controversial questions he has adopted the very words of Lord Mansfield, and
Sir William Scott, even at considerable length. Where can the reader tread so safely as in the footsteps
of those most celebrated men, to vary from whose very modes of expression, when they can be had,
would be miserable affectation of novelty, with total disregard of utility?" See Bourguignon, supra note
87, and F. Wiswall, The Development of Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice Since 1800 (1970).
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The inclusion of all these subjects in a single work reflects the existing
court structure in England where Doctors' Commons and its membership--
judges, advocates (barristers), and proctors (solicitors)- had a monopoly on
those parts of the law with Roman or civil law roots and without any
common law tradition.9' Thus, the members of Doctors' Commons practiced
in the courts dealing with the probate and interpretation of wills, matrimo-
nial disputes and divorce, the property disputes and discipline of the clergy
of the established church, and the law of admiralty. There was no formal
Doctors' Commons in Ireland, but there was a specialized bar whose
members practiced in the equivalent courts based on Roman law.
The author defined his methodology as "the method and order adopted by
Mr. Justice Blackstone ... as nearly as the spirit of the two laws would
possibly allow. .. ". ,92 William Blackstone 93 published his Commentaries on
the Laws of England in four volumes from 1763 to 1769, and even
twenty-eight years later, when Arthur Browne wrote, that seminal treatise
was still reverberating around the English legal world, perhaps in the same
way that six centuries earlier the discovery of the complete but long-lost
Corpus Juris Civilis had exploded on the Middle Ages and, by its
methodology, changed the law of Western Europe for all time.94
The portion of Browne's text devoted to admiralty proceeded, after
Blackstone's analysis, "to mark the great sources of the law of the admiralty
in the civil law." 95 Defending his combination of civil law with admiralty
law in a single treatise, Browne wrote that all our principles are derived from
9 1See G. Squibb, Doctors' Commons: A History of the College of Advocates and Doctors of Law
(1977), and Wiswall, supra note 90.
921 Browne at iii.
93William Blackstone (1723-1780) was trained at Pembroke College and later All Souls College,
Oxford, prepared at the Middle Temple, and was called to the bar at the age of twenty-three in 1746. He
retired from practice to lecture on the common law at Oxford, the first such formal lectures at an
academic institution, and was the first holder of the Vinerian Chair of Law (1758-66). In 1761, he
entered the House of Commons as M.P. for Hindon, later serving for Westbury. In Parliament his views
were those of a country Tory, opposing repeal of the Stamp Act in 1766 and favoring the expulsion of
John Wilkes in 1769. In 1770 he became Judge of the Court of Common Pleas. His "Commentaries on
the Laws of England" appeared in four volumes from 1763 to 1769. Despite ferocious criticism from
Jeremy Bentham in England, Blackstone remained required reading for American students of law in the
first half of the nineteenth century.
Nevertheless, Browne could criticize Blackstone on a question of prize law, despite his admiration for
Blackstone's system of analysis. "The truth is, Blackstone's Commentaries are a most useful, great and
precious work, but by no means implicitly to be depended upon. Besides the political errors often marked
in that great work, there are many legal ones." 2 Browne at 217.
94The University of Bologna introduced the study of law in the twelfth century based on the complete text
of the Corpus Juris Civilis in Latin. It has been speculated that the manuscript may have been found in the
library of the Poggibonsi monastery, where it had been forgotten 600 years earlier. See P. Vinogradoff, Roman
Law in Medieval Europe (1968); Cappelletti, Merryman & Perillo, supra note 89, at 14-22; C. Haskins, The
Renaissance of the Twelfth Century 193-233 (1957); and Berman, supra note 89.
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the laws of Rome, listing the nature and effects of contracts; of masters and
mariners; average and contribution; collision of ships; shipwrecks and
hypothecations. He also noted that admiralty practice was unintelligible
without knowledge of the civil law since the court of admiralty "always
proceeds according to the rules of the civil law, except in cases omitted." 96
B. Historical Basis and Summary
The work begins with speculation on the origin of the office of the
Lord High Admiral 97 and the court established under that office. 98 It
examines the Roman law99 and the Rhodian law' 00 before reviewing
briefly the other authorities known at that time in Western Europe, such
as the Laws of Ol6ron, 01 the Consolato del Mar of Barcelona, 0 2 the
96Id. at 507.97 1d. at 23-26. The first Lord High Admiral, according to Browne, may have been appointed by King
John (about 1200), although some of the authorities cited by Browne date the first appointment from
1272, in the reign of Edward I. Holdsworth believes the first mention of an Admiral was in 1295. See
1 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 544 (2d ed. 1937). See also infra note 134.
982 Browne at 28. Deputies of the Lord High Admiral were judges of the court from its early days.
The Admiral was usually a powerful baron surrounded by clerical advisors and assistants.
991d. at 34-38. Roman law is described as "sterile." Id. at 38. After referring to the Lex Aquilia and parts
of the Pandects and Code, Browne summarizes its provisions: the ship and shipowner are liable for the
master's contracts, id. at 35; fault liability applies in collisions except in cases of "accident," id. at 36; and
the shipowner is liable for any loss of cargo (merchandise) and passengers' effects unless occasioned by
shipwreck or pirates or any other causes which the civil law includes under major vis. Id. at 37.
'°°Id. at 38-39. The Rhodian Law is described as the earliest sea laws of which any traces now exist. Id.
at 38. Scholars remain divided about the authenticity and content of Rhodian Law. See The Rhodian Sea Law
(W. Ashburner ed. 1909); Benedict, The Historical Position of the Rhodian Law, 18 Yale LJ. 223 (1909); F.
Sanborn, Origins of the Early English Maritime and Commercial Law (1930); Lobingier, The Maritime Law
of Rome, 47 Jurid. Rev. 1 (1935); and Gormley, The Development of the Rhodian-Roman Maritime Law to
1681, With Special Emphasis on the Problem of Collision, 3 Inter-Am. L. Rev. 317 (1961).
1012 Browne at 39-40 (reproduced at 30 F. Cas. 1171). The Laws of O16ron allegedly were
promulgated during the time of Eleanor of Aquitaine (1122-1204), who served as duchess of the
region that included the port of Olron at the mouth of the Gironde or Garonne River. Eleanor was
married in turn to King Louis VIII of France (1137-1152) and King Henry II of England
(1152-1189), establishing the legend that the Laws of Olron, produced by the clerics who
administered her court, were the foundation of maritime law in France and England. See generally
Stinson, Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction of the Courts of Great Britain, France and the United
States, 16 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1921), and Runyan, Rolls of Olron and the Admiralty Court in
Fourteenth Century England, 19 Am. J. Legal Hist. 95 (1975).
1022 Browne at 41. A translation of the Consolato del Mar of Barcelona (thirteenth century?) can be
found in S. Jados, Consulate of the Sea and Related Documents (1975). See also Smith, The Llibre del
Consolat de Mar: A Bibliography, 33 L. Lib. J. 387 (1940). Its provisions for shipowners' liability for
damage done to the cargo by rats is notable:
Art. 68 If any merchandise or cargo is damaged by rats while aboard a vessel, and the patron has
failed to provide a cat to protect it from rats, he shall pay the damage; . .. if there were cats aboard
the vessel while it was being loaded, but during the journey these cats died and the rats damaged
the cargo before the vessel reached a port where the patron of the vessel could purchase additional
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Laws of Visby, 10 3 and the Black Book of the Admiralty (the source book
for England). 104
Under the first title, "Perquisites of the Admiralty Court," there is a
discussion of governmental rights in shipwrecks. Then the general title
"Jurisdiction of the Instance Court" examines both contract jurisdiction,
including charter parties, bills of lading, and seamen, and tort jurisdiction,
including property rights in ships. A second chapter on the Instance Court
deals with traditional maritime institutions: owners, masters, and mariners;
cargo carriage; general average; and rights of security in ships.
A lengthy analysis of the prize court and the law of prize follows. Prize
law had again become very active with the outbreak of the war with
revolutionary France in 1793 and would continue until the cessation of the
Napoleonic wars in 1815.
Court practice occupies the remaining third of the work, beginning with
an historical essay on practice in the Roman courts followed by an
examination of practice in the Instance Court, the prize court, the criminal
jurisdiction, and the operations of the colonial vice admiralty courts, which
customarily had a wider jurisdiction than the admiralty court in England. 10 5
Browne briefly discussed the admiralty court of the Kingdom of Scotland,
which also had a wider jurisdiction than in England' °6 over "the seas, fresh
water within flood and mark and in all harbors and creeks." This court also
had jurisdiction in "mercantile causes, even where they are not strictly
maritime." However, the statutory union with England in 1706 seems to
cats; [but] if the patron of the vessel purchases and puts aboard cats at the first port of call where
such cats can be purchased, he cannot be held responsible for the damages....
1032 Browne at 39-41. The Code of Visby, part of the 500 year old Hanseatic League of German
merchants in northern European cities reaching from London to Novgorod, is reproduced at 30 F. Cas.
1189. (Visby is a walled city on the Swedish island of Gotland, south of Stockholm.)
1°42 Browne at 42. The Black Book of the Admiralty is not a text but rather a compilation of sources
for use by admiralty judges and practitioners. Sir Travers Twiss published it in four volumes in 1876.
'°
51d. at 490-95. See C. Ubbelhode, The Vice Admiralty Courts and the American Revolution (1960).
See also Owen, Admiralty Practice in the 19th Century, 13 J. Mar. L. & Com. 147 (1982).
Admirers of the Aubrey/Maturin novels of Patrick O'Brian will appreciate the colloquy between Dr.
Stephen Maturin and the deputy judge advocate at Gibraltar:
... Stephen asked him how, in naval courts, a suit for tyranny and oppression might be instituted
in cases of extreme disparity of rank: ... whether the matter would have to be referred to the High
Court of Admiralty, the Privy Council or the Regent himself.
"Why, sir! ... if the persecution were tortious and if it happened at sea, or even on fresh water
or reasonably damp land, the Admiralty Court would no doubt have cognizance."
"Pray, sir .... just how damp would the land have to be?"
"Oh, pretty damp, pretty damp, I believe. The judge's patent gives him power to deal with
matters in, upon, or by the sea, or public streams, or freshwater ports, rivers, nooks and places
between the ebb and flow of the tide, and upon the shores and banks adjacent-all tolerably
humid."
P. O'Brian, The Far Side of the World 51 (1984).
'62 Browne at 30.
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have ended that court, admiralty jurisdiction thereafter being under the Court
of Session or the Lord High Admiral (or the commissioners) of Great Britain
respecting prize. 10 7
Ireland had no Lord High Admiral, but Browne noted the existence "from
time immemorial of an instance court of admiralty." 108 The Irish admiralty
court was put upon a new footing in 1782, and by Article 8 of the 1801 Act
of Union with Great Britain, the instance court for causes civil and maritime
only was to continue, with appeals to the Irish court of chancery. 1°9
C. Perquisites of Admiralty
Chapter III on the "Perquisites of the Admiralty" deals mostly with the
rights of the government after a disaster at sea (civil droits) and the rights of
government in wartime (prize droits). The American edition of 1840 made
no substantive changes in this chapter even though the rights of the Crown
were inapplicable.
The civil droits are flotsam, 110 jetsam,"1 and lagan, 112 referring to the
ship's cargo or passengers' goods; wrecks (i.e., the ship herself); 113 and
derelicts' 14 and deodands.tt 5
The disputes between the Lord High Admiral and the Crown in Browne's
time ceased with the transfer of these funds to the Exchequer and the Royal
Navy (prize law now being codified by statute under the jurisdiction of a
naval tribunal). t 6 In the United States, however, the situation is complex.




I1°When goods (cargo or passengers' effects) thrown (or jettisoned) into the sea, in order to lighten
a ship imperiled by storm, continue to float, they are called flotsam. See id. at 50.
11'Similar to flotsam, but the goods sink and remain under water. Id.112 Lagan (or ligan) is the word used to describe goods which, under circumstances similar to flotsam
and jetsam, are jettisoned voluntarily but are tied to a buoy so as to be recovered when the storm ceases.
Id.
113Browne distinguishes the common law definition ("such goods as, after a shipwreck, are cast upon
the land by the sea, and left there within some county"), id. at 46, from the admiralty definition of
"wreck at sea" ("a ship totally disabled by the force of a tempest at sea, though she doth not founder,
and though one or two of her crew may have been by accident left behind, so that she is not a derelict,
and being a whole ship and not a fragment, is not usually called flotsam, it is commonly called a wreck").
Id. at 49. His summary of the distinction is, "floating wreck while the tide is in, is in the admiralty;
stranded wreck when the tide is out, is in the king." Id.
"
4Meaning "boats or vessels forsaken or found on the seas without any person in them." Id. at 51.
5 Meaning "things instrumental to the death of a man on shipboard, or goods found on a dead body
cast on shore." Id. at 56.
116See the 1948 Prize Act, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, ch. 9. See generally C. Colombos, The International Law
of the Sea 747-56 (6th ed. 1965).
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after the independence of the component states, or whether the federal
government (the Second Continental Congress) came before the independent
state governments (replacing royal colonies). The federal government had
not asserted the inherent rights of the crown in the civil and prize droits until
1978, when it claimed the sovereign prerogative as devolved from King
George 1[1.117
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the government's devolution
theory, asserted in a dispute with a treasure salvor who was claiming
artifacts, especially gold and silver treasure worth $6,000,000, from the 1622
wreck of the Spanish ship La Nuestra Sefiora de Atocha off of the Marquesas
Keys of Florida.' " 8 The court held that the law of finds had been correctly
applied and affirmed title in the plaintiff, noting that the result would be the
same under salvage law. There are, however, federal statutes dealing with
the ocean areas where treasure seekers may be operating: the 1906
Antiquities Act,1 19 the 1979 Archaeological Resources Protection Act, ' 20 the
1980 Maritime Sanctuaries Act,' 2' and the 1987 Abandoned Shipwreck Act
(ASA). 122 None of these applied to the Treasure Salvors case. To these more
narrowly based statutes can be added the more general 1953 Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act 23 and the 1953 Submerged Lands Act.124
"17See The Siren, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 389 (1871), a claim of prize by the crew of a union naval vessel
against a confederate blockade runner scuttled and fired by her crew on the day Charleston surrendered
to union forces. The district court rejected the claim for prize, a decision which was later affirmed by the
Supreme Court. In the course of the opinion Justice Swayne wrote:
In our jurisprudence there are, strictly speaking, no droits of admiralty. The United States have
succeeded to the rights of the crown. No one can have any right or interest in any prize except by
their grant or permission. All captures made without their express authority enure ipso facto to their
benefit.
Id. at 393.
Much later, Justice Sutherland found the source of the foreign relations powers of the United States
(and the President as the sole organ of foreign policy) outside the Constitution in the devolution of
international sovereignty from George III to George Washington. See Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. v.
United States, 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Justice Sutherland's historical theory has not stood up to critical
analysis. See Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55
Yale L.J. 467 (1946); Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical
Assessment, 83 Yale L.J. 1 (1973); and L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 19-26 (1972).
" lSTreasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 337,
1978 AMC 1404, 1412 (5th Cir. 1978).
119Act of June 8, 1906, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225, now codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33 (1988). The Act
is restricted to lands owned or controlled by the United States and is confined to "the smallest area
compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected." A presidential
proclamation is necessary to establish a national monument. To date, a total of 162 national monuments
and memorials have been proclaimed or designated.
12016 U.S.C. § 470aa-mm (1988).
12116 U.S.C. §§ 1431-39 (1988).
12243 U.S.C. §§ 2101-06 (1988). See Giesecke, The Abandoned Shipwreck: Affirming the Role of the
States in Historic Preservation, 12 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 379 (1988).
12343 U.S.C. §§ 1331-56 (1988).
The question of the states of the United States as inheritors of the royal
prerogative is also complicated. During the period after independence but
prior to the federal constitution, states created admiralty courts, often with
juries. 125 Because of the popularity of the jury as fact-finder, use of state
courts in admiralty cases was not suppressed after the federal constitution
gave jurisdiction in cases of admiralty and maritime law to federal courts.
The "Savings Clause" in the 1789 Judiciary Act preserved maritime
disputes before state juries where the common law was competent to provide
a remedy.12 6
Reception of the common law had varied from state to state, but a frequent
formula was that the non-statutory law of England up to the time of
settlement (seventeenth century), or up to the Declaration of Independence
in 1776, would be binding until changed by the state legislature.1 27
Coastal states have asserted the rights of the crown either by devolution
from King George III or by new statutes. As the science of marine
12443 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1988). See infra note 132.
125The Second Continental Congress had recommended that the states establish admiralty courts on
November 22, 1775, seven months before the Declaration of Independence. State admiralty courts with
trial by jury were created by state constitutions in Maryland and Virginia (1776), and by statute in
Massachusetts (1775) and New Jersey (1776). New York's admiralty court, which did not use juries, was
created in 1777. Other states creating admiralty courts by constitution but silent as to jury trial were
Delaware and North Carolina (1776). Admiralty courts created by statute and silent as to jury trials were
formed in Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Georgia, and South Carolina (1776), as well as in Pennsylvania
(1778). Under the Articles of Confederation (effective 1781), Congress created a Prize Court of Appeals.
See H. Bourguignon, The First Federal Court: The Federal Appellate Prize Court of the American
Revolution, 1775-1787 (1977).
126The Federal Judiciary Act, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 76, § 9, provides:
That the district courts ... shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures under laws of import, navigation or trade
of the United States, where the seizures are made, on waters which are navigable from the sea by
vessels of ten or more tons burthen, within their respective districts as well as upon the high seas;
saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is
competent to give it....
The present version, found in 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1988), provides, "saving to suitors in all cases all
other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." This change accommodates the use of equitable
principles as well as the common law. See D. Robertson, Admiralty and Federalism 126 (1970).
Although state courts have been forbidden to create the in rem remedy, see The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 411 (1866), and The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1866), state attachment procedures
in personam extended to vessels as property are not forbidden. See Rounds v. Cloverport, 237 U.S. 303
(1915), and Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 1954 AMC 405 (1954). This distinction is due to
the fact that admiralty procedures in rem, leading to judicial sale and condemnation, give title good
against all the world, while state attachments, leading to a sheriff's sale, provide the purchaser with the
sheriff's title, subject to the validity of the original claim, judgment, execution, and sale.127See generally Horwitz, An Instrumental Conception of Law,, 1780-1820, in Law in American
History 292-98 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971); G. White, The American Judicial Tradition 43-47
(enlarged ed. 1988); R. Pound, The Formative Era of American Law 6-8, 107, 144 (1938); and I W.
Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States 578-609 (1953). See also E.
Brown, British Statutes in American Law, 1776-1836 (1964).
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archaeology has developed, treasure salvors are now able to find and recover
valuable artifacts from the wrecks of ships and have sought to assert rights
as finders or as salvors. The states, however, have zealously contested these
assertions. 28 In these contests the states, relying on the Eleventh Amend-
ment to the Constitution, 129 have refused to consent to suit or counter-suit by
"salvors," who have asserted the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts
in admiralty to determine salvage disputes (since the common law is
incompetent to provide a remedy).
. The response of Congress to these disputes, at the request of the states,
was the ASA, 130 which abolished the law of salvage and the law of finds' 31
l2 8See, e.g., Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 1983 AMC 181
(1982), on remand 689 F.2d 1254, 1983 AMC 181 (5th Cir. 1982). This dispute earlier had been in the
Supreme Court. See 420 U.S. 531 (1975) (rejecting Florida's claim to the site) and 425 U.S. 791 (1976).
See generally Owen, Some Legal Troubles with Treasure: Jurisdiction and Salvage, 16 J. Mar. L. & Com.
139 (1985). See also Platoro Ltd., Inc. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 508 F.2d 1113, 1975 AMC
1216 (5th Cir. 1975), 614 F.2d 1051, 1981 AMC 1097 (5th Cir. 1980), and 695 F.2d 893, 1984 AMC
2288 (5th Cir. 1983), for another Spanish treasure ship from the coast of Texas.
129The Eleventh Amendment became part of the Constitution in 1795 in direct response to
anti-federalist outrage to Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), the Supreme Court's first
substantive decision. The Eleventh Amendment (allegedly written by then Vice President John Adams)
limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts where suits have been brought against states by citizens of
other states or foreign nations. It thus changes those provisions of Article III, § 2 of the Constitution that
had permitted actions in the federal courts by citizens of another state against a state.
In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), the Supreme Court ignored the exact language of the
Amendment to endorse the general concept of the sovereign immunity of states whereby citizens could
not sue their own states in federal court. The Eleventh Amendment still confuses the Supreme Court. See
Welch v. Texas State Dep't of Highways, 483 U.S. 468, 1987 AMC 2113 (1987).
130 See supra note 122.
131On the law of finds, see Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 186 F. Supp. 452,
1960 AMC 1774 (E.D. Va. 1960). The ASA was challenged in Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked and
Abandoned Vessel, 941 F.2d 525, 1992 AMC 532 (7th Cir. 1991). The court remanded for a finding as
to whether the wreck was "embedded," noting the possibility that the ASA was unconstitutional under
an "exclusiveness of admiralty" analysis, whereby Congress cannot alter the traditional admiralty
jurisdiction by statute since Article III's court-creation power does not authorize legislation. In this view
a constitutional amendment would be necessary to achieve the congressional purpose.
On remand, 811 F. Supp. 1300, 1993 AMC 2201 (N.D. 11. 1992), the district court held that the ASA
did not oust the traditional admiralty remedies of salvage and finds because of its requirement that the
embedded wreck has to be abandoned. As to salvage, the court found that the law of finds rather than the
law of salvage would be applied by traditional admiralty law when no claim to the wreck is made; the
ASA does not apply unless the wreck has been abandoned and when it creates ownership in the states
of embedded wrecks, no one can assert a claim against the states because of the Eleventh Amendment.
As to finds, there is no owner by definition, as the wreck has been abandoned, thus again when the ASA
creates ownership in the states the admiralty court can only award title to the states and no one can assert
a claim against the state because of the Eleventh Amendment; further, finds was probably never part of
admiralty jurisdiction. See supra note 129. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, see 19 F.3d 1136 (7th Cir.
1994), restating the rationale slightly, stressing the 1868 abandonment of the vessel since salvage
presumes an owner and the law of finds presumes abandonment but the Eleventh Amendment
automatically forbids ownership claims against the state.
In the dispute over Congress' 1948 decision to expand admiralty jurisdiction, see 46 U.S.C. app. § 740
(1988), the Ninth Circuit upheld the statute. See infra note 353. The Supreme Court has assumed the
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over shipwrecks "embedded" in submerged lands or coral formations or
listed on the National Register of Historic Places and located within three
nautical miles from shore. 32 Thus, there is no longer any question about
applying the law of salvage or, alternatively, the law of finds to marine
archaeological discoveries on the high seas.' 33
To summarize, if the property is an ancient shipwreck discovered on the
ocean bottom under the high seas, the law of finds may be applied where the
wreck has been abandoned and the discoverer who brings up artifacts from
the bottom will be awarded title. If the original owner abandoned the wreck
to its insurers but the insurers have not abandoned it, the discoverer will have
only a maritime lien for salvage. If the shipwreck is discovered in state
territorial waters (that is, three miles from the low water mark), where it is
embedded, having been previously abandoned, neither salvage law nor the
law of finds will be applied and the states may impose whatever rules or
conditions they consider appropriate. If the shipwreck is discovered in the
territorial waters of the United States beyond the states' waters (twelve miles
from the low water mark), or on the continental shelf, or in the water column
of the exclusive economic zone, the discoverer may be subject to the law of
finds (if abandoned) or to the law of salvage, subject to the federal statutes
applicable to marine sanctuaries and historic wrecks. Courts may in all
situations require some type of preservation in the interests of science with
respect to any historic artifacts.
Most of Browne's chapter III on the perquisites of admiralty is today of
historical interest only, as the principal controversy is now forgotten. That
involved a struggle between the rights of the Lord High Admiral and his
validity of the 1948 Act; see Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Co., 373 U.S. 206, 1963 AMC 1649
(1963). Cf. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 1972 AMC 1 (1971).
Another relevant doctrine of uncertain limits proclaims the inability of states to alter the uniformity
of the unwritten general maritime law. Cf. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), discussed
infra notes 306-21; Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barium, 293 U.S. 21, 1934 AMC 1417 (1934); and
Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 1973 AMC 811 (1973).
1321n United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960), the Supreme Court had held that the federal
government, rather than the states, controlled the continental shelf areas of the ocean with all their
resources-especially petroleum reserves. Congress effectively overturned the decision in the 1953
Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1988). The Act awards to adjacent coastal states all the
interest which the federal government had in the continental shelf within three miles of the low water
mark. In subsequent decisions, states in the Gulf of Mexico have been awarded the continental shelf out
to nine miles from the low water mark. See United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960), in which
Florida's Atlantic coast boundary is three miles while its Gulf of Mexico boundary is nine miles.
133 See Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel
Believed to be S.S. Central America, 1988 AMC 2957, 1989 AMC 1955, and 742 F. Supp. 1327, 1990
AMC 2409 (E.D. Va.), rev'd on other grounds, 974 F.2d 450, 1992 AMC 2705 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1625 (1992); Marex-Titanic, Inc. and Titanic Ventures v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel
Believed to be R.M.S. Titanic, 2 F.3d 544, 1993 AMC 2799 (4th Cir. 1993); and Moyer v. The Wrecked
and Abandoned Vessel Known as the Andrea Doria, 836 F. Supp. 1099 1994 AMC 1021 (D.N.J. 1993).
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court (rights originating in a grant from the King to the Lord High Admiral)
versus the rights of the King 'jure coronae," the inherent rights of kingship
without the intervention of the admiralty court. Even in Browne' s time there
was no longer an individual with the title of Lord High Admiral, the office
being administered by commissioners. 34
In this controversy and in the subsequent questions about maritime
contract jurisdiction, Browne was required to trace 35 the problem back to a
1389 statute limiting the jurisdiction of the admiralty court to things done
upon the sea, as well as a subsequent statute restating that admiralty was not
to deal with things within the body of the counties. 36 Browne therefore
distinguished between wreck of the sea coming to land and thereby subject
to the King's prerogative rights and wreck of the sea, still at sea, and thus
within admiralty jurisdiction. 137
In the United States the controversy over admiralty jurisdiction took on a
political tone at an early time, but with two unexpected twists. Justice Story
had been appointed to the Supreme Court by President Madison as a
Democratic-Republican. During a long association with Chief Justice John
Marshall, however, Story came to adopt many of Marshall's Federalist
views. 138 The Federalist party-the party of Eastern business and banking-
had created a congenial instrument in the federal government. Since
Federalists saw danger to property interests in the state governments
134The commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral were appointed in 1673 under
Charles II when his Roman Catholic brother (later James II) was excluded from holding the Admiral's
office because of his failure to comply with the Test Act (to receive the Holy Eucharist according to the
rites of the Church of England). Since the Hanoverian succession (1714), the office has been held by
commissioners. See 2 Browne at 32-33. In 1964, when the Admiralty became part of the Department of
Defense, the title Lord High Admiral was offered to and assumed by Queen Elizabeth II.
1352 Browne at 46-47, 79, 86, 91-93.
136The 1389 statute, 13 Rich. 2, ch. 5, dealing with "thing(s) done upon the sea," was reenacted two
years later to specify "all manner of contracts, pleas and quarrels and all other things rising within the
bodies of the counties." See 15 Rich. 2, ch. 3.
Richard 11 (1367-1400) succeeded his grandfather in 1377 as a boy of ten (subject to control by
regents until 1389). One of the weakest of England's kings, he was badly advised by unpopular favorites
and clashed repeatedly with Parliament. Following the Black Death, the country suffered very hard times,
leading to the Peasants' Revolt of 1381 under Wat Tyler that was suppressed with great bloodshed. Henry
of Lancaster (later Henry IV) captured King Richard II, who was subsequently deposed by Parliament
in 1399 and murdered by his jailers at Pomfret Castle. See G. Trevelyan, England in the Age of Wycliffe
(1909). Shakespeare's Richard II (probably written in 1595) is renowned for its glowing praise of his
native land in words spoken by John of Gaunt, Act II, Scene I, lines 40-50: "This royal throne of
kings.... This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England."
1372 Browne at 48-49.
138See R. Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, Statesman of the Old Republic (1985), and
G. Dunne, Justice Joseph Story and the Rise of the Supreme Court (1970). Joseph Story (1779-1845) was
appointed to the Supreme Court in 1811 after one term as a congressman (1808-09). After the founding
of the Harvard Law School in 1817, he taught there as Dane Professor of Law until his death. In addition
to his numerous judicial opinions, Story wrote twelve treatises on commercial law and the constitution.
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controlled by Jefferson's followers, the expansion of the jurisdiction of the
federal courts was a positive good in Federalist eyes. 39
When confronted with an argument against the jurisdiction of the federal
admiralty courts based on the ancient jurisdiction of the admiralty court of
England, Story pronounced that the constitutional grant was intended to be
much broader because of its use of the word "maritime" in addition to
admiralty. This reading enabled Story to conclude that an action by an
insured against a marine insurer for payment of a claim based on a contract
of marine insurance was within the American admiralty jurisdiction, even
though it would not be within the English admiralty jurisdiction, since the
insurance contract was made on land.' 40 Thus, the word maritime enabled
Justice Story to capture all contracts conceptually maritime for America's
admiralty courts.' 4'
When it came to tort jurisdiction, however, Story the historian overcame
Story the nationalist. In The Thomas Jefferson, a case concerned with the
wrongful withholding of wages on a steamboat plying the Ohio, upper
Mississippi, and Missouri Rivers, Justice Story denied tort jurisdiction. The
English admiralty court had jurisdiction over torts on the high seas or within
the ebb and flow of the tide on rivers navigable from the sea. 142 Thus, there
39C. Warren, The Supreme Court in the History of the United States i, 189-95, 319-29,414-22 (rev.
ed. 1926).
1
"nSee DeLovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418 (No. 3,776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815). Justice Story, sitting as a
Circuit Court Judge, found that admiralty jurisdiction did exist in a twenty-six page opinion full of
citations to continental European scholars, English cases, and Arthur Browne's text. English precedent
could be disregarded because the statutes did not extend to the colonies (as yet undiscovered in 1389);
more to the point, the colonial courts of vice admiralty had a very wide jurisdiction over maritime
contracts and torts; lastly, the statutory language, speaking of kings and lord high admirals, was
inappropriate in a modem republic. Having removed English "admiralty" jurisprudence, Story turned to
the word "maritime" in the constitutional and statutory grants of jurisdiction, reading it liberally so as
to confer on United States admiralty courts the widest commercial maritime jurisdiction, as in continental
Europe.
laWld. at 442-44. Story pronounced that American admiralty jurisdiction in contract would extend to
"all contracts (wheresoever they may be made or executed, or whatsoever may be the form of the
stipulations) which relate to the navigation, business or commerce of the sea." Id. at 444.
142The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825). The ebb and flow doctrine led to
conflicting decisions concerning steamboats on the tidal Mississippi at and above New Orleans, more
than 100 miles from the mouth of the Mississippi River. See infra notes 288-305.
The political crisis of the time of the decision may have affected Story's decision to turn away from
Federalist principles. By 1824, the Federalist party was dead, having nominated its last presidential
candidate (Rufus King) in 1816. The Democratic-Republican party of Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe
was about to burst apart following the "Era of Good Feelings" of the Monroe presidency. In 1824, five
potential candidates emerged from the Democratic-Republican party: John Quincy Adams (Monroe's
Secretary of State), Andrew Jackson (victorious general and leader in popular voting), Henry Clay
(Speaker of the House of Representatives), William H. Crawford (Secretary of the Treasury), and John
C. Calhoun (Secretary of War). Calhoun withdrew before the inconclusive general election. Since no
candidate had a majority of the electoral vote, the election was thrown to the House of Representatives
(voting by states in accordance with the Twelfth Amendment).
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could be no traditional "admiralty" jurisdiction; furthermore, there could be
no "maritime" jurisdiction since maritime meant pertaining to the sea; a
river hundreds of miles from the sea could not pertain to the sea, there being
no ebb and flow of the ocean tides.
After Story's death, the Jacksonian Democrat, Roger B. Taney, 43 wrote
the opinion that one might have expected from a Federalist. In The Genesee
Chief,144 Taney abandoned the ebb and flow of the tide as a limit on the
riverine jurisdiction of the federal admiralty courts and overruled The
Thomas Jefferson, 45 based on the inherent nature of admiralty jurisdiction
over public navigable waters. Twenty-two years later, in 1873, the jurisdic-
tion of the admiralty court in the United Kingdom was similarly freed from
the ancient limitation on its jurisdiction. 46
In the House Clay's followers gave their votes to Adams, leading Jackson's supporters to charge that
they had made a "corrupt bargain" and thereafter making life difficult, if not impossible, for President
Adams. By the 1828 election there had been a "coagulation" of the forces. Jackson (with Calhoun as
Vice President) won the election for the "Democratic" party. The Clay-Adams forces became the
National-Republican, later Whig (1836), and still later Republican party (1856). States' rights (including
slavery) remained the principal issue but conservative opinion no longer regarded an expansion of federal
jurisdiction as essential to protect business.
In 1845, the last year of his life, Justice Story assisted secretly in the preparation of a statute extending
admiralty jurisdiction to the Great Lakes (5 Stat. 726, now 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1988)) on condition that
either party could demand a jury. The statute was upheld, although rendered obsolete (except for the jury
trial provision) in The Genesee Chief, discussed infra note 144. See generally Note, From Judicial Grant
to Legislative Power: The Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1214 (1954).
143Roger Brooke Taney (1777-1864), originally a Federalist, had become a Jacksonian Democrat by
the time he was elected Attorney General of Maryland in 1826. As Attorney General of the United States
under President Jackson (1831-33), he drafted Jackson's veto of the Second Bank of the United States
and was appointed an associate justice of the Supreme Court but rejected by the Senate in 1835. On the
death of John Marshall, Taney was appointed Chief Justice and confirmed by the Senate in a political deal
in 1836. See C. Swisher, Roger B. Taney (1935).
144The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). The nationalism evident
in the Genesee Chief contrasts strongly with Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857),
Taney's infamous decision holding that Congress could not abolish slavery in the territories and that the
institution of slavery in the older states was protected by the Constitution as "property." Dred Scott was
overruled by the Civil War and the Thirteenth Amendment, ratified in 1865, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1868.
14553 U.S. at 458-59. See also The Eagle, 75 U.S. 15 (8 Wall.) (1868), holding that admiralty
jurisdiction applied on the Great Lakes (actually the Detroit River) by virtue of the 1789 Federal Judiciary
Act rather than the 1845 statute.
146See 3 & 4 Vict., ch. 65 (1840); 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 99 (1846); 13 & 14 Vict., ch. 26 (1850); 17 &
18 Vict., ch. 104 (1854); 24 Vict., ch. 10 (1861); and 31 & 32 Vict., ch. 71 (1868) (all enacted before
the transfer of the Admiralty Court to the Probate, Admiralty and Divorce Division of the High Court of
Justice by the Judicature Act, 1873). The connection to Roman law was broken in 1970 by the
reassignment of the Admiralty Court to Queen's Bench. See further Wiswall, supra note 90, and
Fitzgerald, Admiralty and Prize Jurisdiction in the British Commonwealth of Nations, 60 Jurid. Rev. 106
(1948).
See also Jackson, Admiralty Jurisdiction-the Supreme Court Act of 1981, [1982] LMCLQ 236.
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D. Maritime Contracts
1. Contracts at Sea
Browne began with sources: "The instance court is governed by the civil
law, the laws of O16ron, and the customs of the Admiralty, modified by
statute law." 147 Closer to his own time were the controversies of the
seventeenth century between the admiralty court and the common law courts
(King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer), 48 wherein by writ of
prohibition Edward Coke, t49 Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas,
sought to confine admiralty jurisdiction by the statutes of Richard 11.150 The
reasons for this struggle remain unclear: possibly it was due to a high-
minded effort to preserve Anglo-Saxon jury trial against Roman inquisitorial
practices (the courts of Doctors' Commons found facts by judge alone). The
other possibility is less high-minded: a quarrel over fees. The consequence
was that Browne had to deal with the residue of two hundred years of
skirmishing between common law and admiralty that had produced much
confusion in English case law and that has been repeated in the United States
up to the present.
A statute of Henry V111 15 enlarged admiralty jurisdiction to include cargo
damage, charter parties, general average, marine insurance, seaworthiness
and negligent navigation of vessels, and bills of exchange, as well as all
contracts made abroad, thereby confirming a "maritime" jurisdiction
similar to continental practice.' 52 But Coke's prohibitions overcame even
this statute and, despite the general language of the Tudor statute, its terms
1472 Browne at 29. Admiralty appeals were to "the king in chancery, who appoints delegates by
commission to hear and determine it." Id. at 29-30.
14SKing's Bench descended from the King's personal administration of justice in the curia regis, with
extensive criminal and civil jurisdiction after 1066. Common Pleas had extensive real estate jurisdiction
but became, after 1178, the court for the trial of civil actions between individual subjects. Exchequer was
originally a court in the royal treasury and later, by fictitious pleading, a court for civil actions between
individual subjects (after 1154). See T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 139-56 (5th
ed. 1956).
149FAward Coke (1552-1634) served as Solicitor General (1592), Attorney General (1594), Chief
Justice-Common Pleas (1606), and Chief Justice-King's Bench (1613). He was dismissed in 1616,
was again M.P. in 1620, and was imprisoned in 1622 for opposition to royal prerogative. He published
his Law Reports in 1600-15 and later his four Institutes (after 1628). Coke was a fierce defender of the
common law courts against other courts of royal prerogative, such as admiralty and chancery. See
generally Holdsworth, supra note 97, at 553-56, and Mathiason, Some Problems of Admiralty
Jurisdiction in the 17th Century, 2 Am. J. Legal Hist. 215 (1958).
150Plucknett, supra note 148, at 662-64.
1512 Browne at 28. (Henry VIII was the first English King to claim the title King of Ireland, doing
so from 1541.)
15 2See generally 3 J. Wigmore, A Panorama of the World's Legal Systems 881-929 (1928), and E.
Gold, Maritime Transport 18-30 (1981).
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were interpreted as being subject to the statutes of Richard 11.153 Accord-
ingly, Browne was required to define marine contracts as "contracts made
on the sea, 154 whose consideration is maritime, and not ratified by deed 155
nor under seal."' 156
Browne then reviewed the fictitious pleadings used to bring cases into
admiralty despite the location of the making of the contract being on land,
as well as the fictions used to force disputes arising at sea into the common
law courts. 15 7 Browne contradicted the doctrine of the law courts that a
contract truly made at sea lost admiralty jurisdiction if the execution of the
contract was to be on land, using the example of a master obtaining
necessaries while at sea by promising to pay money on land. 158
Without concern for inconsistency he took up the question of the
practice of the admiralty court in cases of suppliers (materialmen) where
the tackle, furniture, and provisions were clearly for use at sea, though
the contract was made on land. This and other special examples (bills of
lading, charters, and marine insurance) led Browne to conclude that "all
contracts which relate purely to marine affairs" 159 should be cognizable
in admiralty, especially because of the ease and speed of the in rem
process of the admiralty court.
Justice Story clearly followed Browne's conclusion "that the subject
matter and not locality should determine the jurisdiction as to contracts." 160
American courts-including the Supreme Court161-have added exceptions
to Story's conceptual doctrine of the contract jurisdiction, but the trend is
now in Story's direction.
1532 Browne at 94.
154Id. at 72. See also id. at 78-79 and 88. Browne defined "sea" as "that part of the water which is









16°See DeLovio, supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
16ln Mintum v. Maynard, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 477 (1854), the Supreme Court held that admiralty
contract jurisdiction did not apply to general agency contracts of vessel management. This was overruled
in Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, 500 U.S. 603, 1991 AMC 1817 (1991). Justice Marshall concluded
that, "Rather than apply a rule excluding all or certain agency contracts from the realm of admiralty,
lower courts should look to the subject matter of the agency contract and determine whether the services
performed under the contract are maritime in nature." Id. at 612, 1991 AMC at 1824. Cf. supra note 141.
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2. Maritime Liens
Browne's study of maritime liens had to account for the homeport
doctrine, 162 by which repairs and supplies to a ship in her homeport would
not create a maritime lien because the furnishers of repairs and supplies were
presumed to have relied on the personal credit of the shipowner. Of course,
this doctrine was legislatively abolished in the United States in 1910.163
In another context Browne stated, "The cargo is tacitly bound for the
freight, which is preferred to all other debts affecting the cargo, though prior
in time," 164 a liability of the cargo itself whether the goods are carried under
charter or bill of lading. 165 In another place he indicated the possessory
nature of this lien, "The master might always retain the merchandise until
paid his freight," but this statement does not resolve the question.166
Browne distinguished bottomry from the maritime lien for necessities (or
hypothecation). Bottomry being a recent development, he had no Roman
history or practice to fall back on and therefore defined it as a contract made
at the homeport for money lent upon the vessel on the condition that if the
ship were lost the lender would forfeit its money, but if the ship returned in
safety the lender would receive its principal plus a rate of interest that could
exceed the legal rate.' 67
The lien for necessities or hypothecation is described as follows: "The
master ... cannot hypothecate the ship except for its own necessities, and
that abroad; and the vessel itself is thereby subject to seizure in the court of
admiralty to satisfy the debt, but no one is personally liable." 168
Browne favored extending admiralty jurisdiction at least to the part of the
bottomry contract dealing with the ship and tackle, while the personal
162The General Smith, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 438 (1819). Browne here wrote: "it seems now settled that
the ship cannot be hypothecated at home before the voyage commences .. " 2 Browne at 80. The
accompanying footnote cites Lord Mansfield that, at home, it is simply a mortgage.
163 See Federal Maritime Lien Act of 1910, 46 U.S.C. §§ 971-75, recodified as 46 U.S.C. app. §§
31341-31343 (1988). Prior to 1971, suppliers were required to inquire concerning the existence of a
charter and to examine it, wherein the denial of a right to lien the ship would be revealed in the
"prohibition of liens" clause. This obligation was removed by amendment to 46 U.S.C. § 973. In the
absence of the obligation, the shipowner has the heavy burden of proving the supplier's knowledge of the
clause.
1642 Browne at 191.
165Id. See generally The Bird of Paradise, 72 U.S. (5 Wall) 545 (1866) (charter parties), and Alcoa
S.S. Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 421, 1950 AMC 1 (1949) (bills of lading).
1662 Browne at 82, 154.
1671d. at 196.
168Id"
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liability of the borrower would be at law. 169 This division of remedy occurs
because admiralty process was in rem and not in personam.170
3. Carriage of Cargo
Browne clearly distinguished charter parties (a contract for use of the
whole ship) from bills of lading (given for a single article, or more, laden on
board a ship that has sundry merchandises shipped for sundry accounts).171
Browne later dealt very briefly with charter parties and bills of lading
simultaneously, using very few cases; thus it may be concluded that disputes
between the cargo-owning interest (shippers or consignees and their insur-
ers) and the shipowning interest (shipowners and their insurers) were
infrequent at the time Browne wrote his text.
During the age of sail the theory that every voyage was a common venture
was a reality. Many ships were owned in part by merchants (often in shares
as small as sixty-fourths), and cargoes were similarly joint investments of
many merchants. Accordingly, cargo owners may also have been shipown-
ers and shipowners may also have been cargo owners, so that each voyage
became a joint venture of many investors.' 72 Bulk cargoes were seldom in
great demand except in wartime. Voyages were usually not to deliver a cargo
to specific consignees but were made "on speculation," accompanied by a
"super cargo," who looked out for the goods and arranged for their sale at
the various ports of call. This mingling of shipowning and cargo-owning
interests may account for the apparent absence of litigation over cargo
damage.
(a) Charter Parties
Browne listed the minimum contents of a charter party as: 1) the name and
burthen (deadweight tonnage) of the vessel; 2) the name of the master and
freighters (charterers, if any); 3) the place and time of loading and
unloading; 4) the lay days and demurrage; and, 5) the penalties for
non-performance. 73
Today each trade has its own form charter with familiar "boiler plate"
clauses providing the certainties and tolerable ambiguities common to that
'
691d.
170 1d. at 98-101 and 132 n.8. The Supreme Court has confused the once clear distinctions between
in rem and in personam in the context of transfers between federal district courts. See Continental Grain
Co. v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 364 U.S. 19, 1961 AMC 1 (1960).
1712 Browne at 81-82.
172A. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business 15 (1979).
1732 Browne at 189.
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trade.1 74 This custom apparently did not yet exist in Browne's day. Further
study of the staples of eighteenth century shipping-the slave trade 75 and
the triangle trade' 76-would be necessary, however, to reach definite
conclusions about charter party forms and the method of "fixing" char-
ters. 177
Browne specified a rule that has been altered in both England and
America when he stated, "A complete embargo, occasioned by war or
reprisals, dissolves the charter party," 178 and again, "In case of embargo,
the charter party is dissolved without charges to either party ..... 179 His
statements would be correct as to the international law consequence that
upon a declaration of war a subject (or citizen) may not trade with the enemy
(neither with the enemy state nor an enemy private citizen).' 80 However, as
the Suez Canal cases in both the United Kingdom and the United States
make clear, the addition of 8,000-10,000 miles to a voyage because of the
closing of a major international waterway as the result of war does not
invalidate a charter.1 81
(b) Bills of Lading
Browne also listed the minimum contents of a bill of lading: 1) the quality,
quantity, and mark of the goods; 2) the names of the shipper and consignee;
174See generally M. Wilford, T. Coghlin & J. Kimball, Time Charters (3d ed. 1989); Admiralty Law
Institute: Symposium on Charter Parties, 49 Tul. L. Rev. 743 (1975); and the collection of forms in 2B
& 2C Benedict on Admiralty (7th rev. ed. 1986).
175See generally P. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census 127-62 (1969); W. Du Bois,
Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United States, 1638-1870 (1896); and J. Pope-Hennessy,
Sins of the Fathers: Atlantic Slave Traders, 1441-1807, 226-245 (1968).
176See generally Bruchey, Success and Failure Factors: American Merchants in Foreign Trade in the
18th and early 19th Century, 32 Bus. Hist. Rev. 272 (1958); Bailyn, Communications and Trade: The
Atlantic in the 17th Century, 13 J. Econ. Hist. 378 (1953); Andrews, Anglo-American Trade in the Early
18th Century, 45 Geographical Rev. 99 (1955); and S. Morison, The Maritime History of Massachusetts,
1783-1860, 16-40 (1921).
177See the description of fixing charters in Great Circle Lines Ltd. v. Matheson & Co., 681 F.2d 121,
1982 AMC 2321 (2d Cir. 1982).
1782 Browne at 189. A reprisal in customary international law was a use of force short of war to punish




180See Calmar Steamship Corp. v. Scott, 345 U.S. 427, 1953 AMC 952 (1953), and The Claveresk,
264 F. 276 (2d Cir. 1920).
181 See American Trading & Produce Co. v. Shell Int'l Marine Co., 453 F.2d 939, 1972 AMC 318 (2d
Cir. 1972) (a "mere" 33% increase in shipowner's costs for the Cape of Good Hope route does not
frustrate the charter). See also Transatlantic Finance Co. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 1966 AMC 1455
(D.C. Cir. 1966). A sale of goods case having a similar result (due to the closing of the Suez Canal) is
Tsakiroglou & Co. v. Noblee Thorl G.M.b.H., [1962] A.C. 93.
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3) the places of departure and unloading; 4) the names of the master and
ship; and, 5) the value of the freight (i.e., cargo). 182
Bills of lading are to be prepared in triplicate for the shipper, consignee,
and master of the ship. In further distinction from the charter party, Browne
said that the charter party settled the terms of carriage while bills of lading
determine the contents of the cargo.' 83 It was not then the custom to have the
bill of lading perform the threefold function of receipt, negotiable document,
and contract of carriage.' 84 Financing trade by letters of credit and C.I.F.
contracts would not become common practice until the latter part of the
nineteenth century.
Respecting the bill of lading as a negotiable instrument Browne noted,
"The indorsement and delivery of a bill of lading is, prima facie, an
immediate transfer of the legal interest in the cargo." 85 Dealing with the
question of the possibility of dispute over the property in the goods because
of triplicate original bills, Browne laid down the rule, still followed, that
"the person who first gets legal possession of one of them (bills) by delivery
from the owner or shipper has a right to the consignment." 186
Browne appears to be disrupting the normal boundaries between contract
and tort in his discussion of cargo damage liability. He wrote that "if the
cargo be damaged, the owner of the cargo has in his turn his remedy against
the ship or its owner," and, "If either party fails in his part of the contract,
the other is free, though it may be imprudent too rigidly to insist on the strict
letter of the agreement... [a]nd he has also his remedy in damages against
the party who failed in fulfilling his contract." 1 87 Although Browne seems
to be setting up the tort, of breach of contract of carriage, 88 the rigid
distinctions between contract and tort at the common law would not have
been part of the frame of reference of a civilian, for whom tort and contract
were both simply obligations (with contract obligations growing out of the
parties' agreement and tort obligations arising by operation of law). 189
1822 Browne at 190.
1831d.
184See generally Yeramex Int'l v. S.S. Tendo, 595 F.2d 943, 1979 AMC 1282 (4th Cir. 1979), and
Westway Coffee Corp. v. M/V Netuno, 675 F.2d 30, 1982 AMC 1640 (2d Cir. 1982); cf. Bally, Inc. v.
The Zim America, 22 F.3d 65, 1994 AMC 2762 (2d Cir. 1994).
185 Note also that by the Act of 26 Geo. 3, ch. 86, § 3, the shipper must state in the bill of lading "the
true nature, quality, and value of such gold" in order to impose liability on the master or owners of a ship
for loss to any "gold, silver, diamonds, watches, jewels, or precious stones by reason of any robbery
etc." 2 Browne at 145-46.
1861d. at 190. See generally Allied Chemical Int'l Corp. v. Cia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileiro, 775
F.2d 476, 1986 AMC 826 (2d Cir. 1985), and G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty, §§ 3-4
to 3-5, at 96-100 (2d ed. 1975).
1872 Browne at 191.
188See P. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 92, at 658-67 (5th ed. 1984).
189See F. Lawson, A Common Law Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law 138-63 (1953).
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It is not possible to know whether Browne would have admitted the
defenses which the Supreme Court found to be the general maritime law in
The Niagara v. Cordes.190 In another place, speaking of charters, he says,
"If none of the contracting parties are in fault, and the failure is occasioned
by an act of government, neither party suffers. If by the act of Heaven, or of
an enemy, the ancient and modern laws are said to differ, though I believe
they do not." 191 Thus, governmental action (quarantine, restraint of princes,
or arrest pursuant to the process of courts) was mutually excludable-neither
shipper nor carrier were responsible, 192 whereas the effect of vis major (Act
of God) and acts of public enemies could be assigned to either party. 193
(c) Deviation and Freight
Browne compares the results under the Hanseatic Laws of Visby with
cases of his time respecting geographical deviation. 194 Thus, where a shipper
has loaded his goods for a voyage to one destination, but the voyage is to a
different and more distant destination, the shipper pays "half the damage
that might happen to such ship."' 95 When a ship destined for one port
arrives at another, the master and his chief mariners must swear under oath
that they arrived at a port different from the destination port because of
constraint or necessity.' 96
Browne noted that normally freight is "collect" and not "pre-paid," that
is, there is no freight due until the completion of the voyage. Accordingly,
the carrier has no right to a pro rata share of the freight for the proportion
'9062 U.S. (21 How.) 7 (1859) ("the act of God, or the public enemy, or by the act of the owner of
the goods").
1912 Browne at 195.
1921d.
'
93 Id. at 192, 195. By the Act of 26 Geo. 3, ch. 86, § 2, "No owner of any vessel shall be subject to
answer for any loss or damage which may happen to goods shipped on board such ship, by reason of any
fire happening on board the said ship." 2 Browne at 145-47. Browne notes that, "This act, in reality,
only enacts the provisions of the old marine laws. See the 41st article of the laws of Wisbuy and the 13th
of the second fragment of the Rhodian laws."
In the United States there is a special statute exonerating the "owner" from liability for "fire" unless
caused by "design or neglect" of the owner. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 182 (1988) (enacted in 1851 in
response to the Supreme Court's decision in The Lexington, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 343 (1848), discussed infra
notes 365-86). No special fire defense appears in the Harter Act, but there is a fire defense in COGSA.
See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1304(2)(b) (1988). At present, the various courts of appeal differ as to whether the
owner must first prove seaworthiness before raising a fire statute defense. Compare Sunkist Growers, Inc.
v. Adelaide Shipping Lines, Ltd., 603 F.2d 1327, 1979 AMC 2787 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1012 (1980), with In re Ta Chi Nav. (Panama) Corp. (The Eurypylus), 677 F.2d 225, 1982 AMC 1710
(2d Cir. 1983).
1942 Browne at 192.
1951d.1961d.
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completed before shipwreck. Browne said nothing about clauses in charters




Browne's simple proposition was that locality is the criterion of admiralty
jurisdiction, so that admiralty has a remedy for injury done to person or
property upon the seas.198 This jurisdictional rule has undergone the greatest
doctrinal change in American admiralty theory with the addition of an
element beyond location on the navigable waters now needed to establish a
maritime tort.
Early case law, such as The Genesee Chief,199 The Plymouth,2°° Atlantic
Transport Co. v. Imbrovek,201 as well as more recent decisions, such as
Nacirema v. Johnson202 and Askew v. American Waterways Operators,
Inc. ,203 did not mention a required element other than location, although it
might be said that those cases dealt only with problems in locality and no
other possible element had been raised by the parties in those cases.
The modem case law requiring that traditional maritime activity be
present to invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction may represent nothing more
than a technique to clear the crowded dockets of the federal courts. The
Supreme Court found this required element in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v.
City of Cleveland2°4 at a time when proposals were being considered to
'
97Id. at 193-94. On the differences between freight collect and freight pre-paid in the context of
United States limitation of liability proceedings, see Complaint of Caribbean Sea Transport, Ltd., 748
F.2d 622, 1985 AMC 1995 (11 th Cir.'1984).
1982 Browne at 201-02. See also id. at 110 ("civil or private injuries to the person, committed on the
seas are remediable in this [admiralty] court; but there, and in all matters of tort, locality is the strict
limit.... In torts, locality ascertains the judicial power.").
199See supra note 144.
20070 U.S. 20 (1866).
201234 U.S. 52 (1914) (longshoreman recovers under maritime tort).
202396 U.S. 212, 1969 AMC 1967 (1969) (longshoreman's statutory recovery).
203See supra note 131.
204409 U.S. 249, 1973 AMC 1 (1972) (absence of maritime tort jurisdiction on crash of cargo aircraft
into Lake Erie on flight from Cleveland to White Plains, New York, with planned stop at Portland, Maine.
This flight, mostly over land, was not a traditional maritime activity as would be the New York to London
flight. Liability of the city was based on its failure to deal with flocks of seagulls at the lakefront end of
the runway; the aircraft engines, having ingested the birds after takeoff, suffered a power failure and
crashed into Lake Erie.).
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lessen or eliminate the case load by, for example, excluding vessels under
300 gross tons from the federal courts. 205
Having opened up tort doctrine to further limiting elements, the next effort
was to eliminate a large category of collision cases from the federal courts
under a states' rights rationale. In Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson,2°6
however, the Court found admiralty jurisdiction for vessel collisions to be
too deeply imbedded to be eliminated on a quasi-political rationale.
Foremost, however, had mentioned navigation in its discussion of collision
jurisdiction. Having redefined the maritime nexus by reference to naviga-
tion,207 lower courts required actual navigation for "traditional maritime
activity." The Supreme Court, however, removed actual navigation as a
requirement in Sisson v. Ruby.208 Current doctrinal disputes concern the
number and type of factors necessary to establish the nexus to traditional
maritime activity. 2°9
2. Collision
The mystery is why there are so few reported collision cases in Browne's
treatise, given the increased volume of shipping produced by persistent war
with France and other continental nations from 1760 through 1815. The first
and second world wars produced a large volume of ordinary shipping
litigation-excluding prize-and one would expect the same in earlier wars,
but there is no evidence of substantial collision litigation and no ready
explanation for its absence. Browne analyzed the collision situation under
three types: when two ships are too near each other in port; when one is at
anchor and the other under sail; and where both are sailing and strike
together. 210
Legal consequences in Roman law depended on fault. If the injury occurs
without fault and by accident, neither party recovers; 21 but "if the party
20 5The debate began with the merger of the Supreme Court's Admiralty Rules into the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in 1966, followed by suggestions to the American Law Institute by Chief Justice
Warren in 1969. A proposed codification was introduced as Draft Bill 1876 in the 92nd Congress (1972),
but the admiralty bar opposed it and nothing has been enacted. See generally Force, Detemining
Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction: An Alternative Analytical Framework, 21 J. Mar. L. & Com. 1 (1990).
206457 U.S. 668, 1982 AMC 2253 (1982).
2071d. at 677, 1982 AMC at 2258-59.
208497 U.S. 358, 1990 AMC 1801 (1990).
20
see Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 1973 AMC 2478 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969
(1974). The Kelly court listed four factors: functions and roles of the parties; types of vehicles and
instrumentalities; causation and type of injury; and traditional concepts of admiralty. Cf. Delta Country
Ventures, Inc. v. Magna, 986 F.2d 1260, 1993 AMC 855 (9th Cir. 1993).
2102 Browne at 204-05. Professor Bourguignon suggests that collisions in crowded rivers and harbors
would have been decided in common law courts. Bourguignon, supra note 87, at 96.
2112 Browne at 203-04.
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occasioning the accident was in fault, he was to make full restitution and
reparation to the injured." 212 Browne then turned to the Laws of Visby.
Under Visby, where a ship under sail damages another ship under sail, "the
damage is to be borne by the ship that did it, unless her mariners swear they
could not help it, and then to be borne by each equally." Secondly, "if two
ships strike against one another, and receive damage, the loss shall be borne
equally between them, unless the men on board one of them did it on
purpose; in which case that ship shall pay all the damage." 213 Lastly,
Browne mentioned a rule of several liability to cargo: where, by accident,
one ship perishes, the cargo loss "shall be valued and paid for pro rata by
both owners, and the damage of the ship shall also be answered for by both,
according to their value." 214 This latter statement is ambiguous. Does it
mean that the allocation of fault is to depend on the value of the ships in
collision, and, if so, as of what time is the value to be determined, before or
after the collision?215
Browne called on Bynkershoek's treatise to aid in interpreting this
statement:
... the mercantile world was not reconciled to the idea that where it happens
by accident, the doer of it should be perfectly free from the obligation of
making some payment or retribution, because if so, it would always be
imputed to accident, and it would often be extremely difficult to prove the
contrary; on the other hand, if the principles of the noxal actions of the
Romans, and of the action de pauperie were here applied, viz. that the theory
which was the immediate cause or instrument of damage, should be given up,
or otherwise the whole damage paid, it would be too severe a rule to be
applied, if the case really happened by accident and misfortune: they therefore
chose a middle course. In case of accident, the loss was to be divided between
both parties, in equal proportions; in case of wilful fault or negligence, the
guilty person was to pay the whole. 216
Browne then goes to the question of the vicarious liability of owners for
the torts of masters and mariners. Under Roman law, each owner is liable to
contribute in proportion to its share of ownership unless the master was
authorized to do the act that caused the damage, in which case the owners'
212Id. at 204 (described as "the decree of fate").
2131d.
2 141d. (citing Articles 29, 51, and 71 of the Visby Code). American law has consistently adhered to
the joint and several liability of colliding vessels to notionally innocent cargo. See The Alabama and The
Gamecock, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 695 (1875); The Atlas, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 302 (1876); The Chattahoochee, 173
U.S. 540 (1899); and United States v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. (The Esso Belgium), 343 U.S. 236,
1952 AMC 659 (1952).
2152 Browne at 205. Turkish law under the Ottoman Empire provided that in a both-to-blame collision
the larger vessel was to bear the greater proportion of fault.
2161d.
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liability would be "in solidum" or joint and several, noting Bynkershoek's
observation that masters are not authorized or instructed to run down
ships.2 17
Bynkershoek's writings are approved as "guides in our courts," ' 218 and a
case is put of a collision occurring through failure to carry lights at night, a
fault of the master but not of the owners since not authorized by them.
Browne prefers to say that while it is a fault of the owners, the liability does
not extend beyond the value of the ship. 219 This interpretation by Browne
may illustrate the Anglo-American concept of the in rem liability of the ship
for her own torts. 220
Browne's last analysis on the subject of collision is from the Laws of
Ol6ron:
... if a vessel moored and lying at anchor be struck by another vessel under
sail, the damage shall be in common, because old decayed vessels have
sometimes been purposely put in the way of better; and if in harbour, where
there is little water, the anchor of one lies dry, the other may remove it, and
the party preventing him must answer the damage; and every ship not having
a buoy to the anchor is liable for any damage happening thereby. 22'
The first part of the quotation would be an exception to the presumption of
fault when a moving vessel strikes a properly anchored vessel. 222
American law with respect to liability in both-to-blame cases was subject
for many years to the inequitable rule of equal division of damages, 223
inherited from English law.224 When the United Kingdom ratified the 1910
Brussels Collision Convention, English law was freed from the equal
division rule. Because the convention also abolishes the rule of joint and
several liability of colliding vessels to innocent cargo, the United States has
refused to ratify the 1910 convention. 225 It was not until 1975 that the United
States Supreme Court rejected the rule of equal division of damages as
2 171d. at 205-06 (citing chapters 18-23 of Bynkershoek's Quaestiones Juris Privati).
215Id. at 206.
21d. at 207.
22°Id. at 206. See The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53 (1868).
2212 Browne at 207 (citing Articles 14 and 15 of the Laws of Oldron).
222See The Louisiana, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 164 (1866); The Clara, 102 U.S. 200 (1880); and The Oregon,
158 U.S. 186 (1895).223See The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855).
224See The Woodrop-Sims, 165 Eng. Rep. 1422 (Adm. 1815), a decision of Sir William Scott. The
House of Lords applied the rule of equal division of damages in a Scottish case, Hay v. Le Neve, 2
Shaw's Rep. 395 (H.L. 1824).
225Intemational Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law With Respect to Collisions
Between Vessels (Brussels, Sept. 23, 1910), reprinted in 6 Benedict on Admiralty, Doc. No. 3-2 (7th rev.
ed. 1986).
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unjust and adopted the rule of proportional fault.226 The United States rule
of joint and several liability of colliding vessels to innocent cargo227 was not
even changed by the creation of the negligent navigation defense in the
Harter Act,228 and the effort of carriers to get around joint and several
liability through bill of lading clauses has been struck down as a violation of
public policy. 229
3. Seamen's Injuries
Browne's discussion of mariners deals principally with wages,230 deser-
tion,23' the supreme rule of the master,232 flogging,233 barratry, 234 and the
obligation of mariners to save and preserve the cargo to the utmost of their
power. 235 He noted that all the old maritime laws provide that if a seaman
is "wounded in the ship's service, he ought to be cured at the expense of the
ship, but if he is wounded in riots and quarrels, he must pay his own
2 26 See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 1975 AMC 541 (1975).227 See supra note 214.
22846 U.S.C. app. §§ 190-96 (1988). See The Chattahoochee, supra note 214.
229 See The Esso Belgium, supra note 214.
2302 Browne at 155, 157, 166, 177-82. Browne quoted Lord Mansfield to the effect that if a ship is
taken by the enemy before the voyage has been completed, the seaman is entitled to nothing because
"freight is the mother of wages, and the safety of the ship is the mother of freight." Id. at 177.231Id. at 156-57, 164. Although seamen are permitted to go ashore for a short and reasonable period
of time if the ship is safely anchored, the Hanseatic Laws dealt harshly with seamen who went ashore
without permission: such men were to be kept in prison on bread and water for one year if the ship
suffered for want of hands. Id. at 164. The modem attitude towards shore leave can be crudely put: "there
won't be perversion if the crew gets diversion." See Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 1943
AMC 451 (1943), and Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 1951 AMC 416 (1951).
232"[Tlhe mariners are to pay due obedience to the master, who hath the supreme rule on ship-board,
and whose power and authority are by the law much countenanced." 2 Browne at 160.233Id. (described as "moderate and due correction," referring to one blow in the Laws of Olron and
Consolato del Mar, but also noting that under the Laws of Oldron the penalty for striking the master was
the loss of a hand). Browne preferred the punishment of loss of wages to corporeal violence. Id. at
160-70.
Richard Henry Dana's experiences aboard the brig Pilgrim, recorded in his classic work Two Years
Before the Mast (1840), made him a strong opponent of flogging and an advocate for its abolition. In
Congress, Senator John P. Hale (1806-75) (R-N.H.), the first senator elected on an anti-slavery platform,
was the strongest proponent of the abolition of flogging.
Flogging aboard United States naval and merchant vessels finally was abolished by the Act of Sept.
23, 1850, 10 Stat. 515. Today, the penalty for mariners' offenses aboard ship is called "logging,"
whereby amounts are deducted from wages for offenses against ship's discipline.
2342 Browne at 172 (quoting Beawes, Lex Mercatoria, as an epidemical disease of seamen). The
English Marine Insurance Act of 1906, 6 Edw. 7, ch. 41, to which the Lloyd's S.G. Policy is appended,
notes in the Rules for Construction of the S.G. Policy: "11. The term 'barratry' includes every wrongful
act wilfully committed by the master or crew to the prejudice of the owner, or, as the case may be, the
charterer."
2352 Browne at 175. See The Niagara, supra note 190.
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charges." 236 Further, if he becomes sick during the voyage and is left on
shore, he is entitled to his whole wages, after deducting what has been laid
out for him, quoting the Laws of Oldron, described as "particularly
humane," whereby the master is to furnish the sick sailor "with lodging and
candlelight, and also to spare him one of the ship's boys, or hire a woman
to attend him, and likewise to afford him such diet as is usual in the ship for
men in health... ,"237
Browne's provisions seem to be very close to maintenance and cure in the
general maritime law and the International Labour Organization's 1936
Treaty on Seamen's Injuries.238 Today, most of the maritime world has
adopted workers' compensation as the exclusive remedy for seamen. In the
United States, however, workers' compensation has been vigorously re-
jected by the seamen's unions and a tripartite scheme or "trident" of
remedies is still available in American courts for seamen who are injured in
the service of the ship or who become diseased during the temporal
existence of the articles of employment.239 The trident of remedies, of
course, consists of maintenance and cure, 24 Jones Act negligence, 241 and
unseaworthiness of the ship. 242
F. General Average
Arthur Browne's notes on the system of general average were prepared
eighty years before the appearance of the York-Antwerp Rules. 243 In three
2362 Browne at 184. See Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 1951 AMC 416 (1951); Farrell v.
United States, 336 U.S. 511, 1949 AMC 613 (1949); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 1963 AMC
1131 (1962); and Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, 1975 AMC 563 (1975).
2372 Browne at 182-83.238See Shipowners' Liability Convention of 1936, I.L.O. Cony. No. 55, Shipowner Liability in Cases
of Sickness, Injury or Death of Seamen, 54 Stat. 1693, T.S. No. 951, 77 L.N.T.S. 407.
.
239This trident of remedies may be heard before a jury, even though maintenance and cure and
unseaworthiness traditionally were tried to the court alone, because the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688
(1988), gives a right to jury trial that has been extended to all three remedies when pleaded alternatively.
See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 1959 AMC 832 (1959), and
Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, 374 U.S. 16, 1963 AMC 1093 (1963).
24°See Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480 (No. 6,047) (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (describing seamen as
"wards of the Admiralty"). See also Laws of Olrron, Articles VI and VII.
24'The Act was found to be constitutional in Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).242The Osceola, 189 U.S. 153 (1903) (dictum). Early cases recognizing the unseaworthiness remedy
were brought by longshoremen. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 1946 AMC 698 (1946),
and Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 1946 AMC 1 (1944). The unseaworthiness remedy was
abolished for longshoremen in 1972. See 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1988). It remains effective, however, for
seamen. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 1960 AMC 1503 (1960).243The York-Antwerp Rules were the first maritime product of the International Law Association
(ILA). Promulgated in 1877, they represented a melding of French and British practices. The ILA was
founded in 1873 in Brussels, in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) and the American
Civil War (1861-65), to reform and codify customary international law. The York-Antwerp Rules have
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pages he offers a glimpse of the provisions, antedating statutory and even
judicial marine insurance law. In general average, losses incurred for the
safety of ship, personnel, and cargo are spread among the financial interests
in the voyage or venture. Thus, a contribution "proportionably" must be
made towards losses for the safeguard of the ship or of the goods and lives
on the ship in time of tempest. 244
Loss "voluntarily suffered" is described as the great principle of general
average. Browne then explains that "voluntary" does not necessarily mean
"consenting," nor is every loss included. Thus, if masts or yardarms are
destroyed by the tempest there is no voluntary loss, but if the same masts and
yardarms are cut away there would be a general average. Similarly, if a ship
runs on shore and is broken up but the cargo saved, there is no voluntary loss
unless the ship was purposely grounded to save the cargo. 245 When a general
average act has been performed, "All persons for whose benefit the act was
done, the freighters [shippers], the master, the owners, the sailors, the
passengers, must contribute." Sailors, however, are usually freed from the
necessity to contribute. 246 Furthermore, "All things in the ship, except the
victualling and provisions of the ship and the bodies of the men (unless
servants) must bear a proportionable share in the contribution. ' 247 Lastly,
been frequently revised (most recently in 1924, 1949, 1974, and 1994), and are incorporated by reference
in charter parties, bills of lading, and other maritime contracts worldwide. See generally Eagle Terminal
Tankers, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of U.S.S.R., 637 F.2d 890, 1981 AMC 137 (2d Cir. 1981). See also R.
Lowndes & G. Rudolf, The Law of General Average and The York-Antwerp Rules (11 th ed. 1990), and
L. Buglass, Marine Insurance and General Average in the United States (3d ed. 1991). The current rules
are reprinted at 1995 AMC 293.
In Ralli v. Troop, 157 U.S. 386, 403 (1895), the Supreme Court defined the elements of general
average as follows: "a voluntary and successful sacrifice of part of the maritime adventure, made for the
benefit of the whole adventure, and for no other purpose, and by order of the owners of all the interests
included in the common adventure or the authorized representative of all of them." Today, the
"authorized representative" is usually the master.
2442 Browne at 198. "There is a general average act when and only when, any extraordinary sacrifice
or expenditure is intentionally and reasonably made or incurred for the common safety for the purpose
of preserving from peril the property involved in a common maritime adventure." Rule A, York-Antwerp
Rules (1994).
2452 Browne at 199. Cf. Barnard v. Adams, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 270, 303-04 (1850):
if the common peril was of such a nature, that the 'jactus,' or thing cast away to save the rest, would
have perished anyhow, or perished 'inevitably,' even if it had not been selected to suffer in place
of the whole, there can be no contribution.... The necessity of the case must compel [the master]
to choose between the loss of the whole and part....
2462 Browne at 201.
2471d. Cf. Rule XI of the York-Antwerp Rules (1994) (concerning wages and maintenance of the crew
during prolongation of the voyage and, at a port of refuge, until the ship either resumes the voyage or is
condemned).
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"[T]he master ought not to deliver the goods until the contribution is settled,
they being tacitly pledged, as they are for the freight." 248
G. Limitation of Liability
Noting the severity of the maritime liability of shipowners for damage or
injury in cases of accident, fire, or theft, a major modification was introduced
in English law by the statute of 1786,249 which limited the liability of owners
of ships to "the value of the ship, with all her appurtenance, and the full
amount of the freight due or to grow due." The precondition is the absence
of knowledge of the owners and the fact that the master or mariners shall not
be privy to loss or damage by reason of any fire or by reason of any robbery
or embezzlement, secreting or making away with any gold, silver, diamonds,
jewels, precious stones, or other goods or merchandise. Browne noted the
origin of this statute in an earlier act dealing only with embezzlement by the
master and mariners; 250 furthermore, he speculated that these English
statutes merely enacted the provisions of the Rhodian law251 and the Laws
of Visby. 252
Respecting distribution of the proceeds from the limitation fund made up
of ship, appurtenances, and freight, Browne wrote that the shippers "shall
receive their satisfaction thereout in average, in proportion to their loss-
es." 253 Equitable principles and the aid of the equity courts were to be
enlisted for the resolution of disputes as to the value of the ship and the
claims of the shippers. 254
2482 Browne at 201. Today, a bond will be required for general average contribution before the cargo
will be delivered to the consignee. See The Jason, 225 U.S. 32 (1912), and Dibrell Bros. v. Prince Line,
58 F.2d 959, 1932 AMC 896 (2d Cir. 1932).
2492 Browne at 145 (discussing 26 Geo. 3, ch. 86). Cf. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183 (1988) ("without the
privity or knowledge of such owner"). The United States Limitation of Liability Act was justified in
Congress, in part, by the need to compete with the British merchant marine. See Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch.
43, 9 Stat. 635, Rev. Stat. §§ 4282-4290. See also Donovan, The Origins and Development of
Shipowners' Limitation of Liability, 58 Tul. L. Rev. 999 (1979). The very heavy burden of proof on
shipowners to establish absence of privity prevents many owners from relying on the Act. See Spencer
Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Hicks (The Linseed King), 285 U.S. 502, 1932 AMC 503 (1932), and Matter of
Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1992 AMC 913 (7th Cir. 1992).
2502 Browne at 145. See 7 Geo. 2, ch. 15.
25'Rhodian Law, § 13 (second fragment).
252 Laws of Visby, art. 41.
2532 Browne at 146. Cf. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 273 U.S. 207
(1927). See also The Mauch Chunk, 154 F. 182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 207 U.S. 586 (1907) (equitable
subordination of claims of the other colliding vessel).
2542 Browne at 146.
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H. Possession of the Vessel
Excepting felonious or piratical takings, for which the criminal jurisdic-
tion was applicable, and takings as prize for which prize jurisdiction only
was applicable, Browne favored applying admiralty jurisdiction to "illegal
possession of the ship in any other way. ' 12 55 Disputes concerning ownership
and control (but not title) led to petitory or possessory suits in admiralty.2 56
Because the admiralty court could not determine title, Browne said the court
was confined to the possessory action, the issue of possession for which the
common law courts had concurrent jurisdiction. 257 The common law courts
had exclusive jurisdiction over title disputes.
On the vexatious question of an illegal taking of a ship followed by a sale
in open market, Browne disputed the view that admiralty lost jurisdiction
because the sale was on land. He felt that since admiralty had cognizance of
the principal issue (the illegal taking), it should also have jurisdiction of the
incidental issue, at least where the whole made one continued act (the sale
after the taking being a continuation of the violence). 258 Respecting practice,
the action in rem would be available for possessory actions. 259
IV
ARTHUR BROWNE'S TEXT IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
Until American texts such as Conkling, 26° Benedict,261 and Flanders,262 as
well as Justice Story's Abridgment of Abbot,263 began to appear, Browne's
text was usually authoritative, either standing alone or as part of a string of
citations. Later, as American precedents became more plentiful, Browne's
255 See supra text accompanying note 172 (noting that because ocean ventures during this time
typically involved many part-owners disputes concerning the control and use of ships were frequent).
2562 Browne at 113. Citing Browne's text, Justice Story, sitting in the Circuit Court in The Tilton, 23
F. Cas. 1277 (No. 14,054) (C.C.D. Mass. 1830), distinguished petitory suits for title from possessory suits
and found no reason for the American courts to continue the distinction. In disputes about the uses to
which a vessel is put when owners cannot agree on a proposed voyage or charter, the guiding principle
in this country is that the vessel must be earning money. See The Annie H. Smith, I F. Cas. 968 (No.
420) (S.D.N.Y. 1878).
2572 Browne at 113.
2581d. at 116. Resolving the question of concurrency, Browne said that an action in rem for restitution
of the ship should be in admiralty, while an action for damages could only be at common law by a writ
of replevin or a case for trover.
2591d. at 118, 396-97, 402-06, 430-32. In The Tilton, supra note 256, owners having a 75% interest
in the vessel had begun an action in rem for possession alleging wrongful withholding by the three
remaining owners. Supplemental Admiralty Rule D clearly provides for process by a warrant of arrest of
the vessel in "Possessory, Petitory and Partition Actions."
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text became the resource of dissenters seeking to preserve earlier substantive
customs and practices.
A. Prize Law and International Law
The first Supreme Court opinion to cite Browne's text as authority was
Jennings v. Carson,264 a prize case from the American Revolution dealing
with a ship and cargo seized by an American privateer and condemned by
the Admiralty Court of the State of New Jersey in 1778. The New Jersey
order was appealed to the Court of Appeals in Prize Cases under the
Continental Congress (before ratification of the Articles of Confederation)
and reversed by that court in 1780 with an order for restitution. After the
government under the United States Constitution came into force in 1789,
the neutral owner of the condemned ship libelled the privateer (and
subsequently his executors) for the proceeds of the prize sale. The opinion
of Chief Justice Marshall for an unanimous court affirmed dismissal of the
libel. Browne's text was used to establish admiralty's jurisdiction over prize
cases, even in the absence of a statute,265 and the arrest in rem of a ship as
the foundation of admiralty jurisdiction. 266
Browne's text would be used in prize cases throughout the United States'
war with Great Britain (1812-14), as well as during the revolutions in Latin
America as those countries sought independence from Spain. 267 It was also
cited in cases under Jefferson's Embargo Act where condemnation of United
States vessels was sought for violation of the prohibition on international
trading; 268 it was further used in discussions of crimes such as piracy,269
murder,270 and oyster-poaching and illegal nets. 271
260A. Conkling, Admiralty Jurisprudence (1848).
26 1E. Benedict, The Law of American Admiralty (1850).
262H. Flanders, Treatise on Maritime Law (1852).
263j. Story, Abridgment of Abbot's Treatise of the Law Relating to Merchant Ships and Seamen
(1810).
2648 U.S. (4 Cranch) 2 (1807).
265Id. at 22-23.
2661d. at 24.
267See Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808); The Nereida, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815);
The Gran Para, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 471 (1822); The Arrogante Barcelones, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 496
(1822); and La Nereyda, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 108 (1823).
268See United States v. The Schooner Betsey and Charlotte, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 443 (1808); The
General Pinkney v. United States, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 281 (1809); Williams v. Armroyd, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 423 (1813); and The Octavia, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 20 (1816).269See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820), and The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S.
(2 How.) 210 (1844).270See United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336 (1818).
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When the law of war was invoked against the Southern Confederacy in
the Civil War the Court turned to Browne;272 but his work was also useful
to the dissenters in The Confiscation Cases.273 During the second year of the
war Congress enacted a statute to confiscate the property of rebels as part of
a provision to suppress insurrection and punish treason. 274 The statute did
not make detailed provisions; in one part it merely ordered the proceedings
to conform as nearly as possible to the proceedings in admiralty or revenue
cases. Justice Strong's Republican majority opinion upheld the confiscation
of Slidell's land under this statute, noting that admiralty proceedings were
selected as the model because "strict conformity" and "technical niceties"
were not required in admiralty. 275 The major objection to these rash and even
hysterical confiscation proceedings was that the proceedings tolerated
alternative and cumulative allegations of treason without strict proof.
Justices Clifford and Field, both Democrats, and Justice Davis (President
Lincoln's 1860 campaign manager) dissented; Clifford merely saying that
the majority opinion "is opposed to the whole current of the decisions of the
admiralty courts and to the rules laid down by the most approved writers
upon admiralty law." 276 Arthur Browne's treatise is listed among the most
approved writers.
Finally, there is a prize case which is the source of the doctrine of the
absolute immunity of foreign sovereigns in United States courts: The
Schooner Exchange v. McFadden.277 The Supreme Court refused to review
the history of a Baltimore schooner because at the time of her arrest in
Philadelphia the vessel was a French warship. Dallas, the United States
Attorney for Pennsylvania, citing Browne, argued for absolute sovereign
immunity and the absence of admiralty jurisdiction. Chief Justice Marshall's
rejection of jurisdiction was held to be required by customary international
27 1See Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855) (oysters), and C.J. Hendry v. Moore, 318 U.S.
133, 1943 AMC 156 (1943) (an unusual forfeiture of an illegal net in a criminal rather than a civil
proceeding under California's game laws).
272See Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 404 (1864).
27387 U.S. (20 Wall.) 92 (1873).
27 4Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, § 7, 12 Stat. 589.
27587 U.S. at 110.
27 61d. at 113 (citing 2 Browne at 401).
27711 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). The vessel had sailed under the orders of her Baltimore owners on
October 27, 1806, bound for San Sebastian, Spain, but was captured by French warships and condemned
by a French prize court. When the vessel, renamed Balaou, sailed into Philadelphia in 1811 under French
colors for emergency repairs she was arrested by her original owners. Browne's text was used by the
government to establish the absence of admiralty jurisdiction on the question of title. See id. at 121 (citing
2 Browne at 110).
law and necessary for the effective conduct of international relations by the
executive. 278
B. Admiralty Jurisdiction
Because the conferral of admiralty jurisdiction is located in Article III of
the Constitution, which creates the federal courts, admiralty jurisdiction in
the United States always raises questions of constitutional dimensions,
whether the federal courts have the power to decide the dispute or whether
the state courts must decide. Admiralty jurisdiction in Arthur Browne's time
did not involve constitutional questions of federalism but rather the choice
of legal system (common law or Roman law) and the type of fact finder (jury
or judge). Furthermore, the United States Constitution granted federal court
jurisdiction in "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," 279 and on
the principle that the Constitution does not use superfluous terms, the word
"maritime" could only broaden the remnant of English admiralty jurisdic-
tion familiar to Arthur Browne. Thus, Browne's treatise was an unlikely
source for arguments in American constitutional disputes. Nevertheless,
Browne's historical background would be used in these cases as arguments
to expand or contract federal court jurisdiction.
To summarize the doctrine, contracts conceptually maritime 280 and torts
involving traditional maritime activity but occurring on navigable waters28'
are today within American admiralty jurisdiction. The fact finder in
admiralty is normally the judge alone, but this is by custom, not by statute
or constitution. The Judiciary Act of 1789 preserved the right of jury trial
through the use of the state courts with juries,282 did not mandate jury
trials, 28 3 and referred the courts and practitioners initially to the practices of
278The absolute foreign sovereign immunity of the Schooner Exchange was applied to government-
owned merchant ships in Berizzi Bros. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926). Executive suggestions of
such immunity were given binding effect in Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). In 1952,
however, the State Department changed the immunity from absolute to restrictive so as to exempt the
"private," as opposed to the "public," acts of foreign sovereigns. Finally, in 1976, Congress enacted the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330 and 1602-1611 (1988), conferring jurisdiction on
the federal courts to determine whether foreign sovereigns are exempt respecting commercial activities.279 See Article III, § 2.28
°See The Lexington, supra note 193; New England Mutual Marine Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78
U.S. (1 Wall.) 1 (1871); and Exxon v. Central Gulf Lines, supra note 161.2 81See The Plymouth, supra note 200; Executive Jet, supra note 204; Foremost, supra note 206; and
Sisson, supra note 208.282ee Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 76, § 9 ("saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a
common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it").2831Id. ("And the trial of issues in fact, in the district courts, in all causes except civil causes of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be by jury.")
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the civil law. 284 Following a hostile reaction to "Roman" practices,
Congress provided that the practices in the federal admiralty courts would
follow the practice of admiralty courts. 285 Under these practice directives,
American admiralty courts would not customarily use juries as the fact
finders. 28
6
While use of Browne's text was essential to Justice Story's circuit court
decision on admiralty contract jurisdiction,287 it was not until much later, in
Waring v. Clarke,288 that the Court used Browne's text on these questions.
In two earlier cases concerning admiralty jurisdiction on the rivers,
Browne's text had been urged by counsel but not applied by the Supreme
Court. In Peyroux v. Howard (The Planter),289 and The Orleans v.
Phoebus,2 90 the issue was admiralty jurisdiction on the Mississippi River,
with the Orleans reaching a result contrary to The Planter.
Story's Orleans opinion confined admiralty jurisdiction to the high seas
and the ebb and flow of the tide, as in The Thomas Jefferson.29 1 "Interior"
navigation thus was not within admiralty jurisdiction despite the enormous
growth in steamboat and barge traffic on the rivers and canals.
In Waring v. Clarke,292 a collision on the Mississippi River (ninety-five
miles above New Orleans and 203 miles from the sea) forced the Court to
revisit the question of the effect of the ebb and flow of the tide on American
admiralty courts and resulted in an expansion of jurisdiction. This case was
decided after the death of Justice Story, who, in The Thomas Jefferson, had
rejected admiralty jurisdiction on the wage claim of a seaman who worked
284See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93 ("And the forms and modes of proceeding in
causes of equity, and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be according to the course of the civil
law").285See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 276 ("And the forms and modes of proceeding ...
in those of equity and in those of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, according to the principles, rules
and usages which belong to courts of equity and to courts of admiralty respectively, as contradistin-
guished from courts of common law").2861n 1920, however, Congress provided for the right of trial by jury in cases of personal injury or
wrongful death of seamen. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988).
287See DeLovio, supra note 140 (Browne's text was an essential part of this decision).
28846 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847).
28932 U.S. (7 Pet.) 324 (1833). In a case arising out of repairs to a steamboat at its homeport of New
Orleans, the defendant denied admiralty jurisdiction because there was no "ebb and flow" of the tide.
The plaintiff, however, successfully proved tidal influence. Under the authority of The General Smith, see
supra note 162, there was no maritime lien unless provided by state law. As noted earlier, the doctrine
was washed away by the passage of the 1910 Federal Maritime Lien Act. See supra note 163.
29036 U.S. (11 Pet.) 175 (1837) (partition action among disputing owners, the issue being the past uses
of the vessel north from New Orleans to Pittsburgh).
29 1See supra note 142.
292See supra note 288 (citing 2 Browne at 92 and 110). As is explained infra note 386, Justice Daniel
concurred in the opinion. Justice Grier concurred as to the result and as to the issue of the existence of
admiralty jurisdiction.
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on a vessel operating from Shippingport, Kentucky to Missouri and back,293
noting that "the voyage not only in its commencement and termination, but
in all its immediate progress, was several hundreds of miles above the ebb
and flow of the tide." 294
Story's Orleans opinion, 295 which confirmed the absence of maritime
jurisdiction beyond the ebb and flow of the tide, had led to great confusion
in New Orleans, one of the most important ports in the United States where
there are no tidal changes but the effect of the distant ocean tides can be seen
on the strong southerly current of the river. In Waring, Browne was not
essential for the majority, although it was cited. 296 Rather, Justice Wood-
bury's thirty-six page dissent found great comfort in Browne's analysis of
the statutes of Richard II and its restrictions of admiralty to things done upon
the sea. 2
97
The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh298 involved a collision on Lake Ontario
between the propeller Genesee Chief and the schooner Cuba. Chief Justice
Taney passed over arguments based on the Great Lakes Act of 1845299 and
based his decision on the character of the waters as public navigable waters
and thereby within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction as known and
understood when the Constitution was adopted. 300 Browne's text was passed
over on the question of jurisdiction but was used on the evidentiary question
of the incompetency of a witness. 30
Jackson v. The Steamboat Magnolia30 2 also dealt with admiralty jurisdic-
tion as a question of constitutional law, applying the logic of The Genesee
Chief to an inland river of Alabama 200 miles from the sea. The Court,
having applied the public navigable waters theory first to the Great Lakes in
The Genesee Chief, and then to the Mississippi River in Fretz v. Bull,30 3 was
now sufficiently confident of its navigable waters doctrine to invade a
sovereign state's territory with federal admiralty jurisdiction, to the intense
despair of Justice Daniel, who saw "the hand of federal power... thrust into
everything, even into a vegetable or fruit basket... [where it was] liable to
293See supra note 142. For Justice Story this was an unusually short opinion (just two pages), without
any of his customary references to history and classical authors.
29423 U.S. at 429.
295See supra note 290.
29646 U.S. at 464.
2971d. at 468, 472, 482, 489, 500, 503.
298See supra note 144.
299See supra note 142.
3 0 See 53 U.S. at 454-57.
'id. at 450.
30261 U.S. (20 How.) 296 (1857).
30353 U.S. (12 How.) 466 (1851) (ebb and flow of the tide could not be argued in a collision occurring
opposite Prophet's Island, Louisiana, some 260 miles above the mouth near Baton Rouge).
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be arrested on its way to the next market town by the high admiralty
power... ... 304 Daniel's hatred of national power led him to conclude that
not even the constitutional grant could change the nature of Arthur Browne's
admiralty jurisprudence as it existed in England in 1789.305
The last case of constitutional dimension in which Browne's text would
be used (in dissent) was Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,30 6 a five-to-four
decision that is cited today for the proposition that because the non-statutory
general maritime law must be uniform throughout the United States, state
legislation may not vary its terms. 30 7
The case involved the applicability of the New York State Workmen's
Compensation Act 30 8 to the death claim of the widow and orphans of a
railroad employee who was unloading lumber in a truck from the hold of a
steamship in berth; the truck was customarily loaded with cargo on the ship,
driven on a gangway out of the ship onto the pier, and then to a place on the
pier where it was unloaded. Jensen (the decedent) was killed on the gangway
as he proceeded backwards into the hatchway.
The New York State Workmen's Compensation Commission had
awarded Jensen's widow $5.87 per week during widowhood, $100 for
funeral expenses, and two years compensation in a lump sum in case of
remarriage; his minor children were each awarded $1.96 per week until age
eighteen. The employer objected to the award as an unconstitutional burden
upon interstate commerce and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The New York State Court of Appeals, however, had affirmed the award.3° 9
It is necessary to apply a broader context than admiralty jurisdiction to
understand the majority opinion, written by Justice McReynolds, 3 10 one of
30461 U.S. at 320.3051d. at 310 (citing 2 Browne at 490).
3
°6See supra note 131.
307244 U.S. at 216-17.
30 See Consolidated Laws of New York, ch. 67, as reenacted and amended by Laws of 1914, ch. 41,
and as further amended by Laws of 1914, ch. 316.
3
°9See 215 N.Y. 514 (1915). New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917), upheld New
York's second Workers' Compensation Act as constitutional; New York's first Workers' Compensation
Act had been held unconstitutional as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
substantive due process. See Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911). In like
manner, New York's attempt at wage and hour legislation, as applied to a baker, had been held
unconstitutional in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
310James C. McReynolds (1862-1946) was born in Elkton, Kentucky. After receiving an A.B. from
Vanderbilt (1882) and an LL.B. from the University of Virginia (1884), he entered practice in Nashville.
A Democrat supporter of Cleveland in the struggle over gold, he was made an Assistant Attorney General
by Theodore Roosevelt in 1903 and served for four years. In 1913, President Wilson appointed
McReynolds Attorney General and, in 1914, named him to the Supreme Court. McReynolds sat on the
Court until 1941 and used his position to disapprove all New Deal legislation (initially as part of the
majority but in dissent after 1937). He was notoriously anti-semitic and was uncivil to Justices Brandeis
and Cardozo.
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the most conservative justices to sit on the Supreme Court, who would later
be thought of as one of the four horsemen (of the apocalypse) 311 because of
his total opposition to any governmental regulation of business activity.
Thus, McReynolds would adopt any rationale to extirpate confiscatory
legislation that deprived the employer of its three common law defenses to
employee injuries: contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and
fellow servant negligence. A substantive due process rationale, however,
was not readily available in Jensen due to the Court's finding, in the
companion case of New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, that the Act was
constitutional.312
Justice McReynolds began by noting that the Supreme Court had merely
held the New York statute "valid in certain respects." 31 3 He then pro-
claimed that Congress had paramount power to establish the maritime law
which is to prevail throughout the country, and that in the absence of statute
the general maritime law as accepted by the federal courts must operate
uniformly in the whole country because the Constitution aimed at uniformity
and consistency on all subjects of a commercial character. 314 Turning to
Jensen's job as a stevedore (in fact, a longshore worker), Justice McRey-
nolds described his employment as subject to a maritime contract and his
injuries as maritime. Thus, application of the New York State statute would
destroy the uniformity in maritime matters that the Constitution was
designed to establish.315
Justice Holmes's dissent speared McReynolds' preference for common
law remedies with succinct analysis: "The common law is not a brooding
omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or
quasi-sovereign that can be identified; although some decisions with which
I have disagreed seem to have forgotten the fact.''316 More important,
Holmes could not understand why McReynolds was choosing to ignore the
statutory exception to the grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the
federal courts, i.e., the exception "saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of
a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it"
(obviously in the state courts) contained in the Judiciary Act of 1789.3 17 To
Holmes there was no reason why the mere silence of Congress should
31'Justices McReynolds, Sutherland, Van Devanter, and Butler were given that nickname in the
struggles over New Deal legislation. All were over seventy in 1937 and were undoubtedly the targets of
the 1937 Roosevelt court-packing plan. See generally L. Baker, Back to Back: The Duel between FDR
and the Supreme Court (1967).
3 12See supra note 309.
313244 U.S. at 211.3141d. at 215.
3151d. at 217.316Id. at 222 (undoubtedly referring to Lochner, supra note 309).3 17See supra note 126.
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exclude the statutory or common law of a state from supplementing the
wholly inadequate maritime law from the time of the Constitution.318
Arthur Browne's treatise appeared in the thirty-two page dissent of Justice
Pitney, cited for the proposition that breaches of contract could be within the
jurisdiction of the common law or admiralty depending on the fictitious
pleading as to the place of making the contract: at sea for admiralty
jurisdiction or on land for common law jurisdiction.319 Pitney concluded that
the grant of jurisdiction to admiralty did not exclude the concurrent
jurisdiction of common law courts already recognized in the "savings to
suitors." He found that an eclectic methodology was practiced both at
common law and in admiralty prior to the Constitution and that nothing in
the Constitution compelled its abandonment; 320 thus the Judiciary Act
contemplated concurrency with the option for the benefit of suitors (plain-
tiffs), not defendants.321 Arthur Browne's treatise served to elucidate and
demonstrate the operation of the jurisdictional limits imposed through
historical processes on the powers of courts that specialize in problems of
ocean transport.
C. Admiralty Practice
In Atkins v. Fibre Disintegration Co.,322 the Court dealt with the crucial
question of attachment of property in order to obtain jurisdiction over a
respondent when the respondent could not be found within the district. The
libellant, a vessel owner, commenced an action in personam in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the
respondent, a charterer, merely describing respondent as a corporation,
without further identification, although in fact respondent was incorporated
in New Jersey. The marshal's return noted that the respondents "were not
found in my district and I attached all the property of the respondents found
in their factory in Red Hook Point... Brooklyn." 323
The respondent moved to quash the attachment, alleging the presence of
the corporation's officers at the factory in Brooklyn within the district.324
The merits of the dispute, which involved a charter party, concerned loading
"'244 U.S. at 223.319 1d. at 230 (citing 2 Browne at 112, 115). In 1917 Justice Pitney wrote opinions upholding the
constitutionality of three different state compensation acts: New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243
U.S. 188 (1917) (New York); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917) (Iowa); and Mountain Timber
Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917) (Washington).
320244 U.S. at 237.
3211d. at 243.
32285 U.S. (18 Wall.) 272 (1874).
3231d. at 273. See also 2 F. Cas. 78 (No. 601) (E.D.N.Y. 1868).
32485 U.S. at 273.
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demurrage and breach of the safe port clause by grounding at the second
loading port (matters not subsequently reviewed on appeal).
The district court ordered the respondent to pay $13,302 in damages to be
realized out of the stipulations (similar to letters of undertaking) that had
been substituted for the attached property. 325 The original motion to quash
the service was never decided as the respondent made a new motion to set
aside all proceedings (for lack of jurisdiction) on the ground that the
commencement of the proceeding violated the Judiciary Act of 1789.326 The
libellant argued that the statute was inapplicable because an admiralty
process was not a civil suit and the admiralty court had an inherent right to
attach the property of absconding, absent, or non-resident debtors. In this
regard the libellant cited Browne's text to the effect that a proceeding by
foreign attachment under the charters of the cities of London and Dublin
were commonly used, by analogy, in admiralty where the respondent could
not be found or lived in a foreign country. 327
The respondent sought to distinguish Browne's language by suggesting
that it applied to aliens to the United States, not to artificial persons at home
in an adjoining judicial district.328 The District Court, however, agreed with
the libellant that the cause was not a civil suit in the sense of the Judiciary
Act and that an admiralty court had inherent power to attach the property.
When the Circuit Court reversed the District Court, an appeal was taken to
the Supreme Court. There, the issues were the inapplicability of the
Judiciary Act and the inherent power of admiralty courts.
Justice Swayne, adopting some of the reasoning of the libellant's counsel,
Erastus C. Benedict, agreed with the District Court that the 1789 Judiciary
Act was inapplicable. He interpreted the phrase "civil suit" not merely in its
immediate context but in accordance with its usage in preceding and
subsequent sections of the Judiciary Act. Thus, the phrase civil suit referred
to suits at common law or in equity, as opposed to admiralty causes. 329 The
opinion pointed to the acceptance of the practice of acquiring jurisdiction in
personam by foreign attachment in an earlier Supreme Court case.330 Lastly,
the Court quoted Arthur Browne, as the trial judge had done, to the effect
3251d. at 276.
326"And no Civil Suit shall be brought before either of said courts [Circuit and District] against an
inhabitant of the United States, by any original process, in any other district than that whereof he is an
inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20,
§ 11, 1 Stat. 76.
32785 U.S. at 275 (citing 2 Browne at 434, 333, 433). The Court also cited the Elizabethan text
Clerke's Praxis Supremnae Curiae Admiralitatis.
32885 U.S. at 275-76.
329Id. at 301-03.
330See Manro v. Almeida, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 473 (1825). Counsels' arguments cited 2 Browne at
113, 333, 426, but the Court did not refer to Browne in reversing the district court.
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that when an admiralty respondent cannot be found in the district its goods
can be attached to compel its appearance. 33'
Respecting the now discarded doctrine that an appeal in admiralty can be
a trial de novo of the merits, Browne's text was used to buttress the growing
practice in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall in a case involving violation
of the embargo, 332 and again in another involving a civil appeal. 333 The
practice of introducing new evidence during appeal was gradually disap-
pearing until the Supreme Court clearly abolished it in McAllister v. United
States.334 Today, under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the findings of fact are not to be altered on appeal unless "clearly
erroneous."
Petitory and possessory proceedings as methods of determining the
ownership of vessels were approved by the Supreme Court in Ward v.
Peck,335 citing Browne's text and approving Justice Story's decision on
circuit in The Tilton.336 The second great dissenter, Justice Daniel, de-
nounced any expansion of federal admiralty jurisdiction by the use of
Browne's treatise. 337
33'85 U.S. at 303 (citing 2 Browne at 434). Respecting modem maritime attachment under
Supplemental Rule B, see Jarvis, An Introduction to Maritime Attachment Under Rule B, 20 J. Mar. L.
& Com. 521 (1989).332See The General Pinkney, supra note 268. Chief Justice Marshall wrote, "The cause in the
appellate court is to be heard de novo, as if no sentence had been passed. This has been the uniform
practice not only in cases of appeal from the district to the circuit courts of the United States, but in this
court also." 9 U.S. at 285.333See In re Hawkins, 147 U.S. 486 (1893) (citing I Browne at 449 and 2 Browne at 436).
334348 U.S. 19, 1954 AMC 1999 (1954).
33559 U.S. (18 How.) 267 (1855).336See supra note 256.
33759 U.S. at 270. Peter V. Daniel (1784-1860), a rabid Jeffersonian from Virginia, was appointed by
President Van Buren and confirmed by the Senate on March 3, 1841, Van Buren's last day in office. He
was noted for lengthy and acerbic dissents critical of Whig colleagues. See J. Frank, Justice Daniel
Dissenting (1964). Daniel wrote:
For the jurisdiction here claimed for the admiralty, we are referred to the treatise of Mr. Arthur
Brown (sic), professor of civil law in Ireland. I have no recollection of-having before seen or heard
the doctrines of this professor recognized as authority, and with respect to his theories, it may justly
be remarked, that if these are to be adopted as law, there is no excess of extravagance to be found
in the exploded notions of Sir Leoline Jenkins, or anywhere else, which will not find an apology,
nay a full justification, in the book of this civil law doctor. If the theories of this professor are to
be regarded as binding, his disciples may look forward at no distant day to an announcement from
this bench, as there has been formerly from that of one of the circuits of the doctrine, that a policy
of insurance (a mere wager laid upon the safety of a vessel) is strictly and essentially a maritime
contract, because, forsooth, the vessel had to navigate the ocean. [describing Story's opinion in De
Lovio, supra note 140, and predicting the opinion of Justice Bradley in Dunham, infra note 356]
It seems somewhat singular, however, that Mr. Brown should be appealed to in support of the
authority now claimed for the admiralty, when in truth his book again and again admits, that such
jurisdiction had been utterly repudiated in England as a sheer usurpation, and may appropriately be
styled a jeremiad over the lost authority and splendor of a system which he would exalt to the
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D. Maritime Liens
Ramsay v. Allegre,338 an action for repairs and supplies to a vessel in her
homeport, was quickly resolved without analyzing admiralty jurisdiction
because the shipowners had given a negotiable promissory note to pay the
debt that had been the subject of the repairer's admiralty action. Greatly
angered by the majority's theoretical expansion of admiralty jurisdiction in
dictum, Justice William Johnson, the first great dissenter, used Browne's
text to narrow the admiralty jurisdiction that the majority seemed to be
enlarging as part of the federal power.339
Enforcing maritime liens for repairs and supplies at the homeport was one
of the most controversial aspects of admiralty law in the nineteenth century.
Justice Story denied the existence of the homeport maritime lien for repairs
and supplies in The General Smith,340 but this was not the end of the
struggle: state legislators enacted maritime lien statutes to protect local
repairers and suppliers and these state-created liens became the subject of in
rem proceedings in the federal admiralty courts.34 1 Although Congress
would not act until 1910 to suppress these state statutes in favor of a federal
maritime lien for repairs and supplies, the Supreme Court in the Admiralty
Rules of 1844342 sought to introduce some elements of uniformity into the
chaos of widely different state maritime lien laws. Browne's text was used
to deny lien status for various materialmen's claims.343
control of every other branch of jurisprudence.... It is that tendency of error once countenanced
or tolerated to grow into precedent, which has ever enjoined it upon me as a sacred duty to resist
its approaches before they have been matured into power....
3'25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 611 (1827).
339 1d. at 621, 628, 630, 632-35 (citing 2 Browne at 80-81, 100, 196-97). William Johnson
(1771-1834), a South Carolinian, was the speaker of his state's legislature and became Thomas
Jefferson's first appointee to the Court. He would be in a Democratic-Republican minority, opposed by
a Federalist majority, for twenty years under five terms of Democratic-Republican presidents. He served
for thirty years (1804-34) and wrote thirty-four dissents, 112 majority opinions, and twenty-one
concurrences. Johnson's position as dissenter was taken by the Jackson Democrat Peter V. Daniel, who
in nineteen years wrote fifty dissents and 74 majority opinions. See supra note 337.
34°See supra note 162.
34 1See The Planter, supra note 289, and The Orleans, supra note 290, and, after the 1844 Rule
discussed infra note 342, The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874).342 See 44 U.S. (3 How.) v (1844) (Rule IX). The Supreme Court's authority to make this first set of
practice rules was provided by the Act of Aug. 23, 1842, ch. 188, § 6, 5 Stat. 518. Prior to the 1910
Federal Maritime Lien Act, see supra note 163, Rule 12 was amended in 1858 and 1872. By the latter
amendment all suits by materialmen for repairs or supplies could proceed against ship and freight in rem
or against the master or owner in personam.
343See The Steamboat Magnolia, supra note 302 (in dissent); The People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 61 U.S.
(20 How.) 393 (1857) (contract to build a vessel not maritime); The Steamer St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. (1
Black) 522 (1861); The Lottawanna, supra note 341 (materialmen's liens not perfected as required by
Louisiana statute treated as a non-lien ship mortgage); and Ex Parte Easton, 95 U.S. 68 (1877) (no
maritime lien for wharfage charge on canal boat).
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E. Collisions and Maritime Torts
A high seas collision between two sailing vessels, both close-hauled on
the wind at about 3:00 a.m. on December 11, 1847, was held to be an
inevitable accident because each vessel must have seen the other at the same
instant without time to avoid the collision. 344 Browne's text was cited for the
proposition that in cases of collision by inevitable accident, where no fault
can be proved, each vessel must bear her own losses,345 declared by Justice
Nelson to be "more just and equitable. ' 346 Browne was also used to
establish the tort liability of defendants who caused damage to two vessels
running upon obstructions in navigable water where none was expectable.
The locality rule provided the basis for admiralty jurisdiction. 347
While the Supreme Court early in this century established that a damaged
vessel could sue a shore establishment for maritime tort, the reverse would
not be permitted until Congress in 1948 enlarged admiralty jurisdiction to
permit the shore establishment to sue the vessel causing the damage. 348 This
anomaly, now removed, was caused by The Plymouth.349 That case involved
the steamship Falcon, a vessel that caught on fire while berthed at the
plaintiff's wharf on the Chicago River. The fire spread from the ship to
warehouses located on the wharf, destroying them. The plaintiff began a
maritime tort action by attaching the Falcon's sistership Plymouth.
Justice Nelson could not find precedent in tort law in which admiralty
exercised jurisdiction over torts occurring partly on water and partly on land,
and he refused to accept the analogy from contract cases because locality is
not essential in contract cases. Nelson formulated the rule for maritime torts
that the substance (or commission) as well as the consummation of the
344See Stainback v. Rae, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 532 (1852).
345Id. at 538 (citing 2 Browne at 204-07).
346Id. As has been pointed out elsewhere, however, lower court decisions had divided damages before
this opinion. See Sprague, Divided Damages, 6 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 15 (1928).347See Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore R.R. Co. v. Philadelphia & Havre de Grace Steam
Towboat Co., 64 U.S. (23 How.) 209 (1859) (citing 2 Browne at 110 and 203) (liability for abandoning
the piles from a railroad bridge no longer in use over the Susquehanna River), and Panama R.R. Co. v.
Napier Shipping Co., 166 U.S, 280 (1897) (citing 2 Browne at 203) (for allowing plaintiff's vessel to be
berthed in a slip where a dredge had previously foundered and sank in the harbor of Colon, Panama).
348See The Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 740 (1988), which provides,
"The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of
damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such
damage or injury be done or consummated on land."
The Ninth Circuit applied the Act to an allision with a dike that had occurred before the statute
became effective in United States v. Matson Navigation Co., 201 F.2d 610, 1953 AMC 272 (1953). The
court did not take a position on whether the source of Congress' constitutional authority was its power
to regulate commerce (Article I) or the admiralty jurisdiction grant (Article III).349See supra note 200.
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wrong must be on navigable waters. 350 Because the Court was unwilling to
separate in theory the consummation on navigable waters from the commis-
sion on navigable waters, the commission of the tort on navigable waters
prevented the Court from bringing along the consummation as pendent or
supplemental to the commission. 351
F. General Average
Columbian Insurance Co. of Alexandria v. Ashby & Stirling352 is a major
case on the law of general average. The decision makes it clear that cargo is
obligated to contribute where there is a stranding and total loss of a ship in
order to preserve the lives of the crew and the cargo. Justice Story's opinion
cited Browne 353 at the end of a list of authors whose opinion differed from
that of the eminent French authority, Emerigon, 354 who held that the ship
must be refloated after a voluntary stranding in order to have a general
average act.355 Browne's opinion in favor of the existence of a general
average act without return to normal service of the imperilled ship concurred
with the Consolato del Mar and a number of classical authors as well as the
then-current practices of Lloyd's underwriters.
G. Maritime Contracts and Cargo Damage
The major Supreme Court decision on the question of whether marine
insurance is within admiralty contract jurisdiction is New England Mutual
Marine Insurance Co. v. Dunham.356 The case came to the Supreme Court
because of a split of opinion among the two judges in the Circuit Court in
Massachusetts on a libel in personam by an insured vessel owner against his
insurer for failure to pay a claim under a hull policy. At issue was the amount
that the insured had spent to repair his vessel after a collision. The
35070 U.S. at 34. Counsel cited 2 Browne at 208: "Every species of tort, however occurring, and
whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance."
See 70 U.S. at 36.
351Id. at 34.
35238 U.S. (13 Pet.) 331 (1839). A later case would rely on Browne's text in support of a maritime
lien for general average contribution based on maritime contract. See Du Pont v. Vance, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 162 (1856) (citing 2 Browne at 122). In that case a cargo of gunpowder was jettisoned and the
cargo owner was permitted to arrest the vessel despite the earlier suggestion, in Cutler v. Rae, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 729 (1849), that there was no jurisdiction in admiralty for general average claims.
35338 U.S. at 342 (citing 2 Browne at 119).354Balthazar Emerigon (1725-1789), an admiralty judge at Marseilles, is today chiefly remembered
for his work Traitd des assurances et des Contrats 6 la grosse (1784).
35'38 U.S. at 341.
356 See supra note 280.
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respondent insurer challenged the existence of admiralty jurisdiction in the
District Court but lost. On appeal, the Circuit Court divided.
The libellant relied on Justice Story's opinion in DeLovio v. Boit,357 which
in turn relied on Browne's text, speculating that a majority of Story's
colleagues would approve Story's result.358 Noting the absence of authority
against admiralty jurisdiction over marine insurance contracts, the libellant
argued, based on the commerce clause,359 that because Congress has
exercised its right to legislate on all commercial matters involving the
limitation of shipowners' liability, registration of ships, carriage of passen-
gers, and navigational rules, the jurisdiction of American admiralty courts
was coextensive with all matters that Congress could regulate. 360 The
libellant also surveyed the jurisdiction of the vice admiralty courts in the
American colonies, concluding that marine insurance was included in the
category of marine causes committed to the royal judges.361
The respondent countered with the argument that marine insurance could
not be a maritime contract, reasoning that the constitutional grant of
jurisdiction in "all cases of admiralty and maritime" had to be interpreted
according to the restricted jurisdiction of the English admiralty, which had
never claimed jurisdiction over insurance policies contracted on land.362
The respondent's argument required the libellant to refute the narrow
view of contract jurisdiction by the arguments of Arthur Browne's treatise,
including the historical commission to the Lord High Admiral, the prohibi-
tions of Lord Coke, and the policy basis for including marine insurance
within admiralty jurisdiction. 36 3
In reviewing these arguments, Justice Bradley examined the treatment of
marine insurance in the laws of Barcelona, Venice, Florence, and Antwerp,
followed by an extensive discussion of French and Scottish law, 364 finally
concluding that Story's broad decision in DeLovio had been correct.
357See supra note 140. It is thought that Story had prepared an historical essay on admiralty contract
jurisdiction and was simply awaiting the opportunity to insert it into any suitable opinion. See the note
authored by Professor David J. Sharpe in N. Healy & D. Sharpe, Cases and Materials on Admiralty 12-13
(2d ed. 1986).
3578 U.S. at 5.
35 9U.S. Const., art. 1, § 8.
36078 U.S. at 7.361
Id. at 8-13.
362Id. at 15-19.
3631d. at 34-35 (quoting 2 Browne at 88, "All contracts which relate purely to maritime affairs, the
natural, short, and easy method of enforcing which is found in the admiralty proceedings.").
3641d. at 33-34.
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The Lexington365 was the most important cargo damage action heard by
the Supreme Court prior to the passage of the Harter Act in 1893.366 As is
well-known, in the Harter Act Congress imposed a statutory allocation of
risks between the carrier interest and the cargo-owning interest. In The
Lexington, six justices (two merely concurring in the result)3 6 7 held the
owner of a steamboat fully liable for the loss of a chest said to contain gold
and silver coins when its unseaworthy vessel sank following a fire.368
The shipper, claiming $25,000 in damages, had alleged that gold and
silver coins had been delivered on board the steamboat Lexington. The
shipper further alleged that the Lexington was a common carrier, that the
chest had been carelessly stowed, that the machinery of the steamboat was
imperfect and insufficient, and that the careless, improper, and negligent
management and conduct of employees, servants, and agents of the
respondent had contributed to the loss of the cargo. 369 The shipper attached
a sister ship of the Lexington in personam.
The shipowner denied these allegations and maintained that an implied
condition of the underlying contract made it responsible only for ordinary
care and diligence and that notice of its non-liability was posted on the
wharf, onboard the steamboat, and in its sales office. 370 Although the District
Court dismissed the libel, the Circuit Court took testimony and gave
judgment for the shipper. 37'
In the Supreme Court, the shipowner contended that there was no
admiralty jurisdiction since the contract was made in New York City and the
voyage through Long Island Sound was land-locked, citing Browne for the
36 55ee supra note 193.
36646 U.S.C. app. §§ 190-96 (1988). See generally Sweeney, Happy Birthday, Harter: A Reappraisal
of the Harter Act on its 100th Anniversary, 24 J. Mar. L. & Com. 1 (1993).367justice Nelson's opinion was concurred in by Chief Justice Taney and Justices McLean and
Wayne. Justices Catron and Woodbury separately concurred in the result. Justice Grier concurred in
Justice Daniel's dissent. Justice McKinley did not participate.368The Lexington, a paddle-wheel steamboat (207' long x 21' beam) was part of a multimodal service
from New York to Boston. The vessel normally proceeded from New York to Stonington, Connecticut,
where cargo and passengers transferred to the new Shore Line Railroad to Providence and Boston. On
January 13, 1840, the Lexington, previously wood-burning, having just been converted to the hotter
medium of coal without change in the fan blowers for cooling, had sailed from New York at 4:00 p.m.
with 150 passengers and 150 bales of cotton as cargo. The red-hot smoke stack ignited the woodwork and
the fire spread to the cargo of cotton bales stowed close to the smoke stack. The fire broke out at 7:30
p.m. in Long Island Sound, only four miles from land. Despite the pilot's efforts to bring the ship to land,
she sank, a total loss from which only four of the 150 passengers were saved.
The subject cargo consisted of approximately $18,000 in silver and gold coins contained in a wooden
chest, 5'x 5'x 6', owned by a freight forwarder. The coins may have been thrown overboard in fighting
the fire.
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proposition that the statute of Richard II excluded admiralty jurisdiction
from ports, creeks, and havens, and implying the same restraint on the
land-locked waters in question. 372 In the respondent's view, admiralty
jurisdiction was only available for possessory or petitory suits and mariners'
wages (for which Browne is cited), but not for contracts made on land. The
respondent also argued that even if there was a contract, there was no
contract between the carrier and the shipper (although separate contracts did
exist between the carrier and the freight forwarder and the freight forwarder
and the shipper). 373
At the oral argument the cargo owner's first advocate, R. W. Greene,
made a policy-based argument, followed by Daniel Webster, who argued
that Congress, by enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Great Lakes
Act of 1845, had made American admiralty jurisdiction coextensive with the
constitutional grant.374
The "majority" opinion was written by Justice Samuel Nelson, an
experienced New York commercial lawyer and former Chief Justice of New
York. 375 Nelson first held that there was a single contract of transportation
between the shipper and the carrier (citing New York and Pennsylvania
cases). 376 Were it not for the "special agreement," respondent as a common
carrier would be chargeable as an insurer of the goods and accountable for
any damage or loss that happened to them in the course of the conveyance,
unless the same arose from an inevitable accident such as an act of God or
the public enemy. After considering the evidence as to improper stowage
and negligent firefighting, Nelson concluded that the carrier was liable
notwithstanding the special agreement. 377 Turning to the jurisdictional
objection, he found that Congress had invested the district courts with the




375Samuel Nelson (1792-1873) was admitted to the New York bar in 1817. Following a successful
commercial practice in New York City, he became an associate judge (1831) and, later, the Chief Justice
(1836) of the New York State Supreme Court. President Tyler appointed Nelson, a Jackson Democrat,
to the Supreme Court in 1845, five days before the inauguration of President Polk, also a Democrat.
Nelson also wrote The Plymouth, supra note 200, and the dissent in The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black)
635 (1863).
37647 U.S. at 380.3771d. at 383-85. The bill of lading provided, after spaces for the names of the shipper, consignee, and
vessel, "... . danger of fire, water, breakage, leakage, and all other accidents excepted; and no package
whatever, if lost, injured or stolen, to be deemed of greater value than two hundred dollars .. " At the
wharf, a sign with the following warning was posted: "Notice to Shippers and Consignees[:] All goods,
freight, baggage, bank-bills, specie, or any other kind of property, taken, shipped, or put on board the
steamers ... must be at the risk of the owners of such goods ..378Id. at 390.
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Justice Catron's concurrence relied on maritime tort theory for carrier
liability, for which Browne was the authority.379 Justice Daniel, the
dissenter, wrote a twenty-four page opinion that was joined in by Justice
Grier. Given his opposition to expanding federalism, Daniel returned to the
statutes of Richard II, noting in his historical review that "the common law
of England is the one uniform rule to determine the jurisdiction of our
courts ... .,,380 Arthur Browne is set up as authority because "scarcely any
assertion of power ever made by the Admiralty courts, however reprobated
and denied by the common law tribunals, is not commended, if not justified"
by Browne. 381 Thus, he endorsed Browne's conclusion that contracts made
on land for execution on the sea are not within admiralty jurisdiction,
excepting seamen's wages and hypothecations. 382 Respecting Catron's tort
theory, Daniel again quoted Browne: "we have the explicit declaration of
Professor Browne himself, amidst all his partiality, that in matters of tort the
jurisdiction of the admiralty is limited to actions for assault, collision and
spoil. .... . 383
Justice Woodbury concurred in the result but chose Catron's tort theo-
ry.384 Distinguishing Daniel's objections, Woodbury found that by 1789
even in England the place of performance of the contract, rather than the
place of contracting, was being used to determine admiralty jurisdiction so
long as the subject matter was maritime.385
Despite the foregoing, however, the lasting importance of The Lexington
is its holding that carriers can be held liable for negligent damage to cargo.
As such, it takes its place with Waring v. Clarke386 in expanding admiralty
jurisdiction under a Jacksonian rather than a federalist rationale. That
rationale was the absolute necessity to serve the thriving industrial economy
of the heartland of America while shipping on rivers, lakes, and oceans was
still vital for our nation's economy.
V
CONCLUSION
Arthur Browne lived against a backdrop of convulsive historic struggles,
one of which remains unresolved to this day. Born in the American colonies,
379Id. at 394 (citing 2 Browne at 144).38 Id. at 400.3811d.
3821d. at 401.
3831d. at 413 (citing 2 Browne at 122).
384Id. at 436.
385Id. at 420.386 See supra note 288. Somewhat out of character, Justice Daniel concurred in the opinion and Justice
Grier concurred as to admiralty jurisdiction and agreed as to the result.
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he was an orphan when he went to Ireland to pursue his university and legal
education. Through his eyes we have seen the haphazard preparation of
barristers for the law courts contrasted with the rigorous classical studies
required for civilians as admiralty proctors and advocates. This may possibly
explain why the learned admiralty court could risk being non-technical 387
and even "free-wheeling" while the law courts were famous for the rigor of
the law, recognizing no exceptions to its rules in favor of loquacious but
ill-prepared attorneys.
Arthur Browne was an academic, an advocate, and a politician with an
active practice in the Irish courts. Appointed to two professorships at Trinity
College, he achieved one of the College's highest honors by being elected a
Senior Fellow. He also represented Trinity College in the Irish parliament.
An enlightenment Whig, he was devoted to the pursuit of civil liberties.
Accounting for the use made of Arthur Browne's treatise in early
nineteenth century America is difficult to explain. Chauvinism is unlikely,
since it is doubtful that American admiralty lawyers knew that he was in fact
an American; references to him are usually to his position as professor in
Dublin. His work usually is cited to its London edition and it may be that the
Anglophile admiralty bar in port cities readily accepted it as congenial
English authority. Another possibility is that his London edition was the
only available source for practitioners and judges at a distance from
metropolitan centers.
Arthur Browne's legacy to us in America is his treatise A Compendious
View of the Civil Law and of the Law of the Admiralty. His reputation as the
admiralty authority for the early republic rests on his classical learning, his
investigation of the historical antecedents of doctrine, his systematic
analysis, and his clear exposition. Of course, he was the champion of
admiralty in its contests with the common law courts, but his partisanship
did not lead him to obscure the victories of the common law. The systematic
structure and indices of his text made his treatise a valuable and very useful
resource for students and practitioners before the advent of contemporary
sources.
Upon completing my studies of Arthur Browne's life and work, I reflected
upon his 1771 letter to the warden of Trinity Church (Newport) in which he
asked the vestry to write to the SPG. He requested that he be portrayed to the
SPG as "a lad of some merit, who, if properly encouraged, might turn out
something. ' 388 How fortunate we are that the SPG saw fit to send his
passage money.
387See, e.g., Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 1953 AMC 972 (1953).388See supra note 22.
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